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Abstract 
People who resettle to make way for large-scale infrastructure development are widely 
acknowledged as vulnerable to a range of impoverishment risks in the field of development-
caused displacement and resettlement (DCDR). Global policy safeguards and standards aim 
to protect affected populations by requiring project developers to avoid displacement where 
possible and mitigate and manage harm through resettlement. This thesis problematises an 
inherent assumption within this guidance: that people targeted by these processes are 
“potentially” affected until the displacement event occurs. The “predisplacement” phase (i.e., 
before physical displacement and resettlement have taken place) is less examined in DCDR 
studies. Adopting an actor-oriented case study analysis, this thesis builds an original and 
practice-focused view of how multiple social actors navigate interests and expectations in the 
predisplacement phase of a proposed copper mine in Cajamarca, Peru. Field research was 
conducted over a period of seven months and centres on a company-sponsored household 
empowerment intervention. The Intervention approached resettlement as a development 
opportunity and aimed to help campesino households prepare for resettlement. Findings 
demonstrate that although resettlement had not occurred, local people were impacted by the 
Project and the prospect of resettlement. Household members were superficially engaged 
with the Intervention, primarily as a result of ingrained distrust of outsiders and prior 
experience of mining companies. The Intervention was vulnerable within corporate decision-
making processes, as commercial pressures ultimately led to the company suspending plans 
to resettle the population – and cancelling the Intervention. The resulting uncertainty further 
exacerbated distrust between actors. Local peoples’ lives were left in limbo after two and a 
half years of activity in preparation for resettlement. This research highlights a range of 
factors that bear upon the implementation of international norms in DCDR, and opens an 
important area of academic inquiry. The insights provided through this case study on the 
characteristics, risks, and impacts of predisplacement on “potentially” affected people are 
also timely, given the increasing involvement of the private sector in DCDR. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCING THE RESEARCH PROBLEM 
 
Introduction 
This thesis is aimed at building new knowledge in the field of development-caused 
displacement and resettlement (DCDR), a subset of forced migration studies (Cernea & Mathur, 
2008).1 The research provides an in-depth examination of the activities, interactions and dynamics 
between so-called “potentially” affected people and mining company representatives during the 
“predisplacement phase” of land acquisition; that is, before the displacement of people and their 
existing livelihoods has occurred. 2  The DCDR literature tends to refer to people as “affected” after 
they have experienced economic or physical displacement. Within this thesis, however, I argue that 
households and communities are already affected by displacement and resettlement plans, 
irrespective of whether they have been displaced. The argument has implications for policy and 
practice configurations in involuntary resettlement. 
The case chosen for this exploratory research is the Rio Tinto La Granja project, located in 
the Andes of northern Peru (see Map 1).3 This project is one of the world’s largest known 
undeveloped copper deposits and represents a complex – yet not atypical – case within the resource 
sector. The thesis will highlight the complexities associated with this case, and connections will be 
made to other cases in the literature. From a technical viewpoint, La Granja is a “greenfield” 
project, meaning that no large-scale industrial development has ever occurred at the site.4 Although 
a mine operation has never been developed in this area, prior research at this site has established 
that people living within the Project footprint do not necessarily distinguish between a project (i.e. 
preparations and planning) and a mine operation (i.e., an open-cut mine) (Castillo, 2015). From this 
perspective, even though there is no mine, the La Granja project is characterised as a “brownfield” 
resettlement scenario (Owen & Kemp, 2015).  
                                                 
1 Academics within the field of DCDR refer to displacement and resettlement as “induced”, “forced” and 
“caused” by development actors. In line with prominent scholar Michael Cemea, and for simplicity’s sake, this thesis 
uses the term “caused” to convey this process.   
2 The company that owns the La Granja project is officially entitled “Rio Tinto Minera Peru SAC Limited”. 
For simplicity, I use “the company” throughout the thesis.  
3 “Rio Tinto Minera Peru SAC Limited” is the name of the company that administers the La Granja project. 
For simplicity, I use “the company” throughout the thesis.  
4 Owen and Kemp (2014, p. 479) suggest that in the mining sector, projects are “referred to as ‘greenﬁelds’ or 
‘brownﬁelds’ to describe the extent to which exploration or industrial activities have previously been conducted in the 
project area”.  
2 
 
 
Map 1. Location of the Rio Tinto La Granja project, Peru. 
Three multinational mining companies have already attempted, and subsequently 
abandoned, the development of a mine at the La Granja site. The first multinational mining 
company, Canadian-owned Cambior, arrived at the Project site in 1995. After four years of 
planning and field research, the company deemed mine development too expensive, and withdrew 
from the area. During this period, the majority of campesino peasant families living within the 
Project footprint were forcibly displaced by the company.5 In 2000, a second mining company, 
Anglo-Australian BHP, arrived in the area with the intention of developing a mine. Within a year, 
the company deemed the Project unfeasible and also withdrew. As part of the close-out plan, BHP 
personnel opted to return the Project land to those families displaced by Cambior. Most families 
returned to the Project footprint. In 2006, a third multinational mining company, Rio Tinto, 
established a presence at the site. The company announced their intention to acquire land and 
resettle the local population in 2012; however, a downturn in the global commodity prices later 
resulted in a suspension of this process in 2014. Research for this thesis coincided with the 
                                                 
5 Within this thesis, I interchange the words campesino and peasant to refer to an Andean person. I recognise 
that this is a simplicification of these terms. The question of how to define “peasant” and “peasantry” has a complicated 
and contentious history (see Edelman, 2013). In the context of the Peruvian Andes, the word peasant has histroically 
refered to poor or landless farmers and agricultural workers (Petras & Veltmeyer, 2010). Furthermore, campesino 
communities in Peru are legally recognised as indigenous, and hold communal land rights, whereas local people in La 
Granja (on campesino communities see Diez, 2003; Himley, 2016). In acnowledgement of this, I adopt the terms within 
this thesis because local people in La Granja self-identify in this way.   
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suspension of land access activity by Rio Tinto, following preparatory activities over a period of 
two and a half years. 
There are several vantage points from which to approach analysis of the La Granja project. 
Scholars examining the institutional complexities of resource extraction have employed a number of 
approaches. Each has relative benefits and limitations; all shape the data collection and analysis 
process, which must be accounted for within the research design. Rajak (2011) and Welker (2014) 
both elected to undertake a corporate ethnography by tracing multiple actors engaged in the 
production of corporate social responsibility from within, and extending out from the company 
organisational structure. Others, such as Li (2015) and Golub (2014), preferred to situate themselves 
within the “community” and engage company personnel from this external standpoint. Kirsch 
(2014), a critic of global mining, has approached the topic from a different viewpoint again. His 
argument follows that researchers are co-opted in the process of corporate engagement and hence, 
analysis is best undertaken from a distance, through secondary data sources and the perceptions of 
impacted actors.  
As a researcher interested in the Rio Tinto La Granja project, I gave strong consideration to 
which viewpoint would provide deep insight into the research problem and questions. A range of 
positional alternatives were considered. I decided to locate myself with a company-contracted NGO 
working with households in the Project footprint. The decision to examine the research problem and 
question from this vantage point enabled me to access to a set of key relationships with local and 
corporate actors. The approach provided a valuable, nuanced insight into actor perceptions, 
experience and interactions with each other.  
 
Research Problem  
Human displacement for development is a “growing global crisis” (Wilmsen & Webber, 
2016, p. 62). Rapid changes in the global economy have spurred unprecedented infrastructure 
development in recent decades (Mathur, 2016b). Much of this development has occurred in the so-
called “developing world” where millions of people are displaced from their homes, livelihoods and 
communities each year to make way for new projects (Satiroglu & Choi, 2015). Conservative 
estimates suggest that 15 million people are affected by DCDR each year (Cernea, 2008a, p. 20).  
In coming decades, the phenomenon of DCDR is set to dramatically increase (Alexander, 
2015). The largest investment boom in history is ahead of us, with extraordinary financial resources 
being mobilised by multilateral banks to launch a new era of infrastructure megaprojects (Flyvbjerg, 
2014; Mathur, 2016a). Of this new era, eminent DCDR scholar Cernea (2016, p. xxii) has warned 
that “bigger programs and bigger infrastructure will also entail bigger and more widespread risks, 
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and severe social impacts”. Tragically, people who move to make way for infrastructure 
development generally end up worse off as a direct result of their displacement (Mathur, 2013a; 
Oliver-Smith, 2009; Vanclay, 2017). While large-scale projects are planned and justified in the 
name of societal progress, research confirms that displacement exposes people to a suite of risks 
which, if left unmitigated, generally exacerbate impoverishment (Abuya, 2013; Alexandrescu, 
2011b; Bisht, 2009; Buzoianu & Toc, 2013; Cernea, 2000; Cernea & MacDowell, 2000; Downing, 
2002; Downing & Garcia-Downing, 2009; Fernandes, 2000; Vesalon & Cretan, 2012). An 
expanding body of case material on DCDR documented the devastation caused to people’s lives, 
particularly in Asia, Africa, and Latin America (Bennett & McDowell, 2012; Hoshour, 2010; 
Mariotti, 2012; Balaji Pandey, 1998). The injustice of this situation has spurred calls for 
improvements in how involuntary resettlement is practised (Wilmsen & Webber, 2016).  
For more than 30 years, involuntary resettlement safeguards and standards have been 
promoted by multilateral banks, some governments (notably, China and India), and private sector 
proponents who manage the impacts of DCDR (Wilmsen & Webber, 2016). In the 1980s, standards 
were limited to a focus on monetarily compensating affected people for land and property 
acquisition. In recent years, academics and activists have played an instrumental role in the 
expansion of involuntary resettlement policy to emphasise that project developers treat involuntary 
resettlement “as a Development opportunity in its own right” (Wilmsen & Webber, 2016, p. 64). 
The significance of this shift is that academics are now encouraging policymakers and developers to 
view resettlement “not as a by-product of transformation, but as a transformative process itself” 
(Wilmsen & Webber, 2016, p. 64). Cernea (2003) has coined this approach “Resettlement with 
Development” and argues that affected people must participate as partners and beneficiaries of 
DCDR, rather than as victims. 
Resettlement with Development has become an increasingly pervasive discourse in 
academic and policy circles (see Perera, 2014a; ICMM, 2015; Satiroglu & Choi, 2015). For 
example, in a recent special edition on DCDR for the Journal of Impact Assessment and Project 
Appraisal, Vanclay (2017, p. 3) concludes the introductory article by stating that “under the right 
conditions, resettlement has the potential to be an opportunity for development”. From an ethical 
perspective, Jay Drydyk (2015) argues that affected people are entitled to achieve meaningful 
development through DCDR processes. The World Bank and International Financial Corporation 
(IFC), furthermore, request lending institutions to conduct involuntary resettlement as a 
development intervention (International Finance Corporation.  IFC, 2012; World Bank, 2004). 
There is limited evidence to suggest, however, that greater commitment to Resettlement with 
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Development, by governments or project developers, has significantly improved resettlement 
outcomes (see Choi, 2015; Oliver-Smith, 2010; Rew, Fisher, & Pandey, 2006).  
Recent research about involuntary resettlement practice highlights that, despite intention, 
problems persist in the implementation (de Wet, 2015). There is no agreed definition of “success” 
in involuntary resettlement; however, case examples of reported success remain elusive and are 
overshadowed by evidence that DCDR continues to result in impoverishment of affected people.6 In 
2015, World Bank President Jim Yong Kim issued a public apology in acknowledgement of the 
dismal track record of Bank-financed resettlement projects (World Bank, 2015a). Empirical 
research suggests that despite guidance, DCDR tends to be poorly planned and under-budgeted and 
lacks both meaningful consultation and the participation of affected people (Cernea & Mathur, 
2008; Mathur, 2013b; Mathur & Marsden, 1998; Price, 2010; World Bank, 2004). The impacts of 
poor resettlement practice have been extensively documented (see, for example, Cernea, 2000; 
Downing & Garcia-Downing, 2009; Scudder, 2012). In contrast, what goes on in the 
predisplacement phase, before the displacement and resettlement event has occurred, is less 
examined (Koirala, Hill, & Morgan, 2017; Perera, 2014b) 
The practice and activities that unfold in the predisplacement phase of involuntary 
resettlement have been virtually invisible to researchers in the field of DCDR. In practice, the phase 
represents an intensive period of engagement between the Project developer and “potentially” 
affected people. It is during this phase that the Project developer typically initiates social and 
environmental studies, determines eligibility for resettlement, and negotiates the terms of land 
acquisition and benefit-sharing, including measures to restore or improve affected people’s 
livelihoods and living standards through resettlement (IFC, 2002; World Bank, 2004). While 
guidance materials describe the kind of activities associated with predisplacement resettlement 
practice, empirical research is needed to better understand the characteristics, risks, and impacts of 
this phase: that is, the practice of predisplacement (Perera, 2014b).  
The mining sector represents an important industry in which to examine the dynamics of 
resettlement practice within the predisplacement phase. Established research suggests mine-caused 
displacement and resettlement (MCDR) has particular characteristics that warrant further empirical 
examination (Kemp, Owen, & Collins, 2017). Owen and Kemp (2015, 2016) argue that company 
plans for land access are often uncertain. Mining companies do not always know their land 
acquisition needs ahead of a mine development, nor can they always anticipate changes in global 
                                                 
6 In the domain of DCDR, “success” is broadly defined as the restoration or improvement of affected people’s 
livelihoods and living standards in post-resettlement, according to their own assessment and external expert review. 
Pockets of “successful” resettlement are documented within the literature (See for example de Wet, 2012; Mathur, 
2006; McDonald, Webber, & Yuefang, 2008). Case examples points to incremental improvements in household income 
post-resettlement, and unanticipated benefits arising from household ingenuity.  
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commodity prices which might affect the viability of a project and its ultimate footprint. How 
companies and locally affected people navigate and respond to changing circumstances in 
resettlement practice thus constitutes a gap within the DCDR literature.  
The mining sector is also an important industry in which to examine the application of 
leading policy guidance in involuntary resettlement. Mining companies have a particular set of 
motivations to promote Resettlement with Development, as acknowledged within industry guidance 
material (see ICMM, 2015). Global demand for minerals and metals is driving company exploration 
and production activities into lower income, less developed countries (SNL Metals Economics 
Group, 2017). Approximately half of the world’s known mineral and oil and gas reserves are 
located within resource-rich developing countries (Dobbs et al., 2013).7 Mineral-rich lands also 
tend to be inhabited by farmers and peasant or indigenous communities who depend on these 
territories for their wellbeing and livelihood (Demonte, 2012). To develop a successful mine within 
these contexts, companies must navigate complex governance, geographical, and social factors.  
In many resource-rich developing countries, companies must negotiate the terms and 
conditions of land access and resettlement directly with land users and occupants (Demonte, 2012). 
Though governments generally provide legal mechanisms to forcibly expropriate landowners and 
users for large-scale infrastructure development, mining companies are increasingly reluctant to 
invoke eminent domain (Demonte, 2012).8 The development of mine operations is increasingly 
acknowledged within industry as dependent on gaining a “social licence to operate”.9 In most 
countries, while subsurface concessions give mining companies the right to extract resources, 
affected people have demonstrated a willingness to mobilise against mining companies that are 
viewed to disregard, or overlook, their interests and expectations (for example see Del Castillo & 
Castillo 2003; Van Criekinge, 2008). For example, landowning communities have stopped the 
development of large-scale mining and oil projects in Peru and Nicaragua, even where their 
governments granted resource concessions (Wiener, 2011).  
Against this background, the mining industry is keen to promote the notion that companies 
have both the means and motivation to self-regulate activities and deliver “shared value” (Porter & 
                                                 
7 Throughout this thesis, I adopt the term “resource-rich developing country” to refer to countries that are both 
endowed with abundant non-renewable natural resources and are resource-dependent, (i.e. they derive a significant 
share of their gross national product, exports, and government revenues from exhaustible resources) (World Bank, 
2015b, p. 2). 
8 Eminent domain refers to the power of government to acquire private rights in land for a public purpose, 
without the willing consent of its owner or occupant (Keith, 2008). 
9 The social licence to operate is used by many academics and industry to broadly refer to the social 
acceptability of large-scale project development by directly affected people and other stakeholders (see for example 
Thomson & Boutilier, 2011; Parsons & Moffat, 2014; Zhang et al., 2015). 
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Kramer, 2011) to stakeholders in the form of commodities and societal development (Hidalgo, 
Peterson, Smith, & Foley, 2014). This motivation is based on a dual imperative: (a) the preservation 
of corporate reputation, and (b) the minimisation of risks to mining operations and activities at the 
local level (Franks et al., 2014; Graetz & Franks, 2015). It is on this basis that multinational mining 
companies aspire to adhere to Resettlement with Development via targeted private sector standards 
and safeguards. This research examines how Resettlement with Development is practised within the 
context of land acquisition and resettlement in mining. Improved understanding of the dynamics, 
expectations, understandings, and misunderstandings that occur between actors during the 
predisplacement phase is one essential element in contributing new knowledge in the field of 
DCDR.  
 
Research Objectives and Questions  
This thesis is guided by two overarching research objectives. The first is to better understand 
the practices and interactive dynamics involved in operationalising Resettlement with Development 
during the predisplacement phase. The second is to identify the practical considerations and 
dilemmas that arise from this practice, and their implications for expanding knowledge in the field 
of DCDR, and mining in particular.  
In line with these objectives, the central question guiding this research is: “How is 
Resettlement with Development practice integrated, understood, and used by actors in the 
predisplacement phase of land acquisition and resettlement for mining?”. Table 1 presents a 
framework for analysing this question on the basis of four subquestions that relate to: (a) the 
broader contexts in which the resettlement practice is embedded; (b) the everyday practices aimed 
at achieving Resettlement with Development; (c) the meaning and value that embedded actors 
ascribe to the practice; and (d) the power relations within and among actors engaged in the practice.  
Table 1. 
Research Objective and Questions 
Research question Design focus Research subquestions 
How is Resettlement 
with Development 
practice integrated, 
understood, and 
used by actors in the 
predisplacement 
phase of land 
acquisition and 
resettlement for 
mining? 
Context What are the key socio-historical, -political, and -
economic contexts in which the practice is situated? 
Practices What are the everyday practices that aim to achieve 
“development” within this context?  
Meanings How is the meaning and value of the practice understood 
by actors engaged in predisplacement activity?  
Power/agency How do these same actors navigate heterogeneous 
interests and expectations of practice? 
8 
 
Thesis Outline 
Chapter Two presents a review of existing literature of DCDR and outlines agendas for 
new research. The chapter initially traces broad debates in the field, and the historical development 
of policy standards and safeguards for involuntary land acquisition and resettlement. I argue that 
despite incremental improvements in this policy, the nature of challenges in practice warrants 
further research. Involuntary resettlement practice is less examined in the DCDR literature 
compared with the post-displacement impacts, which are widely documented. The first contribution 
is to build upon existing knowledge of resettlement practice. Next, I argue the role of the private 
sector in DCDR as an important and emerging area of research. Historically, DCDR theory is based 
on observations drawn from government-management projects; greater insights into for-profit and 
private sector involuntary resettlement processes constitute a second agenda for new research. The 
mining sector is a fruitful site in which to examine resettlement practice. Multinational mining 
companies have both normative and pragmatic motivations to share project benefits with local 
stakeholders, including through resettlement. MCDR practice is identified as a third research 
agenda. Finally, I argue the value of examining these dynamics within the predisplacement phase of 
DCDR processes. While human displacement has not occurred, preliminary research confirms the 
phase as a significant moment in building relationships and setting expectations between actors on 
the ground. Taking account of these four research agendas, the final section of the chapter outlines a 
rationale for applying an actor-oriented theoretical lens to examine the research questions.  
Chapter Three charts the development of a methodology firmly based in the social 
constructivist-interpretivist paradigm and qualitative methods of sociology. It draws insights from 
actor-oriented theory and cross-cultural and practice research. The paradigm and exploratory 
research questions suggest the value of undertaking an in-depth analysis of a single case study. 
Selection of the La Granja case study is justified for strategic and purposive criteria, which also 
serve the basis for future comparative analysis. Four mutually reinforcing methods are selected to 
elicit thick, rich, and descriptive qualitative data. These are: semi-structured and unstructured 
interviews (n = 119); direct and participatory observations (n = 60 ethnographic events); recording 
of a field diary; and documentation of secondary data (n = 26 documents). Research data is 
collected from a cross-section of participants, including company and NGO personnel, household 
members, and qualified informants. Borrowing from grounded theory, I outline an iterative, 
recursive, and dynamic data analysis process, which occurred in parallel to data collection. The 
main themes emerging from the analysis form the basis of the findings chapters. I outline the 
procedures adopted to enhance research credibility, including ethical considerations of an in-depth 
single case study. 
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Chapter Four is dedicated to the historical and sociological context of the La Granja case. 
The chapter is divided into three parts. Part one introduces the broader context of mining and 
resettlement in Peru, and details key attributes of the Rio Tinto La Granja project and local 
“communities” affected by the proposed mine. Part two traces the history of social disruption at the 
Project site and provides a rich overview of local experiences with previous mining companies in 
the area. Given this background, part three provides Rio Tinto’s land acquisition and resettlement 
process, which forms the basis of this case study. The framework has two components: (a) a 
negotiation stream and (b) a development-focused stream of practice. The development-focused 
practice is centred on a Household Empowerment Intervention (referred to throughout this thesis as 
the “Intervention”). This Intervention becomes the focus of subsequent chapters. The next four 
chapters present empirical findings on: the practices associated with operationalising Resettlement 
with Development; actor interpretations on the meaning and value of the practice; and how actors 
navigate heterogeneous interests and expectations of practice, and each other. 
Chapter Five invites the reader to “zoom in” on the everyday interaction and dynamic 
between frontline practitioners and household members engaged in the Intervention. The findings 
reveal challenges associated with frontline practice. Practitioners worked in a context where local 
people did not easily trust them. In some cases, household members were perceived by practitioners 
to question and even resist their work. A range of planned and idiosyncratic practices were 
employed by practitioners to override, convince, and direct household members to trust in, and 
progress through, the Intervention. The findings raise questions about the extent to which household 
members meaningfully engaged with the practice.  
Chapter Six focuses on how multiple actors ascribe meaning and value to the practice. The 
chapter is structured around the experience and perception of the three actor groups that were 
interlocked at the social interface of practice: the mining company representatives, household 
members, and NGO staff. Findings reveal discrepancies in actor perceptions of the practice intent, 
and the means to achieve it. Contradictory messages had formed in the dynamics and relationships 
between them over time. NGO personnel attempted to conduct their work in a vacuum, by 
disassociating from the company and instead focusing on local-level empowerment. The 
Intervention was ultimately unable to address households’ core expectations, which were instead for 
security of livelihood and certainty over plans. Changes in company priorities resulted in land 
acquisition and resettlement (LA&R) management discontinuing the Intervention, and led to 
diminished trust between all actors. 
Given the disjuncture in understanding between actors, Chapter Seven considers how these 
same actors sought to navigate their heterogeneous interests and expectations of the practice. The 
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chapter is structured around three vignettes or scenes of action I observed during fieldwork. Each 
vignette highlights an example of how actors attempt to wield power over the Intervention practice 
and each other. The examples are chosen to demonstrate that household members and NGO 
personnel found ways to use the practice in meeting strategic and practical needs. Ultimately, 
however, company personnel were in a position to reinterpret and redirect the practice in response 
to their changing business priorities. The company abandoned the Intervention’s original intent, and 
discontinued the NGO’s involvement with ongoing project activity. When land access was no 
longer a pressing company priority, all household information recorded for development purposes 
was absorbed into the company social database, effectively constituting a breach of household 
confidentiality.  
Chapter Eight presents an overview of these key findings by interpreting their significance 
for each actor group, with reference to established DCDR literature, policy, and practice. First, in 
the context of La Granja, the Resettlement with Development practice was unimplementable; 
largely as a result of the history of prior company engagements with local people. Legacy issues 
create barriers to practitioner and household engagement; local people did not understand or value 
the intent of the Intervention. Second, the practice is found to be vulnerable within its organisational 
setting. As a contingent social process, Resettlement with Development practice is linked to the 
broader mine development and influenced by the uncertainty of corporate planning. In the La 
Granja case, land access planning was interrupted, partially due to volatility in the global 
commodities prices. The effect was to expose local people to a range of impoverishment risks and 
impacts, and exacerbate their distrust of company-managed processes. Third, the La Granja case 
demonstrates the potential for Resettlement with Development policy to become distorted, and 
misused in the practice. The mining company advertised development as a certain outcome of 
resettlement, rather than an intended goal. I argue that this conflation may render the practice a 
mechanism for encouraging local people to participate in their own impoverishment, by 
relinquishing their source of livelihood for an uncertain future.  
Chapter Nine draws together the core argument of this thesis, which is that DCDR 
academic and policy guidance broadly overlooks the risks and impacts of predisplacement to people 
targeted for future resettlement; nor does it address gaps in corporate accountability for promises of 
resettlement that lead to household development. I develop this argument by mapping the 
relationship between the characteristics of the predisplacement phase, and the implications for 
practice, and for people in the La Granja case.  
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CHAPTER TWO: DEVELOPMENT PRACTICE IN THE CONTEXT OF DISPLACEMENT AND 
RESETTLEMENT  
 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I situate my research problem within the context of academic literature and 
outline the actor-oriented approach that I use to engage the problem of resettlement practice. This 
review is primarily drawn from the literature of DCDR and sociology of development. Extractives 
and societies, community development, and critical development literatures were included in the 
review. The chapter is presented in four sections. In the first section, I will highlight how 
resettlement academics and policymakers have responded to dismal resettlement outcomes by 
broadening policy safeguards and encouraging developers to approach resettlement as a sustainable 
development process. There are few empirical investigations that examine how this policy intent is 
operationalised within a project context. I propose to contribute new research into the 
implementation dynamics of Resettlement with Development in a project context. 
Private sector–led displacement and resettlement is an emerging frontier of DCDR research. 
As such, the second section of this chapter engages with recent academic contributions highlighting 
the characteristics that differentiate resettlement in the mining sector from other large-scale 
development projects. This literature identifies planning uncertainty and brownfields legacy as 
common characteristics of MCDR. As with other types of resettlement, the practice implications are 
largely unexplored in the academic literature. This thesis examines the implementation of 
Resettlement with Development within an empirical case that engages specific characteristics of 
MCDR, thereby contributing to filling this gap in this sector-specific literature.  
The third section of this review focuses on the planning and implementation of resettlement 
by private sector  developers. The review examines calls for increased academic attention to the 
institutional process of resettlement. I argue for building a more nuanced, grounded, and practice-
based examination of resettlement implementation, particularly in the predisplacement phase of 
implementation. The predisplacement phase is a neglected area of DCDR research, and a critical 
moment for engagement between actors. In the fourth and final section, I propose an actor-oriented 
theoretical focus to engaging the research problem, recognising the ongoing, socially constructed 
and negotiated dimensions of resettlement practice. The chapter argues the need to better 
understand the interactive dynamics, experiences, and expectations of actors engaged at the 
interface of Resettlement with Development practice. 
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Development-Caused Displacement, Impoverishment Risks, and Resettlement with 
Development 
The phenomenon of DCDR has emerged as a major concern and challenge in sociology in 
recent decades.10 Situated within the broader field of forced migration studies, DCDR represents 
one of three leading causes of internal displacement; the other two are conflict and natural disasters 
(Terminski, 2015). Unlike the latter, however, DCDR is presumed to be planned, as the cause of the 
displacement is “predictable, intentional, scheduled and largely regulated” (Owen & Kemp, 2016, 
p. 1228). As such, a normative assumption is that, with forewarning and deliberate action, affected 
people can be provided the means and mechanisms to successfully re-establish their lives 
elsewhere. DCDR literature focuses on seven main causes: development for water supply; urban 
infrastructure; transportation; energy; agriculture expansion; parks and forest reserves; and 
population redistribution schemes (Robinson, 2003; Terminski, 2015). 
Within the DCDR literature, “displacement” may result from physical and/or economic 
types. People experience displacement when they are required to relocate from their land, but also 
when access to livelihood resources is restricted as a result of infrastructure development (World 
Bank, 2004). “Resettlement” refers to the process of physically relocating displaced peoples and the 
re-establishment of their socioeconomic condition within household units and as larger 
communities.11 In this way, resettlement is a more comprehensive process than simply the 
relocation of people from one site to another; it involves population movement and an element of 
planning and control (Chambers, 1969). Depending on the case, resettlement can include 
acquisition of land and physical structures, relocation, and/or the economic rehabilitation of 
displaced persons to improve – or at least restore – livelihoods and living standards (World Bank 
2004). 
The World Bank (2004) defines displacement and resettlement as involuntary when affected 
people cannot exercise informed consent or power of choice. Affected people are deemed to 
provide informed consent when they gain a comprehensive understanding of the implications and 
consequences of the decision to resettle, and agree to resettle. Power of choice also implies that 
affected people will not experience any negative consequences should they reject resettlement. 
Power of choice, therefore, can only be exercised if a project location is flexible (see World Bank, 
                                                 
10 The historical emergence of DCDR as a scholarly field is linked to the global infrastructure boom between 
the late 1960s and the 1980s. During this period, thousands of people were involuntary displaced across the developed 
and developing world, primarily for the construction of dams (Cernea 2008, p. 20). Seminal research pieces within this 
field include Colson’s (1971) ethnographic account of the impact of state-led resettlement on approximately 57,000 
people bordering the Zambezi and Brokensha and Scudder’s (1968) and Chambers (1969) research about the forced 
relocation of around 80,000 people for the Askosombo dam in Ghana.   
11 Within the field of DCDR, “project affected people” describes those individuals living on or nearby a 
proposed development site who are impacted by a proposed project and its construction. “Affected households” are 
units of affected people living in a dwelling; these people are not necessarily related but act as a single economic unit.  
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2004, p. 4); that is, if no alternative site is available for project development, resettlement is 
categorised as involuntary, even if affected people elect to leave.12  
The binary between voluntary and involuntary resettlement is increasingly critiqued as 
unhelpful, and is better understood as a continuum rather than a dichotomy (Penz, Drydyk, & Bose, 
2011; Price, 2015b; Wilmsen & Wang, 2015; Xue, Wang, & Xue, 2013). Emerging scholarly 
debates question the extent to which involuntary displacement might be rendered voluntary when 
affected people negotiate the terms of land acquisition and resettlement (Penz et al., 2011, pp. 41-
61). The assumption is that negotiated agreements can reduce power asymmetries between actors, 
particularly when conducted in good faith (Eriksen, 1999).13 When viewed in this light, the focus is 
on whether affected people are given meaningful opportunities to participate in and influence the 
decision-making processes that affect their lives. In this way, the term “involuntary” might depict a 
spectrum of willingness rather than of forced displacement. The debate is important, given the 
plethora of DCDR literature highlighting the ongoing negative impact of resettlement on affected 
people. In the context of this thesis, it also raises questions about the role of development practice 
within a resettlement context, both in the sense of incentivising affected people to leave an area, and 
providing them with opportunities in a post-resettlement context.  
The post-resettlement impact of displacement on project-affected people is a central concern 
across the DCDR literature. The cumulative and multidimensional impact of displacement and 
resettlement processes on affected peoples is well established (Cernea, 2000; Downing & Garcia-
Downing, 2009; Scudder, 2012). Empirical evidence demonstrates that more vulnerable and 
marginalised sectors of society are more likely to be affected (Bennett & McDowell, 2012). While 
the link between displacement and risk of impoverishment is undisputed, the central “problem” of 
DCDR remains a matter of perspective and debate. At the heart of the issue is a question about what 
constitutes “development” as a social goal, and the means by which that goal should be achieved 
(Oliver-Smith, 2010).14 Dwivedi’s (2002) broad categorisation between the “movementalist” and 
“managerial” approaches is a helpful heuristic. However, while these categories provide helpful 
markers, I have taken them as representing a spectrum of perspectives in the field. Furthermore, the 
positions are not necessarily contradictory. Both categories are concerned with social justice and the 
material wellbeing of affected people. The former focuses on the causes of displacement, the latter 
                                                 
12For example, a rural road can be redirected if a landowner objects to resettlement. In contrast, the surface 
land of an open-pit mine is immutable, because the ore body is fixed. Unless an alternative entry point to the ore body is 
possible, resettlement would be involuntary. 
13 Good faith negotiations imply intent by parties to hold fair and open interactions. According to the 
International Finance Corporation (2007, pp. 64-65), good faith negotiations occur free of coercion or intimidation, 
where both actors have equal and timely access to the best available information, and to grievance redress mechanisms. 
14 The historical emergence and critical examination of the invention of “development” has been documented 
and reviewed in depth elsewhere (see Cowen & Shenton, 1996; Peet & Hartwick, 2009; Rist, 2008). 
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on improving the effects. I review these approaches briefly by way of locating a relevant 
contribution to the field vis-à-vis established literature and engaging the continuum. 
The movementalist perspective positions displacement as a crisis of “development”, 
highlighting its uneven and unfair distribution of costs and benefits (Dwivedi, 2002, p. 712). The 
perspective originates from the critical, deconstructivist or post-development paradigm of 
development studies (see for example Escobar, 1995; Escobar, 2015; Ferguson, 1994). In its most 
radical form, the movementalist perspective contends that large-scale development is an expression 
of hegemonic power, pitting the rights of the state and, increasingly, private capital against those of 
people targeted for displacement (Oliver-Smith, 2010, p. 30). It is therefore important to expose 
assumptions underlying official legislative definitions and the rhetoric enabling DCDR, particularly 
where the interests and rights of marginalised peoples become overridden by the process (Koenig, 
2006, p. 105). For example, a key ethical issue is the use of eminent domain to evict people for 
development (Colchester, 1999; Oliver-Smith, 2010). Governments frequently justify DCDR in the 
name of “public interest” by adopting a cost–benefit analysis to normalise the sacrificing of a few as 
a reasonable cost for the subsequent net gains to society. This justification is critiqued as having 
intrinsic limitations (see Cernea, 1997; Penz et al., 2011, pp. 63-83). The social costs of 
displacement are not entirely quantifiable, are underestimated, and are frequently distributed 
unequally.15  
From the movementalist perspective, the failure of resettlement and the associated political, 
civil, economic, social, and cultural abuses of displaced peoples are self-evident. This perspective 
focuses not on why involuntary resettlement programs frequently fail, but rather on how to 
strengthen the ability of affected peoples to protect and defend their interests. In this regard, the 
rights-based approach has become an important mechanism for addressing power asymmetries by 
drawing attention to the rights and entitlements of peoples threatened or affected by DCDR (see for 
example Clark, 2009; Koenig, 2006; Neef & Singer, 2015; Penz et al., 2011).  
In contrast, the managerial perspective on displacement accepts large-scale infrastructure 
development as part and parcel of a “progressive” society (Dwivedi, 2002). Human displacement is 
an inevitable and unfortunate consequence of neoliberal economic development. The approach 
reflects the instrumental and structuralist paradigms of development studies, which largely 
dominate in governments, multilateral institutions, banks, and other institutions responsible for 
DCDR. Where displacement is deemed unavoidable, the managerial focus is upon how to mitigate 
the negative impacts, principally by providing affected people with well-planned and justly 
                                                 
15 For example, social gains often accrue to elite actors. In the US, for example, Carpenter and Ross (2007) 
documented civil resistance to local governments that used a public interest rationale to displace neighbourhoods, only 
to later sell the land rights to private developers. The question of how costs and benefits are distributed when 
displacement occurs for the private sector is an emerging area of inquiry in the field of DCDR.  
15 
implemented resettlement.16 This focus has result in an extensive body of literature dedicated to the 
analysis and diagnosis of resettlement impacts, and recommendations on how to improve 
resettlement policy safeguards and planning instruments (Cernea, 1997; Mathur & Marsden, 1998; 
Pandey, 1998). Several conceptual frameworks have also been developed to assist researchers, 
policymakers and project planners in the identification and management of impoverishment risks 
through resettlement.  
The Scudder and Colson (1982) four-stage model was one of the first significant theoretical 
models of a resettlement process. The model sought to challenge the perception that monetary 
compensation was enough to restore affected people’s lives, and to highlight that the process entails 
at least four stages: recruitment, transition, development, and incorporation or handing over 
(Scudder, 2012, p. 43).17 In subsequent decades, DCDR researchers have developed numerous 
models (for example, see Smyth and Vanclay (2017)), however, Cernea’s (2000) Impoverishment 
Risk and Reconstruction (IRR) framework is currently the most influential model in the field of 
DCDR. The IRR framework posits that there are eight generic risks which will inevitably manifest 
if unmitigated through resettlement. These risks include landlessness, joblessness, homelessness, 
marginalisation, food insecurity, increased morbidity, loss of access to common property resources, 
and social or community disarticulation (Cernea, 2000, p. 20-2).18 Cernea (2000) argues that the 
IRR framework has a predictive-cum-planning capacity, whereby the severity of multiple risks can 
be measured and anticipated before displacement becomes a “self-destroying prophecy” (Merton, 
1979, cited in Cernea, 2000). According to Cernea (2000), “the general risk pattern inherent in 
displacement can be controlled through a policy response that mandates and finances integrated 
problem resolution” (p. 34). Widespread application of the IRR framework has assisted social 
scientists in the identification of specific trends and patterns that characterise resettled communities, 
and informed the improvement of international policy safeguards and guidance (Muggah, 2003, pp. 
10-11). Indeed, the first policy standard on involuntary resettlement was based on the work of 
Cernea, and published through the World Bank in 1980 (Price, 2009).  
                                                 
16 This perspective is also characteristic of a risk-based approach where the potential benefits and cost of an 
investment are weighed, and adverse impacts reduced where possible (Price, 2015). 
17 Empirical research suggests that displaced people unaccustomed to handling cash are prone to misdirect 
compensation money, and end up assetless and cashless (Cernea, 2003; Hakim, 2000; Mahapatra, 1999; Nayak, 2000). 
18 Of these, the risk of social disarticulation, described as the net loss of valuable “social capital” (which 
compounds the loss of natural, physical, and human capital), is most often unperceived and uncompensated during 
planning yet has significant long-term consequences for resettled peoples (Cernea, 2008b; Downing & Garcia-
Downing, 2009). It is important to note that academics have also established additional risks not accounted for within 
the IRR framework. These include, for example, loss of access to services (Mathur, 1998, p. 70), loss of access to 
schooling (Mahapatra, 1998, p. 218), and psychological marginalisation (Fernandes, 2000, p. 212) among others. De 
Wet (2004) suggests “cultural disarticulation” and “political disarticulation” as additional “threats” closely tied to the 
risk of social disarticulation. 
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Operational Policy 4.12 on Involuntary Resettlement (henceforth referred to as “the Policy”) 
is the leading policy benchmark in involuntary resettlement. The Policy has become an 
internationally institutionalised set of “principles and mandatory norms, based on social science 
knowledge, for reducing the harm caused by development-induced displacement” (Maldonado, 
2012, p. 195). While the Policy was initially intended to guide governments borrowing funds from 
the World Bank, a lack of guidance within global and national policy frameworks has result in a 
“ripple effect” (Cernea, 2005).19 International development banks, development agencies, and some 
governments, notably China and India, have also adopted the Policy as a legal and policy 
framework.20 In the private sector, many companies endorse the Policy via a tailored version 
released by the International Finance Corporation (see IFC, 2012b). The IFC is the private sector 
lending arm of the World Bank, and the largest global development institution mandated to provide 
technical and financial policy support to private investments in developing countries. Companies 
also adhere to the Policy via the Equator Principles, which set the benchmarks for the financial 
industry to manage social and environmental issues in project financing. Since the 1980s, objectives 
of the Policy have been revised and expanded to include provisions for the compensation of 
displaced people’s physical and economic losses, in addition to the restoration of assets and 
livelihoods in their new location.21  
Several DCDR scholars have been instrumental in broadening the scope of the Policy 
(Cernea, 2008a, 2009; Gamaathige, 2014b; Mathur, 2006, p. 66; Tamondong, 2008). Downing 
(2002) and Scudder (2005) have criticised the World Bank’s 2001 policy on the grounds that it did 
not emphasise Resettlement with Development clearly enough (De Wet, 2012, p. 396). A prominent 
argument in the literature is that resettlement should do more than restore affected people’s lifestyle 
and livelihoods; it should also offer an opportunity for displaced people to experience 
improvements in their resettlement locale. The theoretical rationale is premised on the managerial 
argument that impoverishment risks can be mitigated and reversed. With adequate resources, 
resettlement could become a targeted intervention aimed at alleviating poverty and enhancing 
development outcomes. According to Cernea (2007), providing resettlement as a development 
                                                 
19 Downing and Garcia-Downing (2009, pp. 240-241) note the difference between hard and soft laws in 
involuntary resettlement. Where hard laws are codified and subject to courts and enforcement, soft laws begin when 
legal arrangements are weakened along the dimensions of obligation or voluntarism. Importantly, while many 
safeguards in involuntary resettlement now exist, the majority are of the latter category. 
20 For example, the Asia Development Bank (ADB, 2009), the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB, 
1998), the African Development Bank Group (ADBG, 2013), and international development agencies including the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the International Finance Corporation (IFC) 
have also released a policy tailored for their clients. Price (2009) documents the evolution of these standards over time. 
21 The term “livelihood” refers to the full range of means that individuals, families, and communities utilise to 
make a living, such as wage-based income, agriculture, fishing, foraging, other natural resource–based livelihoods, 
petty trade, and bartering (IFC, 2002).  
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opportunity ultimately reduces project costs and delays to project development, which can occur via 
local-level resistance or protracted negotiations (see also Price, 2015b).  
This debate has led to a broadening of the Policy, which now states that involuntary 
resettlement ought to be conducted as a “sustainable development” intervention (World Bank, 2013 
para 2b).22 DCDR scholars refer to the policy ideal variously as “resettlement-as-development”, 
“resettlement-with-development”, and “resettlement-with-development-opportunity” 
(Alexandrescu, 2011a, p. 8; Duan & McDonald, 2004; McDonald, Webber, & Yuefang, 2008; Neef 
& Singer, 2015; Price, 2010; Steil & Yuefang, 2002; Wilmsen, Webber, & Yuefang, 2011). Within 
this thesis, I refer to these terms collectively as “Resettlement with Development”. According to 
guidance material released by the World Bank and IFC, Resettlement with Development requires 
project developers to plan and implement resettlement as a deliberate development exercise, aimed 
at leaving affected people better off as a result (see IFC, 2012b, p. 2 and World Bank 2013, p. 1). A 
key emphasis within the World Bank and IFC guidance is upon early and ongoing participation by 
and consultation of affected people in resettlement planning and implementation. This emphasis is 
important in the context of this thesis, which seeks to build understanding of how this guidance is 
applied within the predisplacement phase of a resettlement.  
That involuntary resettlement be conceived as a sustainable development intervention 
remains ambiguous, both in theory and practice. Perera (2011, p. 381) critiques the policy concept 
and states that Resettlement with Development has “limited value” because it circumvents human 
rights issues that relate to loss of shelter, income and livelihood sources, and social disarticulation. 
In a review on new directions in DCDR research, Maldonado (2012, p. 202) argued that 
Resettlement with Development remains too conceptual and may not in fact be operational at all. 
The meaning of key terms, including “development”, “opportunity”, and “improvement”, remains 
open to interpretation. In the narrowest sense, development has been reduced to a measurement of 
household income post-resettlement (Gamaathige, 2014b). For example, Dickson and Webber 
(2007, p. 540) examined available studies on dam-induced Resettlement with Development in 
China and reported evidence of mixed “successes”, measured as incremental improvements in 
people’s material wellbeing. Notwithstanding the importance of economic recovery, some DCDR 
academics take a broader interpretation of Resettlement with Development. For example, 
Bartolome, de Wet, Mander, and Nagraj (2000) and Price (2015a) describe Resettlement with 
                                                 
22 The ability of project proponents to facilitate involuntary resettlement as a sustainable development 
intervention centres on the capacity and will of a project proponent to identify potential risks to displaced peoples and 
invest sufficient inputs to mitigate, restore, and improve the lifestyle and livelihoods of affected peoples through 
resettlement (see IFC, 2012b, p. 2 and World Bank 2013, p. 1).   
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Development as involving recognition of the psychological, social, and cultural, as well as physical, 
losses, and benefit-sharing mechanisms. 
Recognising the coexistence of multiple interpretations of Resettlement with Development 
within the literature, a currently relevant question concerns how project developers interpret and 
implement this policy in practice. The World Bank and IFC place an onus on project developers to 
translate guidance principles within a project setting (see IFC, 2012b, p. 2 and World Bank, 2013, 
p. 1), yet the implementation practices associated with the Policy have not featured strongly within 
academic literature. Moreover, while academics have argued for greater upfront inputs in 
resettlement programs, the predisplacement phase has been virtually invisible to researchers (see 
Koirala et al., 2017). By its own admission, the World Bank has failed to adequately document or 
regulate the implementation of its own Policy (see World Bank, 2014, 2015). The lack of oversight 
on bank-funded resettlement programs is concerning, given the weight of evidence demonstrating 
the risks of resettlement to affected people. Even less examined is the role of private sector, for-
profit project proponents who claim voluntary adherence to the Policy in the absence of state 
mandates or lending arrangements. In the following section, I elaborate upon this argument with an 
examination of MCDR.  
 
Private Sector Engagement with Resettlement and Development: A Focus on the Mining 
The role of the private sector in human displacement and resettlement is an increasing focus 
of DCDR literature (see for example Cernea, 2015; Fernandes, 2011; Mathur, 2016a; Price, 2010, 
2015b; T.  Scudder, 2009). While the role of lenders and governments has been widely documented, 
human displacements for private sector, for-profit projects are increasingly common (Koenig, 2002; 
Mathur, 2016a; Oliver-Smith, 2010, p. 31). Emerging academic debates have questioned the 
legitimacy of human displacement for private sector projects, particularly when the state invokes a 
“public interest” rationale (Maldonado, 2012). Cernea (2005), L. Long, Xiao, and Touzel (2010) 
and Hoshour (2010) engage longstanding questions about corporate activities, including how 
businesses are held to account for resettlement outcomes and whether companies can deliver upon 
international policy guidance, including Resettlement with Development. The mining sector 
represents one industry that claims to have both the means and the motivation to address the social 
impacts of operations on affected people. The sector is also a cause of displacement and 
resettlement. 
Mining is an important driver of private sector human displacement (Downing, 2002; Owen 
& Kemp, 2015; Terminski, 2015). Downing (2002, p. 3) predicted that the incidences of MCDR 
would increase as mining companies respond to growing demand for minerals, and take advantage 
of factors enabling the expansion of sector activity into more remote and densely populated areas. 
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Over a decade later, Owen and Kemp (2015) found evidence of at least 125,000–150,000 persons 
who were displaced by 58 mine projects between 1990 and 2014. The data source is far from 
comprehensive; no global survey has assessed the full scale of MCDR (Terminski, 2015). An 
absence of sector-wide data on the scale and impact of MCDR may partially explain why the 
phenomenon has not been a more prominent focus of industry or academic attention. 
In the policy realm, industry peak body the International Council on Mining and Minerals 
(henceforth, the ICMM) recently released guidance material to assist companies with resettlement. 
By comparison, the topics of mining and human rights, gender, and agreement-making have been a 
focus of guidance materials for close to a decade. On resettlement, the ICMM has released a broad 
statement, which is generic at best. Echoing the international guidance and managerial assumptions 
within the field of DCDR, the statement encourages companies to start planning early, engage 
affected people, and mitigate impacts (ICMM, 2017). The only tailored resettlement guidebook for 
the sector was released as recently as 2015 (ICMM, 2015). The guide states that well-planned and 
managed resettlement is one means by which mining companies can positively contribute to local-
level development, reflecting the sentiment of Resettlement with Development (ICMM, 2015, p. 2). 
Empirical research in MCDR suggests, however, that ongoing challenges persist in the practice of 
resettlement.  
The academic field of MCDR is underdeveloped, and dispersed across academic disciplines. 
Established literature can be characterised as scholarly (typically peer-reviewed), publicly available 
independent and commissioned studies, and privately held and commissioned reports (Owen & 
Kemp, 2015). The Mining and Resettlement Initiative at The University of Queensland holds the 
most comprehensive repository of MCDR literature (see Centre for Social Responsibility in Mining, 
2017). Of the 113 recorded studies, less than 40 per cent are academic publications; the remaining 
60 per cent are classified as grey literature. The analysis highlights the prominence of material 
being produced by proponents of MCDR, such as international banks and consultants (for example 
AngloGold Ashanti, 2008; International Finance Corporation, 2014; Ltd., 2009; Reddy, Smyth, & 
Steyn, 2014; Sonnenberg & Munster, 2001). Advocacy groups seeking to cast a critical eye on the 
sector’s activities are also contributors (Human Rights Watch, 2013, 2014; Oxfam America, 2004). 
It is noteworthy that Owen and Kemp (2015, p. 480) argue most research remains privately held by 
major mining companies who commission academic studies on a commercial-in-confidence basis. 
This suggests that the private collection is even larger, and that the body of MCDR knowledge is 
not benefiting from valuable learnings captured within the collection.  
In order to gain an overview of the landscape of established knowledge in MCDR, the 
following is a review of peer-reviewed research. Downing’s (2002) sector-wide assessment of 
MCDR is a seminal piece as one of the first DCDR researchers to call attention to the practices of 
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mining companies in displacement and resettlement. In an analysis of case studies, Downing 
highlights the unacceptable tendency of major mining companies and governments to externalise 
the liability of displacement onto project-affected peoples. According to Downing, mining 
companies are failing to adequately plan for resettlement and recognise the processes as posing 
major risks to affected people. The valuable contribution of Downing was to open up a space for 
future and ongoing research and policy debates about MCDR. A pressing issue for Downing was 
the significant power asymmetry between corporations and the vulnerable – and often marginalised 
– communities impacted by operations. In his own words, Downing questioned, “how do we find 
solutions in a situation where the stakeholders are mostly unaware of their obligations, operating 
with undefined limits, and immersed in conflicts of interest?” (Downing, 2002, p. 21). 
In the decade since Downing’s report, a number of investigations have drawn attention to 
the extent of poor industry practice in the area of company-managed resettlement. Fernandes (2007) 
bird’s eye view of land acquisition and displacement across India highlights that the most 
vulnerable sectors of society, namely, tribal peoples and women, are disproportionately impacted by 
industry operations. The work of Terminski (2012, 2015) is another important global perspective. In 
his analysis of MCDR case studies from the majority of continents, Terminski concedes that the 
sheer, albeit undetermined, scale of mine displacement warrants increased academic attention. 
Applying a human rights lens, Terminski (2012, pp. 9-10) finds that MCDR has led to “mass 
infringements on human rights”, which “stems from asymmetric capacities of local communities 
vis-à-vis big corporations that have money at their disposal, contacts in power circles, and a huge 
legal backroom”. Terminski characterises MCDR as a struggle over resources, and his concern is 
with the rights of affected people and their capacity to resist a form of “development” that does not 
meet their interests (Terminski, 2012, p. 9). Terminski concludes with a list of recommendations 
that centre on the need for companies and government to respect human rights. Reflecting 
Downing’s earlier appraisal, the work appears disengaged from the practice of mining companies, 
and the kinds of challenges and enabling factors that bear upon local-level dynamics. For example, 
the portrayal of mining multinationals as all-powerful entities potentially oversimplifies local-level 
engagement and the agency of affected people (Burton, 2014). 
The most recent global perspective on MCDR is by Owen and Kemp (2015), who pave the 
way for a more nuanced appreciation of the characteristics of MCDR.23 They argue that a barrier to 
improving MCDR practice is the tendency of policymakers and academics to treat mining as a 
generic category of DCDR (Owen & Kemp, 2015). For example, a prominent feature is the effect of 
                                                 
23 These characteristics are: the nature of incremental expansion and uncertainty, cohabitation between 
company and community activities, interdependency, leveraging and cost increase, and complexities of governance 
arrangements. For a comprehensive review of each characteristic, see Owen and Kemp (2015, pp. 482-486). 
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project life cycles. Mine operations are developed in a series of phases: exploration, project design 
and planning, construction, and operations.24 While the IFC and ICMM guidance materials 
emphasise the importance of early planning, land-use needs are often contingent on external factors 
(Owen & Kemp, 2015, 2016). Land use and resettlement planning can change on account of 
“stakeholder expectations, project financing requirements, in addition to legislative requirements 
and regulatory standards at different phases” (Owen & Kemp, 2015, p. 481). Furthermore, because 
mine development is tied to the global commodities market, companies may not be able to pre-plan 
land use and resettlement needs to the extent required. Volatility in global markets can result in 
decisions to fast-track, suspend or alter land access strategies. The uncertainty of company land use 
and resettlement planning is a significant challenge. Owen & Kemp (2016) argue the implications 
for resettlement practice warrant further attention.  
Another confounding and ill-explored characteristic of MCDR practice is how companies 
might operate within a brownfield resettlement scenario. Owen and Kemp (2015, p. 481) 
demonstrate that projects may be identified as “greenfield” when viewed from a technical 
evaluation; however, they may have “brownfield” tendencies when examined from a resettlement 
viewpoint. The researchers identify the history of land access at La Granja as an important 
brownfields case study. The Tampakan Copper-Gold Project in the Philippines (Wenk & Scherler, 
2016) and the Weda Bay Nickel Project in Indonesia are similar to La Granja: they have also 
remained in an exploratory phase for decades as a result of prolonged and interrupted company 
plans. It remains unclear how brownfield resettlement scenarios influence resettlement practice. 
Owen and Kemp (2015, p. 487) argue that there is an urgent need to understand how companies 
“address the long-term and cumulative impacts of displacement on affected peoples”. Furthermore, 
they identify the “practical effect” of industry approaches to Resettlement with Development as a 
gap in the established literature (Owen & Kemp, 2015, p. 487). It is with this gap that this thesis 
engages.  
Given the infancy of MCDR as a subset of DCDR, the majority of available studies sit either 
in the DCDR or the extractives and societies literature. A dominant focus of this material has been 
the qualitative and quantitative measurement of post-resettlement impacts on affected people. The 
research predominantly examines the experience and perceptions of project-affected people (for 
example Abuya, 2013; Buzoianu & Toc, 2013). Thematic areas include community perceptions of 
compensation and livelihood restoration initiatives (Mathur, 2001), mental health (Goessling, 
                                                 
24 Before construction, mining exploration phase generally comprises three key stages. The earliest is “target 
generation and testing”, a more advanced stage is “project of merit”, the most advanced is “order of magnitude”. The 
next steps in preconstruction involve a design and planning phase, which includes a prefeasibility and feasibility study 
stage. Once these phases are successfully completed, a mine project team will require commissioning approval, and can 
initiate the construction phase.   
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2010), and gendered impacts (Debasree, 2015; Ghose, 2008; Lahiri-Dutt, 2014). The disjuncture 
between the sector’s stated policy compliance and practices on the ground is another core focus of 
case studies. The weakness of resettlement safeguards in mining, and failure of government and 
companies to regulate and enforce legal and regulatory standards, has been the subject of several 
studies (Mares, 2012; Ray & Saini, 2011; Szablowski, 2002, 2006a, 2007). The inadequacy of 
company resettlement process to account for risks, including those presented by the social and 
political context of operations, is highlighted to exacerbate local-level conflict, and leads to 
violations in human rights (Alexandrescu, 2011b; Farrell, Hamann, & Mackres, 2012; Golub, 2014; 
Hemer, 2016). 
In summary, it is clear that contributions to the literature have been made from two 
prominent vantage points: either MCDR is approached as a generic subset within the DCDR 
literature, or it is seen as a “complicating factor” within the extractives and society literature (Owen 
& Kemp, 2015). A complicating factor is that resettlement is one of many social issues, such as 
migration and conflict, which impact the performance of a mine operation. Researchers contributing 
to the field from a DCDR standpoint tend to replicate dominant investigative interests of the 
broader field, without accounting for the distinct characteristics of the mining sector. How 
companies respond to uncertainty and volatility in land access strategies, or a brownfields 
resettlement legacy, remains unexamined within an empirical case. Furthermore, established work 
emphasises the post-resettlement impacts reflecting the broader trend in DCDR literature. In 
building upon this work, in the following section I argue that the predisplacement phase is also a 
significant yet largely unexamined gap in the DCDR literature.  
In this thesis, I seek to shed light on the dynamic and negotiated aspect of a mining 
resettlement process, rather than treat resettlement as an outcome or complicating factor. The kinds 
of barriers and enabling factors that shape resettlement processes are underexplored, and greater 
insight into the implementation practices of MCDR represents an original and complementary 
contribution to established work. Examination of how the characteristics of MCDR play out in 
practice will help improve coherence of – and in – the field more broadly. Given the limitations of 
research about resettlement and mining, I return to the broader field of DCDR to examine 
established knowledge on the planning and implementation of resettlement.  
 
The “Problem” of Resettlement Practice 
The planning and implementation of resettlement is a neglected issue within the academic 
field of DCDR, and in policy and practice debates. While the emphasis on post-resettlement impacts 
indicates challenges in the planning and implementation of resettlement, limited research has been 
dedicated to what goes “wrong” in the process (Cernea, 2006; Mathur, 2013a; Oliver-Smith, 2009). 
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Prominent DCDR scholar Hari Mohan Mathur describes established research about the 
management and practice of resettlement as both “woefully inadequate” (2006, pp. 45-46) and 
“rather appalling” (2013a, p. 90). He argues that DCDR scholars and policymakers underestimate 
the complexity of resettlement planning and implementation, conceiving of the process far too 
simplistically. Rew, Fisher and Pandey (2006, p. 38) similarly contend that the lack of attention on 
resettlement implementation is “disconcerting”. They argue that greater research emphasise must be 
paid to the institutional process of policy implementation, referred to within this thesis as “practice” 
(Rew et al., 2006).  
One entry point in developing the literature on resettlement practice is to examine the way 
that policy becomes enacted, understood, and potentially reworked by actors on the ground. In the 
area of resettlement practice, the “resource deficits” and “inherent complexity” represent two 
explanations for the challenge of implementing resettlement policy (de Wet, 2009).25 The resource 
deficits explanation reflects the managerial perspective that resettlement is an issue of management 
and planning. Within the field, a resettlement action plan (RAP) is the key mechanism for guiding 
resettlement implementation.26 As one of the most prolific writers on critical management issues, 
Mathur (2006, 2011, 2013b, 2016a) has argued that resettlements repeatedly fail because project 
developers underestimate the necessary investment in the RAP. Mathur (2013b) discusses the 
piecemeal approach taken by project developers in the planning and implementation of RAPs in 
Rajasthan and India. Mathur finds critical shortages in budget, staff, skills, and time; and inadequate 
consultation and participation. The deficits are exacerbated by a lack of national and regional legal 
frameworks, policies, and political will to govern RAP implementation. Recommendations arising 
from Mathur’s examination focus on a set of normative procedures that appear self-evident: 
improving the detail of planning, increasing coordination between agencies and affected peoples, a 
more realistic budget, time-scale, and so forth. According to Mathur (2013b), the availability and 
proper utilisation of these economic and technical inputs somewhat guarantees success in 
resettlement. 
                                                 
25 I prefer the term “resource deficits” in place of “inadequate inputs” as originally coined by de Wet.  
26 The RAP lays out the strategy and implementation plan required to consult and negotiate with impacted 
communities and landowners over compensation and other benefits. While the institutional arrangements, legal 
requirements, and content of a RAP will vary from project to project, all RAPs generally contain several distinct 
planning phases. These include: (a) an assessment of the full range of project impacts, including loss of land and 
immovable property and assets; (b) the enunciation of principles and guidelines to mitigate losses; (c) categorisation of 
the potentially affected persons by loss and definition of specific entitlements to compensation and assistance for each 
category; (d) the outline of measures to facilitate relocation and ensure income restoration; (e) designation of the 
responsibility for managing resettlement and monitoring its progress (Mathur, 2013b, p. 93). 
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The inherent complexity explanation posits that the problem of failed resettlement is an 
outcome of both resource deficits and specific characteristics that render elements of the DCDR 
process unamenable to a rational planning approach. Like Owen and Kemp’s (2015) observations of 
MCDR, de Wet (2015) argues that some characteristics of displacement and resettlement processes 
are not adequately addressed by academics, policymakers, and resettlement planners. Drawing on 
cases from Africa, de Wet highlights how the combination of externally imposed spatial change, 
new challenges to accessing resources, and accelerated socioeconomic change on resettled 
populations gives rise to particular challenges that cannot always be anticipated or planned for. The 
complexity of resettlement corresponds to the interrelatedness of a range of cultural, social, 
environmental, economic, institutional, and political issues that operate at different levels of the 
process. These challenges not only face affected people as they respond to a new settler context, but 
are also a dynamic of how policy safeguards are translated and negotiated by different actors 
involved in the process of RAP implementation.  
In review of these two explanations for the challenge of resettlement practice, it is clear that 
neither adequately accounts for the dynamic of implementation and interaction between actors at 
the frontline. Prior research highlights that resettlement implementation is itself a problematic 
institutional process (for example see de Wet, 2015; Rew, Fisher, & Pandey, 2000; Rew et al., 
2006; Szablowski, 2002). By way of explanation, Rew et al. (2006) provide a visual on the 
institutional process of resettlement. They depict it as a landscape comprising three arenas of action: 
hilltop, plateau, and swamp (see Figure 1). At the “hilltop”, investors, private companies, 
government, and other actors influence and set normative, regulatory, and/or legal mandates to 
guide project developers. At the “plateau”, in-country managers and engineers from government, 
company headquarters, or district towns coordinate the translation of this guidance into practical 
plans and activities. At the bottom of the hill is a complex “swamp” of project detail that ultimately 
results in outcomes for affected people (Rew et al., 2006, p. 50). Rew et al. (2006) use the term 
“policy-practice” to highlight that the implementation of policy into practice is part of one process. 
De Wet (2002); Rew et al. (2006), and Szablowski (2007) have each argued that resettlement policy 
is transformed in the interaction between actors at the various levels of the institutional process.  
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Figure 1. The institutional process of resettlement: Tracing “policy-practice” from the hilltop to the 
swamp (adaptation from Rew et al., 2006). 
At each level of the institutional process, the meaning and intent of resettlement policy-
practice is reworked to accommodate the concerns of various interest groups. De Wet (2009, p. 40) 
argues that complexity in the institutional process of resettlement relates to the cumulation of 
factors that undermine a smooth translation of policy intent. Generic factors include: poor 
communication and coordination between various agencies and organisational units; work pressure 
and (dis)incentives at each level of the process; constraints in human capacity; and resource 
shortages. This cumulation of challenges ultimately ends in a situation where frontline resettlement 
workers or practitioners are left with considerable discretion over how and what resettlement 
entails. De Wet (2009, p. 41) warns that resettlement policy “effectively becomes what local-level 
officials make of it on the ground”. Surprisingly, however, of all the arenas of action identified in 
Figure 1, the “swamp” is least examined within the DCDR literature. 
The value of examining implementation dynamics in the “swamp” is substantiated in other 
fields of research. Observation of policy translation in the public sector has led some scholars to 
conclude that “policy implementation in the end comes down to the people who actually implement 
it” (Lipsky, 1980). In the field of DCDR, Rew et al. (2006) examination of frontline practitioners is 
a standout contribution for its focus on the challenges of resettlement implementation. In examining 
public sector resettlement projects in India and Uganda, the research highlights practitioners’ 
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apathetic and resentful attitudes to working at the coalface with affected people. The research also 
suggests cash compensation was lost through corruption or squandered on non-resettlement 
activities. In both cases, frontline practitioners were shown to exercise a high degree of discretion 
over client treatment. In Orissa, India, a cumulation of understaffing, the burden of multiple 
responsibilities, and lack of skills meant practitioners were neither empathetic nor responsive to 
affected people’s concerns. In Uganda, government officials with no specialised experience in 
resettlement were placed in charge of relocating the population without any specific guidance. 
There is significant scope for building knowledge on the challenges of resettlement implementation 
at the interface between actor groups engaged in the process. While the examined cases suggest 
critical resourcing challenges and disincentives in the implementation process, this thesis considers 
a more dynamic view on how heterogeneity in actors integrates and expectations shape and distort 
practice. This research is thus situated within one of the less examined phases of resettlement 
implementation. 
The predisplacement phase of resettlement has not been a sustained focus of research within 
the field of DCDR (Koirala et al., 2017). A notable exception is Perera’s (2014) study of the 
proposed West Seti Hydropower Project in Nepal. The research concentrates on the significance 
and impacts of the predisplacement phase. The study centres on a critique of the IRR model. Perera 
argues that the model cannot adequately deal with the impact of predisplacement because it is 
limited in two key respects. First, the model assumes that impoverishment risks manifest following 
physical displacement. As evidenced by the study, “potentially” affected people had already 
experienced psychological trauma, impoverishment, and social disarticulation despite the fact that 
they were yet to be displaced. Second, Perera shows that the predictive-cum-planning capacity of 
the model was limited. In the examined case, it was unable to predict that failed or delayed project 
development “would force people to encounter all or most of multiple vulnerabilities listed in the 
model” (Perera, 2014b, p. 85).  
The findings of Perera’s research open up avenues for new research. In theory, the phase 
should represent a critical moment for building relationships and setting shared expectations 
between actors. For example, Cane’s (2014) research about the gendered dimensions of mining in 
Mongolia has highlighted the phase as an important “expectation setting” period between actors. 
MCDR scholars Owen and Kemp (2016) are optimistic that front-loading resources in the 
preparation phase might offset the traumatic impacts of displacement. Nonetheless, many studies 
touch upon, but do not specifically examine, the predisplacement phase. This is surprising given 
that guidance by the World Bank, IFC, and ICMM describes this phase as involving intensive 
engagement with affected people for data collection, consultation, and information sharing and 
negotiation over the content and process of land acquisition and resettlement. A contribution of this 
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thesis is therefore to build understanding of the dynamics, expectations, understandings, or 
misunderstandings that can occur during the predisplacement phase. 
 
Theoretical Focus  
This research draws from actor-oriented sociology to examine Resettlement with 
Development practice in the context of mining.27 The actor-oriented approach originates from the 
Manchester School of Anthropology and was popularised through the work of sociologists Norman 
and Ann Long, and Alberto Arce. These scholars sought to advance a more sophisticated treatment 
of social change and development intervention than has been widely prompted by the dominant 
modernisation, political economy, and neo-Marxist theories (Long, 2001; Mosse, 2013). By 
comparison, the actor-oriented approach attempts to account for the “complexity of policy as 
institutional practice” through examination of an intervention interface (Mosse, 2004, p. 644).  
The actor-oriented approach takes policy intervention and outcomes as socially constructed 
and negotiated processes in which contests of meanings, purposes, and powers are central. The role 
of “human agency” and self-organising processes is of central importance. Long (2015) explains 
that “agency refers to the knowledgeability, capability and social embeddedness associated with 
acts of doing (and reflecting) that impact upon or shape one’s own and others’ actions and 
interpretations” (p. 38). As such, different social forms develop under the same or similar structural 
circumstances as different actors attempt to “come to grips, cognitively and organisationally, with 
the situation they face” (Long, 2015, p. 37). This is because intervention outcomes are shaped by 
the “mutual determination” of both “internal” and “external” factors and relationships (Long, 1984, 
p. 276). The actor-oriented approach therefore conceives of differential patterns of social behaviour 
as being grounded in terms of “knowing, active subject[s]” (Knorr, 1981, p. 4, cited in Long, 2015, 
p. 37) and not merely due to the differential impact of broad “external” forces, such as demographic 
pressure or incorporation into capitalism. For example, through examination of development 
interventions in the Peruvian Andes and other locations, Long (2001) demonstrates that while 
structural factors may constrain an intervention process, all actors are capable of exercising some 
form of “power” over project processes. Of the more vulnerable or marginalised actors, he argued 
that: 
Within the limits of information, uncertainty and the other constrains (e.g. physical, 
normative or politico-economic) that exist, social actors are “knowledgeable” and “capable”. 
They attempt to solve problems, learn how to intervene in the flow of social events around 
them, and monitor continuously their own actions, observing how others react to their 
behaviours and taking note of the various contingent circumstances. (Long, 1990, p. 8) 
                                                 
27 Norman Long’s Sociology of Development (2001) is a core reference informing this thesis. 
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The actor-oriented approach highlights that intervention processes are often characterised by 
social difference, diversity, and conflict. As such, the aim of the researcher is to illuminate the types 
and sources of social discontinuity and linkage that underscore implementation dynamics and 
processes at the social interface. Use of the word interface extends beyond a dictionary definition of 
a face-to-face interaction between two parties. The interface is a site of interaction between people 
with “different fields or levels of social organisation” and potentially “discrepancies and 
discontinuities of value, interest, knowledge and power” (Long, 2004, p. 16). Long and Long (1992) 
depict the interface of a development intervention as a “battlefield of knowledge” or contested arena 
in which actors’ understandings, interests, and values are pitched against one another. It is through 
the examination of this interface that various kinds of “negotiated orders, accommodations, 
oppositions, separations and contradictions” arise, and actors work to stabilise interpretations and 
influence perceptions of intervention “success” or “failure” (Long, 2004, p. 15). 
Actors and individuals engaged at the frontline of intervention activity naturally play an 
important role in the analysis of how policy or official plans are “put into action, reshaped or 
radically transformed” in the implementation process (Long, 2004, p. 24). It is at the interface 
where implementation practice becomes oriented towards problems of bridging, accommodating, 
segregating, or contesting social, evaluative, and cognitive standpoints. As such, some scholars 
focus attention to the important role of “brokers” in “translating” intervention goals in practice 
(Lewis & Mosse, 2006, p. 10).28  
Brokers are the individuals (e.g., company managers, frontline practitioners, or household 
members) working along the fault lines of the Project – the interface – who navigate the co-
existence of the different rationalities, interests, and expectations (Lewis & Mosse, 2006, p. 15). 
“Translation” describes the work that brokers undertake to enrol the support of various social actors 
towards a particular intervention outcome (Latour, 1996, pp. 85-86). 29 The work of translation does 
not unify social actors with potentially divergent interests, but rather enables the formation of a 
heterogeneous grouping. By examining the work of translation, research can potentially highlight 
the areas of development practice that are often hidden or silenced by policy or plans, yet remain 
                                                 
28 The “interface” metaphor is increasingly being criticised as conveying a false sense of compartmentalisation 
between the “life-worlds” of social actors. Rossi (2004) and others have argued that no such division exists and 
demonstrates that project staff may identify as a company worker and member of the recipient group, thus potentially 
managing simultaneous and potentially conflicting interests. 
29 The concept of translation can be likened to Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987) notion of assemblage 
(agencement), which describes the “flexible, contingent and continuous work of pulling disparate elements together” 
through project practices (Mosse, 2013, p. 231). Whereas the use of the actor-orientated approaches seeks to 
demonstrate how power is exercised by all social actors (to varying degrees), the assemblage lens tends to be used as a 
way of demonstrating how powerful actors override the interests of less powerful actors. For example, see Li (2007). 
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“critical to understanding how events actually unfold in particular settings and why interventions do 
or do not work” (Lewis & Mosse, 2006, p. 15).30  
This thesis proceeds by focusing on the unfolding implementation dynamics at the interface 
of an empirical case study of Resettlement with Development. The resource deficits and inherent 
complexity explanations for resettlement implementation have not adequately accounted for the 
dynamics of practice. By adopting an actor-oriented approach, the research provides an original 
contribution to the established DCDR literature by highlighting how practice, meaning, and power 
are enacted in context, and the dynamic of interaction and engagement between actors (see Figure 
2). In Chapter Five, I examine the frontline practitioner’s role in translating policy intent in their 
daily interactions and practice with recipient households. Chapter Six examines the meaning and 
value of the practice from the perspective of actors embedded at the interface. Chapter Seven places 
the question of power and agency at the centre of analysis, and considers how actors navigate 
divergent interests and expectations in the process.  
 
 
Figure 2. Theoretical focus. 
                                                 
30 Scott (1990) was perhaps one of the most influential authors in recognising the existence of complex sets of 
largely concealed personal, community, and institutional “system goals” which co-exist as “hidden transcripts” with 
official goals, or “public transcripts” in development projects. 
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Chapter Summary 
This chapter has established the need to better understand the interactive dynamics, experiences 
and expectations of actors engaged at the interface of Resettlement with Development practice. 
Human displacement for large-scale infrastructure development is widely criticised for failing to 
protect people who move to accommodate projects. The issue is particularly contentious where 
households and communities are left impoverished by private sector, for-profit projects and raises 
questions about the ethics and distribution of associated risks and benefits. Some academics and 
policymakers advocate that resettlement ought to be conceived as a sustainable development 
intervention, effectively recasting affected people as project beneficiaries rather than victims of 
displacement. Nonetheless, this literature review identifies four research agendas warranting further 
attention in the DCDR literature.  
First is to build knowledge on the practical considerations and dilemmas of Resettlement 
with Development practice. Given that policy concepts represent “the emanation of complex webs 
of interests, ideologies, and power”, greater insight is needed on how project developers practically 
interpret and operationalise this policy intent within a project setting (Molle, 2008, p. 132). Second, 
the review suggests the importance of ongoing investigation into DCDR for the private sector. 
Mining-focused research is an underdeveloped subset of DCDR literature. The implication of 
mining characteristics, such as planning uncertainty and brownfield tendencies, are ill-explored in 
practice. Third, the institutional process of resettlement was identified to involve multiple levels and 
actors and, potentially, varied interests and expectations of the process. Of this institutional process, 
dynamics at the coalface of resettlement implementation are least examined. Drawing from an 
actor-oriented theoretical lens, this research seeks to understand how embedded actors’ interests and 
expectations become engaged or sidelined in this process, and to what effect. Fourth, the research 
responds to calls for contributions on the less-examined predisplacement phase of land acquisition 
and resettlement processes. The following chapter details how these research agendas might be 
translated into an appropriate methodology which asks how Resettlement with Development 
practice is integrated, understood, and used by actors in the predisplacement phase of land 
acquisition and resettlement for mining.  
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CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY 
 
Introduction 
An actor-oriented theoretical lens focuses on multiple actors’ subjective experiences, 
attitudes, priorities, and actions at the social interface (Long, 2001). Gaining insight into 
Resettlement with Development practice, therefore, requires a methodology which centres on the 
experience of embedded social actors, and accounts for the mutual determination of internal and 
external factors and relationships (Long, 1984). This approach involves developing a qualitative 
methodology that is both appropriate for cross-cultural research and informed by ontological and 
epistemological assumptions underpinning the social constructivist-interpretivist paradigm of 
sociological inquiry (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994). In this chapter, I outline the development of such a 
methodology and detail how I applied it to the La Granja case study. 
This chapter is organised in five main sections. The first describes the ontological and 
epistemological guidelines that underpin social constructivism and interpretivism, and the 
implications for developing an appropriate research design. I locate myself within the study and 
discuss my approach to reflexivity and cross-cultural research. Second, I provide a rationale for 
examining the research questions via a single case study. Third, I review my selection of four 
mutually reinforcing methods, in order to elicit thick, rich, and descriptive qualitative data. These 
are: (a) semi-structured and in-depth interviews; (b) direct and participatory observations; (c) 
recording of a field diary; and (d) document analysis. The fourth section details an iterative, 
recursive, and dynamic data analysis process, which coincides with data collection. Fifth, I describe 
a series of credibility procedures employed in the study to ensure rigour of the findings and address 
ethical questions raised by the research. 
 
Developing an Appropriate Methodology 
The research question guiding this investigation aims to explore the context-specific, 
perceptions and experiences of multiple actors at the interface of Resettlement with Development 
practice. The question is informed by actor-oriented theory, which calls for building an in-depth 
understanding of the “social life” of planned interventions, and “the processes by which images, 
identities and social practices are shared, contested, negotiated, and sometimes rejected by the 
various actors” (Long, 2004, p. 16). The nature of the research question and adopted theory reflect 
an ontological position based in social constructivism. 
According to social constructivism, all knowledge (and therefore meaningful reality) is 
viewed as “a collection of local and specific realities, which are constructed and interpreted through 
interactions and experiences in everyday life” (Crotty, 1998, p. 42). It thus opposes the ontological 
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realism of positivist science, which claims that meaning resides in the world independently of 
consciousness (Hammersley, 1992) and which provides “little room for exploration and 
interpretation of multiple perspectives” (Nagy Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 2006, p. ix). An interpretivist 
epistemology goes hand in hand with social constructivism.  
Interpretivism places central importance on the emic perspective – verstehen – or how social 
actors interpret the complex world of their lived experience (Schwandt, 1994). Knowledge is 
understood as interpreted by those who construct it (i.e., research participants), and then again by 
those who seek to understand it (i.e., the researcher). Thus, research findings do not represent an 
objective understanding of the other, but are rather “co-constructed” (Schwandt, 1994). The 
researcher is involved in the activities in which their observations and interpretations take place, 
and thus interpretations are tacitly shaped by their own biographical and theoretical perspectives 
(Long, 2004). Drawing on the constructivist-interpretivist paradigm and actor-oriented theory, I 
outline a set of ontological and epistemological guidelines that inform my methodological 
approach. 
The first guideline is to adopt the principle of the hermeneutic circle: to build an 
understanding of “a complex whole from preconceptions about the meanings of its parts and their 
interrelationships” (Klein & Myers, 1999, p. 71). In adopting actor-oriented theory, this “whole” is 
the case study, which centres on the “social interface” of an intervention process. As described in 
Chapter Three, a social interface is an organised entity of interlocking relationships and 
intentionalities (Long, 1990). It provides a useful heuristic device for “identifying and analysing the 
critical points of intersection between different fields or levels of social organisation since it is at 
these interfaces that discrepancies and discontinuities of value, interest, knowledge and power are 
clearly revealed” (Long, 1999). In applying the principle of the hermeneutic circle to my research, I 
have considered the interdependent meaning of parts (i.e., different actor perceptions and 
experiences), and the whole that they form (i.e., the social interface) in my approach to analysing 
and presenting the data. 
The second guideline is to recognise knowledge as always situated, and partial. It emerges 
out of “a complex interplay of social, cognitive, cultural, institutional and situational elements”, and 
is, therefore, “essentially provisional, partial and contextual in nature” (Long & Long, 1992, pp. 
212-213). This principle has several implications for my research. Initially, I acknowledge that data 
interpretations are situated within social and historical contexts (Klein & Myers, 1999, p. 73). I 
have therefore provided the reader with an in-depth understanding of how the current situation 
under investigation emerged in Chapter Two. Later, recognising knowledge as partial requires me 
to critically reflect on how I have influenced data collection and interpretations (Klein & Myers, 
1999, p. 73). As will be elaborated, I have undertaken a process of documenting my reflections and 
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have engaged an iterative approach in the process of data collection and analysis (Willig, 2017). 
Finally, significant thought was given to identifying the idiographic details relevant to the La 
Granja case, from phenomena that can contribute to theory building, and for which theoretical 
generalisations can be made (Klein & Myers, 1999, p. 72). I elaborate on this point as part of the 
research limitations in Chapter Nine. 
The third guideline is to acknowledge the coexistence of multiple interpretations. 
Researchers must be sensitive to the “possible differences in interpretations among the participants” 
(Klein & Myers, 1999, p. 72). In adopting an actor-oriented approach, I have sought to highlight the 
heterogeneity of interpretations both within actor groups (i.e., company personnel) and between 
them (i.e., households and NGO personnel). I have presented the thesis findings to provide the 
reader with a sense of divergence and similarity in participant interpretations. I have also 
maintained sensitivity to possible biases and systematic distortions that are introduced in participant 
narratives by actively seeking disconfirming evidence and member checking (Creswell & Dana, 
2000). I elaborate on the application of these principles in the research credibility section of this 
chapter. 
Finally, qualitative methods fit with methodologies which seek to build an understanding of 
the emic perspective, and the role of interaction in constructing how we understand the social world 
(Guba & Lincoln, 1994). Qualitative methods provide participants with flexibility in determining 
and exploring the concepts, perceptions, and feelings relevant to their lived experience. Quantitative 
methods can limit participant responses, for example, to predetermined categories of a survey 
(Neuman, 2012). Given that this research is exploratory, I deemed the use of multiple qualitative 
methods as useful and appropriate for data collection. In the following table (Table 2), I provide the 
reader with a summary of my research design which indicates how I have linked the research 
questions, data sources, and methods in this thesis. The remainder of this chapter is dedicated to 
expanding upon my research process.  
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Table 2. 
Summary of the Research Design 
Thesis chapter and research question Primary data source Secondary data source Method 
Chapter Four 
What are the key sociohistorical, political 
and economic contexts in which the practice 
is situated? 
Interview transcripts 
Researcher notes  
Public census 
Company baseline studies 
Academic research 
Mining company policy documents 
NGO policies/training manuals 
Media reports 
Interviews  
Observation  
Fieldwork diary 
Analysis of secondary data  
Chapter Five 
What are the everyday practices that aim to 
achieve “development” within this context?  
Interview transcripts  
Researcher notes  
Mining company policy and internal 
documentation 
NGO policies, presentations, practitioner 
training manuals, and “family files”. 
Interviews  
Observation  
Fieldwork diary 
Analysis of secondary data 
Chapter Six 
How is the meaning and value of the 
practice understood by actors engaged in the 
predisplacement activity?  
Interview transcripts 
Researcher notes 
 
 
 
Company public and internal documentation 
NGO public and internal documentation 
(presentations, practitioner training manuals, 
and household files) 
Interviews  
Fieldwork diary 
Analysis of secondary data 
 
Chapter Seven 
How do these same actors navigate 
heterogeneous interests and expectations of 
practice? 
Interview transcripts  
Researcher notes  
 
 
Company public and internal documentation 
NGO public and internal documentation 
(presentations) 
 
Interviews  
Observation  
Fieldwork diary 
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The role of the researcher 
The social constructivist paradigm recognises an investigator’s active role in knowledge 
production (Guba & Lincoln, 1994). Because interpretations are co-constructed, the findings 
necessarily reflect, and are influenced by, the researcher’s values, assumptions, and biases. It is 
therefore important to provide the reader with insights into my personal biography, and adopt a 
reflexive approach in the research process (Creswell, 2008). Reflexive research acknowledges and 
challenges the power and status accorded to researchers (Fechter, 2005). Here I offer a brief account of 
my relationship to the data and how I sought to maintain a reflexive approach to the collection and 
analysis process.  
My background as a middle-class, Anglo-Australian woman and “cultural outsider” (Acker, 
2001) has both enabled and constrained my interpretation of the La Granja case. My prior experience 
as a community development practitioner and mining researcher in Central and South America assisted 
me in connecting to the experience of NGO and company personnel. My familiarity with core concepts 
associated with their community of practice (such as “empowerment” or “business risk”) assisted me to 
bridge my lived experience and that of the research participant. As a young woman, my presence was 
relatively non-threatening, particularly to professional staff. My privileged background and image (tall, 
light hair, blue eyes) were perhaps most intimidating to local people, many of whom had very limited 
experience of foreigners. The gap between my lived experience as a researcher and that of the peasant 
farmer was significant. I have consulted the peasant studies and methodological literature on cross-
cultural research to provide guidance on how to conduct my research in an informed and culturally 
sensitive manner.  
In the process of undertaking this research, I have maintained a strong awareness of my position 
as an outsider, with limited local knowledge, cultural understanding, and language skills. In exercising 
reflexivity and cross-cultural understanding, I actively sought to engage “cultural brokers” who 
provided advice on how to understand and engage in the cultural landscape of the La Granja case 
(Liamputtong, 2008, p. 67). I consulted five Peruvian social scientists and anthropologists about my 
research and interpretations. I also spent extensive periods of time with key local informants during 
fieldwork, discussing and clarifying my understanding of social dynamics, and actor interests and 
expectations. By writing myself into the data chapters, I seek to remind the reader of my positionality 
within the findings, and where appropriate, offer the text of research participants who are best placed to 
provide their perspective. 
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The Case Study 
As outlined in Chapter One, this case study centres on the interactions and perceptions of actors 
engaged in resettlement preparations for the La Granja project in Peru (see Map 1). Interpretive case 
studies are compatible with the social constructivist paradigm (Creswell, 2014; Denzin & Lincoln, 
1994; Merriam, 2009). They provide opportunities to connect DCDR theory and involuntary 
resettlement policy with the localised practices and experiences of actors engaged at the interface of 
Resettlement with Development practice. I chose to examine the research questions via a single                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
case study. My rationale reflects the exploratory nature of the research questions, and the 
epistemological guidelines which centre on the importance of building depth of understanding. In 
Chapter Two, I established that Resettlement with Development − as policy ideal and practice − lacks 
conceptual clarity in the DCDR literature. A strength of the single case is to provide an opportunity to 
examine sensitive and ill-defined concepts in-depth and over time, with the use of multiple methods 
(e.g., interviews, observations, immersion) (Stake, 1995; Yin, 2013). The single case study lends itself 
well to opening new areas of social enquiry so that “thick description” (Geertz, 1973) and explanation 
of the phenomena can follow (Neuman, 2012). In the following section, I detail the rationale for 
selecting the La Granja case, my approach to defining conceptual boundaries of the case study, and my 
approach to gatekeeper access. 
 
La Granja case selection criteria 
I have selected the La Granja case based on five purposeful criteria. These criteria form a 
foundation for future comparative research and theoretical generalisation (Yin, 2013). First, the case 
represents an example of DCDR practice during the predisplacement phase. The predisplacement 
phase has not been a significant focus of DCDR in comparison to the post-displacement phase (Koirala 
et al., 2017). Fieldwork for this research coincides with activity at La Granja in preparation for 
resettlement. In mid-2012 company personnel informed local people of their plans to resettle the 
population by 2016. My arrival at the site in 2014 followed two and a half years of land acquisition and 
resettlement preparations. Household members were engaged in resettlement preparation activity via a 
dialogue and agreement-making process, and a household empowerment intervention. The timing of 
fieldwork therefore presented an opportunity to examine the research questions following a substantial 
period of company–community activity in preparation for displacement.   
Second, the case is an example of private sector–led DCDR processes. An emerging area of 
DCDR research is the implication of private sector displacement and resettlement (Price, 2010). The La 
Granja case constitutes an example of corporate-sponsored involuntary resettlement practice. The 
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Project is fully funded by multinational mining company Rio Tinto and does not require a loan from 
the IFC at this stage. Early-phase activity at the site is therefore largely self-regulated by the company. 
As construction and the displacement of local people has not been initiated, the government does not 
have significant presence at the site. Early phase project development requires that the company submit 
environmental and social impact studies to the state as part of the mine feasibility process. This does 
not require inputs from government officials, but rather, intensive stakeholder engagement between 
company and community personnel. This case is therefore an example of private sector–led DCDR 
processes in the predisplacement phase. 
Third, the case provides an example of Resettlement with Development practice. Rio Tinto 
report adherence to normative social and environmental safeguards, stipulated in the company’s global 
code of business conduct (see Rio Tinto, 2015a; Rio Tinto 2015b). All Rio Tinto projects and 
operations seek to comply with the IFC Performance Standard 5 on Land Acquisition and Involuntary 
Resettlement so that “resettled people and communities have their standard of living and livelihood 
sustainably restored or improved over the long term as a result of the resettlement” (Rio Tinto, n.d., p. 
1).31 In the La Granja case, the Project team sought to go beyond the minimum requirement of this 
standard − to minimise harm, and restore livelihoods and living stardards − and instead aspired to 
facilitate resettlemnet as development.  
Fourth, the case represents an example of displacement and resettlement practice in the mining 
sector. The academic field of MCDR is underdeveloped within DCDR studies (Owen & Kemp, 2015). 
The La Granja case has several characteristics which highlight it as a complex yet not atypical mining 
project. It is characterised as a greenfield project with a brownfield resettlement legacy; two companies 
have attempted and abandoned project development, yet a mine has never been constructed. The 
Project is speculated to be a first-class asset: tipped as one of the largest undeveloped copper deposits 
in the world with the potential to be a Top 10 copper producer in the future (Swanwpoel, 2013).32 
Given the anticipated size, the La Granja case will potentially have significant economic, social, and 
environmental impacts at the local, regional, and global scale.  
Fifth, the La Granja case is an example of MCDR in a resource-rich developing country 
context. I have characterised the Peruvian case as a resource-rich developing country because the state 
is “endowed with abundant non-renewable natural resources (hydrocarbons and minerals)” and is also 
                                                 
31 Rio Tinto has released specific guidance notes on compensation and benefits for land access to assist projects 
with the practical implementation of compensation and benefits (Rio Tinto, 2012) and resettlement (Rio Tinto, 2011). 
32 The La Granja project has proven reserves estimated at more than 2.8 billion tonnes at 0.51 per cent copper and 
0.11 per cent zinc (Flynn & Vergara, 2015). 
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“resource-dependent” (World Bank, 2015b, p. 2). The government derives a significant share of its 
gross national product, exports, and government revenues from exhaustible resources (KPMG, 2016). 
Sustained economic growth from the mining sector has spurred Peru to transition from a lower income 
country to a middle-income country, coinciding with dramatic decreases in poverty in the past three 
decades. Nonetheless, human development remains a challenge. Rural and marginalised populations, in 
particular, have ongoing poverty-related challenges; many continue to live in extreme poverty (UNDP, 
2016). In addition to these purposive criteria, the La Granja case was selected for strategic reasons, 
namely site access. In the following section, I elaborate on my approach to gaining access to the La 
Granja project site and the study participants.   
 
Fieldwork access and timeline 
I conducted fieldwork for this research over a period of seven months between July 2014 and 
February 2015. Three and a half months of this period was spent living at the NGO office in La Granja. 
My arrival in Peru initially involved negotiating site access. In this respect, I heeded the advice of 
Lofland, Snow, Anderson, and Lofland (2006), who recommend “outsider” researchers consider 
negotiation techniques and tactics to overcome possible political, legal, and bureaucratic barriers in an 
international context. In this respect, I sought advice from other Anglo researchers with experience 
conducting mining-focused research in Peru (in particular, reflections offered by David Szablowski and 
Mathew Himley were extremely helpful). I also initiated contact with senior company staff months 
before my arrival. On arrival in Lima in July 2014, I met with the director of the La Granja Social 
Project, who was already familiar with my research proposal. The director offered full support for my 
study, which I attribute in part to our signing of a visiting student deed, which stated that I must seek 
Rio Tinto’s permission to publish confidential information. No information was flagged as commercial 
in confidence in the course of the research. 
Company support for my research was also based on the pre-existing institutional relationship 
between Rio Tinto and the Centre for Social Responsibility in Mining (CSRM), where my primary 
supervisor Professor Kemp and I have worked for several years. Professor Kemp and I had examined 
the La Granja case on two occasions before initiating this doctoral research. The first was in 2011, 
when Professor Kemp co-managed a study on company–community conflict management and 
corporate culture in Peru with researchers from Harvard Kennedy Business School (see Rees, Kemp, & 
Davis, 2012). The second was in 2012, when we evaluated a pilot of the Household Empowerment 
Intervention, which is examined in this research (see Kemp & Ramsay, 2012). It is important to 
recognise that these studies, including my doctoral research, were wholly funded by independent 
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grants. Research funds provided by Professor Kemp, and an Australian Postgraduate Award (APA), 
support my fieldwork activities. 
Senior company personnel provided me with initial gatekeeper access to research participants in 
the La Granja case. Rio Tinto provided in-kind support including assistance in accessing company 
personnel at various levels of the organisational hierarchy, and company documents. Company 
personnel introduced me to senior members of the contracted NGO that was responsible for 
administering the Intervention. NGO practitioners later arranged meetings for me with the ronda 
campesino presidents in each sector of the direct area of influence, and with community leaders and 
household members on arrival at La Granja. While in Lima, I contacted several academics and 
consultants with knowledge of or experience with the La Granja case, or resettlement in Peru more 
broadly. 
Data collection for this research occurred at four sites across Peru: Lima, Chiclayo, La Granja 
village, and Trujillo (see Figure 3). In Lima, I spent time at the Rio Tinto La Granja project head office 
with senior and middle management. I also visited the coastal city of Chiclayo to interview staff at the 
La Granja project and NGO regional offices. Between August and November 2014, I lived in the NGO 
field office located in the La Granja village. From this location, I shadowed practitioners in their daily 
activities and met with company staff at the Project camp site and households involved in the company 
land acquisition and resettlement process. In December 2014, I visited the NGO headquarters in 
Trujillo for final interviews before returning to Lima.  
 
40 
 
Figure 3. Geographical sites visited during field research. 
Defining the case study boundaries 
By definition, a case study is an in-depth description and analysis of a bounded case (Merriam, 
2009; Yin, 2013). In defining the boundaries of the La Granja case, I have centred my analysis on the 
social interface of the company’s Household Empowerment Intervention, which I describe in greater 
detail in the following chapter. The Intervention connects embedded social actors− the mining 
company, NGO, and households − around a program of activity aimed at preparing households for 
Resettlement with Development. As depicted in Figure 4, the Intervention practice is at the heart of the 
study and is the primary unit of analysis. It intersects with the company’s other activities: the broader 
company land acquisition and resettlement process and corporate social investments (i.e., the Social 
Fund and Community Relations programs). The practice also intersects with the sociohistorical context 
of the La Granja project. Figure 4 demonstrates that the case study encompasses these fields and is 
located within a broader research context on mining and involuntary resettlement in Peru.  
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Figure 4. The La Granja case study. 
 
Using Mixed Methods 
Case studies must use a broad range of data sources, methods, and analytic strategies to support 
the intensive nature of the research process and generate rich, contextual details and descriptions 
(Stake, 1995; Yin, 2013). Ethnographic techniques are useful in interpretive case studies (Madden, 
2010) and actor-oriented research (Long, 2001). They assist a researcher in elucidating “social 
meanings, purposes and powers” within and between actor groups, in a natural setting (Long, 2004, 
p. 15). I have selected four mutually reinforcing methods aimed at generating qualitative data on the La 
Granja case. These are (a) semi-structured and in-depth interviews, (b) direct and participatory 
observations, (c) recording of a fieldwork diary, and (d) document analysis. 
The choice of methods is tied to my research questions and theoretical grounding in actor-
oriented sociology, which lends from a post-structural and interpretivist epistemology. The decision 
also reflects the practicalities of fieldwork. The methods are shaped by issues of access, constraints on 
time and resources, building relationships with participants, and my evolving understanding of local 
contexts through time spent in the field. In many ways, my approach resembles an ethnography, where 
a researcher attempts “to get to grips with the contexts and contents of different people’s everyday 
social, cultural, political and everyday lives” (Crang & Cook, 2007). I have consulted several texts on 
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ethnography in the process of grappling with the design of this research. While I use ethnographic 
methods, my study is not presented as an ethnography.33 
Ethnography is associated primarily with observation during long periods of immersion in a 
research context; however, not all researchers who use observation consider themselves ethnographers 
(Ouroussoff, 2001). Time and resource constraints limited the time I spent in the field to seven months, 
meaning that I could never achieve the cultural “insider” relationship underpinning ethnographic 
research. Instead, I have drawn from ethnographic methodology where appropriate (e.g., in my 
approach to data analysis, which involved the analysis of primary data such as participant interview 
transcripts, and my field notes and personal reflections).  
 
The sample 
The data sample comprises 119 interviews, observations of 60 ethnographic events, and the 
analysis of 26 documents (see Table 3). Unless otherwise stated, all data generated in this research was 
collected in Spanish, and translated by me into English.34 The data represents a non-probability, 
purposive sample, which I generated by applying a snowball sampling technique during fieldwork. The 
snowball technique − also known as chain referral, network, or reputational sampling − helps a 
researcher to recruit informants of a target population by drawing on individuals’ interconnected 
networks of people (Creswell, 2014; Neuman, 2012). The snowball technique was a suitable sampling 
approach, as I could not predetermine the research participants ahead of fieldwork. Access to 
individuals and resources − including private company documentation − was negotiated in the process 
of data collection.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
33 Key documents consulted in the design of this study include Cefkin (2009) and Ouroussoff (2001) for guidance 
on ethnography with corporations. Crang and Cook (2007), Emerson, Fretz, and Shaw (2011), Madden (2010) and 
Liamputtong (2008) deal with how to undertake cross-cultural ethnographic field research, analyse data, and address many 
of the practical challenges arising throughout fieldwork. 
34 As an intermediate Spanish speaker, I conducted data collection activities unaided. I always sought to record 
conversations (with consent) and cross-check ambiguity to ensure rigour of my translations. I consulted an experienced 
Peruvian anthropologist with familiarity with the project site on Andean slang and terminology. I hired a professional 
translator and a research assistant to support the translation of official research documents (such as the participant informant 
sheets) and the transcription of recorded Spanish interviews, which I later translated.  
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Table 3. 
Sample Overview 
Data collection Sample 
Interviews  119 interviews with 82 participants  
Observation 60 ethnographic events 
• 33 household visitations 
• 8 public company–community meetings 
• 7 closed company–NGO meetings 
• 6 closed NGO meetings 
• 6 NGO, company, and community workshops 
Fieldwork diary 
 
Fieldwork diary: Approximately 60,000 words. Containing 
descriptive and reflexive notes and photos 
Document analysis 26 documents reviewed on the La Granja project land acquisition 
and resettlement process and case context 
 
The sample comprises four informant groups: (a) mining company, (b) NGO personnel, (c) 
local informants from the direct project area of influence, and (d) “qualified” informants. I briefly 
detail the characteristics of these informant groups before elaborating on the methods used for data 
collection below.  
The first informant group are mining company personnel. In building a company sample, the 
primary focus was to recruit as many company staff as possible who were connected to the social 
project activity for land access. Where possible, I also included previous employees who played an 
instrumental role in the design and administration of the land acquisition and resettlement process. The 
secondary focus was to build a holistic sample by engaging individuals at different levels of the 
organisational hierarchy and across diverse teams. I recruited informants from senior and field-site 
positions from all five teams in the social project: Community Relations (henceforth CR), Land 
Acquisition and Resettlement (henceforth LA&R), Social Studies and Systems, Regional Development, 
and Employment and Procurement.  
The second informant group are NGO personnel. Given the finite size of the NGO team, I 
recruited all working staff to the study (13 in total). To increase the breadth of NGO perspectives, I 
recruited three former practitioners for interviews. An additional seven ex-practitioners declined or did 
not respond to my request.35 While the relative size of the NGO sample is small, remaining staff are 
longstanding employees. Sixty-five per cent of the sample had worked in La Granja on the Intervention 
since its initiation in 2012.  
                                                 
35 In the months before my fieldwork, the NGO workforce at La Granja was reduced from 26 to ten personnel as a 
result of a reduction in the company's project activity  
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The third informant group are local informants, also referred to as households or household 
members within this thesis. In building my household sample, I targeted two types of informants: 
household members (heads and spouses) participating in the Intervention, and community leaders (the 
presidents of the ronda campesino). I generated a diverse local sample on account of four criteria. The 
first criterion was geographic. I collected data in all communities across the direct area of influence (La 
Pampa, La Iraca, La Lima, La Uñiga, and Checos). Second, I aimed to capture diversity of perspectives 
on the basis of age. I collected an even spectrum of perspectives from young adults and more senior 
community members. Third, I was cognisant to incorporate roughly even numbers of male and female 
voices. Fourth, I was interested to hear a diversity of perspectives and experiences on the Intervention. 
During fieldwork I was conscious to seek out different opinions on the Resettlement with Development 
practice; I used the snowball method to connect with household members reported to have both 
positive and negative experiences.  
The fourth and final informant group are qualified informants. I use the term “qualified” to refer 
to consultants and academics with knowledge of the sociohistorical and political contexts of the study. I 
consulted three types of qualified informants: (a) thematic, (b) mining sector, and (c) case study. 
Thematic informants are Peruvian or foreign academics with experience conducting research on the 
topic of involuntary resettlement and the mining sector in Peru. Mining sector informants provided 
insider knowledge on the Peruvian mining sector or particular cases of resettlement. Case study 
informants are individuals with experience or in-depth knowledge of the La Granja case. Many 
previously worked at the La Granja project.  
 
Interviews 
The first method adopted in this study was interviews. Two interview techniques were 
employed to satisfy Yin’s (2009, p. 106) recommendation that case-study interviews must provide for 
flexibility and discovery, while simultaneously meeting the line of inquiry within the interview 
protocol. These techniques are semi-structured (n = 61) and unstructured interviews (n = 58). Semi-
structured interviews are conversations guided by open-ended questions which touch upon themes. The 
researcher is afforded flexibility in the sequencing of questions, and to probe into participant 
experience and interests (Minichiello, Aroni, Timewell, & Alexander, 1990). Unstructured interviews 
(or ethnographic interviews) afford even greater flexibility (Burgess, 1984). The technique is in many 
ways an extension of participant observation, as interviews are unplanned, rather, the researcher 
generates questions “quickly and smoothly” during extended interaction (Patton, 2002, p. 343). The 
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focus is to create deep insight into the interviewees’ social reality, and thus explore potentially 
unanticipated themes (Y. Zhang & Wildemuth, 2009).  
I held semi-structured interviews with the company, NGO, and local informants. I developed 
three tailored interview protocols to guide the interview process; each one outlined the procedural level 
of interviewing and included an introduction, a series of open-ended questions, and a close out. I issued 
all interviewees with a research information sheet in Spanish (see Appendix A and B), which detailed 
the nature and purpose of the research, and how the results would be used. I held interviews in a 
location most convenient to the interviewee, typically in the Rio Tinto corporate office, NGO La 
Granja office, or the home of a local informant. I explained that participation in, and recording of the 
interview was voluntary and subject to informed written or verbal consent. The protocol centred on 
four thematic areas: 
1. The sociohistorical context of mine activity in La Granja  
2. Knowledge and experience of Rio Tinto’s land acquisition and resettlement process 
3. Knowledge and experience of the Household Empowerment Intervention 
4. Perceptions of recent change, power, and decision-making.  
Though unstructured interviews are primarily driven by interviewee narratives, it is also 
acceptable for a researcher to prompt with an “aide memoire” (Minichiello et al., 1990) or agenda, 
thereby ensuring a degree of consistency across different interview sessions (Y. Zhang & Wildemuth, 
2009). My unstructured interviews were always loosely based on the four thematic areas. The 
technique enabled me to achieve deeper insights on particular themes with different participants. Time 
constraints meant that I was not always able to achieve the same depth during each semi-structured 
interview. Unstructured interviews with the company, NGO, local, and qualified informants occurred 
on an opportunistic basis. I met with professional staff for coffee or lunch and spoke with local 
informants before and after community events. Time spent living with the NGO practitioners afforded 
me many opportunities to discuss my themes, as will be elaborated in the Observations section below. 
I documented all interviews through handwritten notes and digital recordings with informed 
consent. Where possible, I sought to simultaneously take notes during interviews. Most mining 
company and NGO interviews were digitally recorded, which assisted me to concentrate more fully on 
asking questions and responding to the interviewee in the knowledge that I would return to the 
recording later. In the interviews that I did not record (i.e., with household members), I sought to 
46 
transcribe and expand upon handwritten notes in as much detail as possible directly following the 
interview. Table 4 provides a breakdown of my interview sample.36  
 
Table 4. 
Semi-structured (SS) and Unstructured (US) Interview Sample 
Informant 
group Type 
Participants Interviews 
Primary Secondary SS US 
Local 
informants Household members and leaders 28 10 23 18 
NGO 
personnel  
Management 3 – 3 1 
Fieldwork practitioner 9 – 14 9 
Mining 
company 
personnel 
Senior and middle management 6 – 10 7 
Site leadership and field personnel  11 – 11 9 
Qualified 
informants 
Thematic expert 3 – – 4 
Mining expert 4 3 – 4 
Case study expert 4 1 – 4 
Total 
68 14 61 58 
82 119 
 
Observation 
The second method adopted in this study is observation. In qualitative research, observation 
refers to “methods of generating data which entail the researcher immersing herself […] in a research 
‘setting’ so that [she] can experience and observe at first hand a range of dimensions in and of that 
setting” (Mason, 2002, p. 84). Observation is a means of triangulating between direct observations of 
settings (e.g., observing NGO practitioners in their daily practice), interactions between NGO and 
company personnel and/or local people and the research process itself (through writing myself into 
                                                 
36 I differentiate between primary and secondary informants. Primary informants are those individuals who 
provided the most information or were the key point of contact. Secondary informants were present and provided 
supplementary information or validation of the primary informants’ perspective via verbal or visual cues.  
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field notes and the findings chapters and considering the influence of my “standpoint” on what was 
observed). To assist in this process, I developed an observation protocol. 
The observation protocol assisted my decision-making process during fieldwork; it constitutes a 
guide on what to observe and record. I consulted practice theory in developing this protocol, given the 
actor-oriented and practice-based focus of the study (similarily to Banks, Scheyvens, McLennan, & 
Bebbington, 2016). Nicolini’s (2013) synthesis of practice theory was influential in my selection of five 
observation categories: (a) descriptions of the physical space in which social actors worked and 
engaged, (b) sayings and doings, (c) tools or artefacts used during activities and interactions, (d) the 
orientation of actors’ practical concerns and processes of legitimation, and (e) stabilisation where 
dissent is noted.  
I collected observational data over three and a half months between September and December 
2014, while living at the NGO La Granja office. The NGO management provided me with a semi-
permanent workspace in the office base and shared accommodation with personnel at no cost. 
Management also granted me gatekeeper approval to observe the organisation’s daily work activities, 
including NGO and company meetings, household visitations, or community events. Between these 
events, I spent time independently connecting with local and company informants through visitations to 
the mining camp, attendance at community activities (i.e., women’s sports and church), and household 
visitations.  
Throughout this period, I employed “direct” and “participatory” observation techniques to 
collect data. According to Meyer (2001, p. 340), a researcher makes direct observations of activity 
when engagement with the participants is “superficial”. For example, I recorded direct observations of 
company–community meetings (see Figure 5). During these meetings, I kept a distance from the 
meeting participants and observed the unfolding events. By contrast, participatory observations are 
made with active engagement in an activity. I collected most of my observational data through this 
participation technique. For example, Figure 6 depicts me attending company–NGO workshops on the 
Intervention, where I was invited to participate in all activities and, on occasion, share my experience. 
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Figure 5. Researcher undertaking direct observations. 
 
Figure 6. Researcher engaged in participatory observation. 
While living at the NGO La Granja office, I had frequent opportunities to “shadow” 
practitioners in their daily activities with household members (Czarniawska, 2007).37 According to 
Quinlan (2008, p. 1480), shadowing involves “a researcher closely following a subject over a period to 
investigate what people do in the course of their everyday lives”. Shadowing was a particularly useful 
data collection strategy in the context of actor-oriented research. The approach provided opportunities 
to observe how practitioners sought to implement the intervention activity with household members. In 
the course of shadowing, I instigated unstructured interviews with practitioners and household 
members aimed at clarifying my interpretation of their opinions, actions, and explanations of the 
                                                 
37 NGO practitioners worked on a two-week rotation with a short break between cycles. This rotation meant that I 
could spend a minimum of three days shadowing every practitioner in their activities with households, in addition to group 
meetings and activities. 
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practice. All observational data − direct and participatory − was recorded in a fieldwork diary. In Table 
5, I provide the reader with a summary of my direct and participatory observation activities, including 
the duration of my observations and the number of observed events.  
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Table 5. 
Direct and Participatory Observation Activities 
Location Method Activity Actor groups Duration N 
Eight localities 
across the direct 
area of influence 
Direct Public company–
community land 
acquisition and 
resettlement suspension 
meetings 
Representatives from the company (CR and LA&R 
teams). 
Representatives from the NGO (management and 
practitioners) 
Local leaders and representatives, household members 
1–3 hrs 8 
La Granja and 
Chiclayo  
Direct Closed NGO meetings NGO management and practitioners  1 hr 7 
La Granja NGO 
base and project 
camp 
Direct Closed meetings between 
NGO and company 
personnel 
 
NGO management and practitioners. 
Representatives from the company (CR and LA&R 
teams) 
1–2 hrs 6 
La Granja and 
surrounding areas 
Participatory Household visitations as 
part of the Intervention 
activities 
NGO practitioners  
Household members 
20mins – 
2 hrs 
19 
La Granja and 
surrounding areas 
Participatory Attempted household 
visitations as part of the 
Intervention 
NGO practitioners  
 
5 mins – 
1 hr 
14 
Villages 
surrounding  
La Granja 
Participatory  NGO-run health 
workshops 
Representatives from the NGO (management and 
practitioners) 
Health professionals from the La Granja health post 
Female leaders and household members 
3 hrs  2 
La Granja project 
camp  
Participatory NGO Intervention 
transferral workshops 
Representatives from the NGO (management and 
practitioners) 
Representatives from the company (CR and LA& R 
teams)  
2 days 2 
Lima Participatory La Granja project health 
and safety induction 
Company health and safety personnel 2 days 1 
Trujillo Participatory NGO-run focus group on 
“Intervention learnings” 
NGO management, practitioners, and former staff 3 hrs 1 
Total ethnographic events: 60 
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Fieldwork diary 
The fieldwork diary is the third method used in this study. As an ethnographic technique, 
fieldwork diaries support qualitative researchers in capturing the emergent, discovery-oriented, 
iterative, and reflexive attributes of the phenomena under study (Emerson et al., 2011). Throughout the 
course of fieldwork, I used the diary to record my observations of events and site descriptions and to 
note outstanding questions and tasks. The nature of information collected was descriptive and 
reflective. I sought to accurately document the settings, actions, behaviours, and conversations, guided 
by my observation protocol. These descriptions focused on the physical setting (i.e., household 
structure, meeting location), social environment (i.e., participant body grouping and language, tension, 
decision-making processes), participants and their role in the setting, and my interpretation of 
participant perceptions. I also included photos and direct quotes or close approximations of what 
participants said, where appropriate.38 At the end of each day, time was spent organising and 
elaborating on these descriptions. I then made reflective notes on my initial analysis of unfolding 
events, how my observations connected to my research questions, and how my presence may have 
impacted on the participants’ behaviours, with implications for my data collection process. The final 
fieldwork diary is approximately 60,000 words long. 
 
Document analysis 
The fourth method adopted in this research is document analysis. Documentation is a key 
method used in case studies (Yin, 2013). During the data collection process, I sought to collect two 
types of information to supplement my primary data. These include (a) documents about the La Granja 
land acquisition and resettlement process and (b) sociodemographical and historical data on the 
national, regional, and local context of the La Granja case. The type of data and source are presented in 
Table 6, where (P) indicates the document is publicly available, and (I) indicates the document is 
internal to an organisation, and confidential.  
 
                                                 
38 Unless indicated, all photos contained within the thesis were taken by the author.  
52 
Table 6. 
Secondary Data Sources 
Data type Source  Content 
The La Granja 
land acquisition 
and resettlement 
process 
La Granja 
project team 
 
• La Granja project organisational chart (2014)  (I) 
• Rio Tinto global code of business conduct (2009) (P) 
• Communities and Social Performance Standards (2014) (P) 
• La Granja Pre-feasibility Study (2011): Regional Development 
Framework: Strategy and Summary Execution Plan Rio Tinto 
Minera Peru La Granja (I) 
• La Granja Pre-Feasibility Study (2009): Land Access & 
Resettlement for La Granja. Preliminary Planning Review (I) 
• Livelihoods preparation investment (2011) (I) 
• Supporting and sustaining family-centred development: A rapid 
analysis of the Family Accompaniment Program at Rio Tinto La 
Granja, Peru. (2012) (I) 
NGO • Intervention Policy (2011) (I) 
• NGO training manual (2012) (I) 
• Presentations on the Intervention methodology and tools (I) 
• Rio Tinto reporting templates: health and safety (I) 
• Household case files (“Life Plans”) (I) 
• NGO organisational chart (2012) (I) 
Local, regional, 
and national 
case study 
context 
Mining 
company/ 
company 
consultants 
• Regional sociopolitical context to the La Granja project internal 
report (2011) (I) 
• Social baseline studies (I): 
o BHP Billiton (2001) – three documents 
o Rio Tinto (2006–2007) – five documents 
o Rio Tinto (2008–2013) – five documents 
 
Qualitative Data Analysis 
Qualitative data analysis is a process of eliciting themes or issues from detailed descriptions of 
settings, individuals, and interactions (Ritchie, Spencer, & O’Connor, 2003). The analysis of case 
studies requires a researcher to “watch closely” and “think deeply” about the research questions and 
data corpus, to generate focused “observations” rather than analysis of “all aspects of the case” (Stake, 
1995, pp. 77-76). In line with a social constructivist-interpretivist approach, data construction occurs 
throughout the entire research process: from focusing the research questions, to deciding on a 
theoretical focus, to choosing methods, and to the constant note-taking and reflection during fieldwork 
(Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009). Analysis occurred alongside data generation, as participants described 
their experience and discovered new relationships themselves, and as I condensed and interpreted 
meanings and presented these back to the participants for clarification.  
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Thematic analysis best characterises my approach, which in many ways parallels methods 
developed by sociologists adopting grounded theory (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). Unlike grounded 
theory, however, theory (findings) did not emerge purely from the data, but “retroductively” (Blumer, 
1986; Katz, 1983). I determined the general issues of interest before analysis. However, the specific 
natures of the categories and themes to be explored were unknown. Thus the analysis is both induced 
from the data and deduced from my theoretical focus and familiarity with the DCDR literature. The 
approach can be described as an “iterative-retroductive” process and required multiple data sources and 
analysis strategies. Data types generated for this research include interview transcripts, researcher notes 
(observation description, reflection, and photographs), and written documents (secondary data). I 
adopted three data analysis strategies in my analysis: close reading, open coding, and memo writing 
(Emerson et al., 2011). 
The first step of the data analysis process involved undertaking a close reading of the entire 
data corpus. This involved examining, line by line, the entire dataset, with the aim of elaborating on 
and refining lines of analysis developed during fieldwork. In compiling my data corpus, I transcribed 
all recordings of semi-structured interview into verbatim transcripts, with the assistance of a Peruvian 
social scientist, and combined them with my notes on those interviews where the interviewee denied 
permission to record. I uploaded 61 semi-structured interview transcripts (the majority in Spanish) to 
Nvivo. All notes of unstructured interviews (n = 58) were recorded in my fieldwork diary in Microsoft 
Word, along with descriptive and reflective observations and photographs. I organised secondary 
documents in a folder categorised by the data source (for example, Rio Tinto, the NGO). 
Second, I combined this close reading with procedures for open coding. Open coding describes 
a process whereby a dataset is extensively coded to “open up” the text and expose the “thoughts, ideas 
and meanings contained therein” (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, p. 102). I coded the data in two stages. 
Initially, I generated broad codes or themes in my close reading of the printed data corpus; I scribbled 
themes in the columns of the pages and made notes on the connections between themes as I moved 
through the body of data. Initial themes were plentiful, for example, “history of social investment at La 
Granja” or “perceptions on practice intent”. Later, I used the qualitative data analysis software, Nvivo 
9.1, as a tool for managing and organising the next stage of coding. I inserted the research subquestions 
into the program and arranged the broad themes or nodes from my initial data review. I then subjected 
all transcripts of semi-structured interviews to a “close, intensive reflection and analysis” (Emmerson, 
Fretz, and Shaw, 2011, p. 172). Coding was performed in Nvivo, and codes with the highest prevalence 
formed a basis for the third and final stage of the analysis process: memo writing. 
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Third, I initiated the process of writing code memos in a separate Word document (Strauss & 
Corbin, 1990). Code memos assist the researcher in formulating and clarifying ideas and insights 
produced through the coding procedure (Emerson et al., 2011, p. 172). They are detailed descriptions 
that elaborate on emerging themes and the relationships between them. My data memos focused on 
common themes discussed by research participants, in addition to negative or outlier cases which 
offered insight into an alternative perspective. As a clearer sense of relevant ideas or themes emerged, I 
generated focused memos by combining code clusters into comprehensive or integrated memos. Data 
presentation draws from these integrated memos (Chapters Four, Five, Six, and Seven), and includes 
participant quotes and photographs. 
 
Research Credibility 
To ensure rigour in the data analysis process, I employed a set of procedures designed to ensure 
the reliability of my findings; all align with the social constructivist-interpretivist paradigm (Creswell 
& Dana, 2000). The first is disconfirming evidence (Miles & Huberman, 1994). In the process of data 
collection and analysis, I continuously reviewed my data for confirming or disconfirming evidence of 
emerging themes. Disconfirming evidence is a constructivist approach closely related to triangulation 
but is less systematic because the researcher uses her lens to examine multiple perspectives on a theme. 
Creswell and Dana (2000) claim, however, that the “search for disconfirming evidence provides further 
support of the account’s credibility because reality, according to constructivists, is multiple and 
complex” (p. 127).  
The second credibility procedure is prolonged engagement in the field. I dedicated a significant 
period of my doctoral research to fieldwork: seven months in total. This was important as 
constructivists understand that “the longer they stay in the field, the more the pluralistic perspectives 
will be heard from participants and the better the understanding of the context of participant views” 
(Creswell & Dana, 2000, p. 128). As a credibility procedure, being in the field “solidifies evidence 
because researchers can check out the data and their hunches and compare interview data with 
observational data” (Creswell & Dana, 2000, p. 128). Time spent in the field provided for regular 
opportunities to “member check” on emerging interpretations and themes (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). 
Member checking is a process of clarifying with a research participant my understanding of their 
perspectives, with the aim of confirming or disconfirming my interpretation. It also meant raising 
counter perspectives, such as by questioning why one actor group might have a different viewpoint, as 
a way of clarifying the participant view. 
55 
Thick rich description is the third credibility procedure I adopted in this research. Thick 
descriptions are “deep, dense, and detailed accounts” of an event or setting. Thick description sits in 
contrast to thin descriptions that “lack detail, and simply report facts” (N. Denzin, 1989, p. 83). Thick 
description invites the reader to determine the credibility of interpretations (Geertz, 1973), and “make 
decisions about the applicability of the findings to other settings or similar contexts” (Creswell & Dana, 
2000, p. 129). In offering rich descriptions of the data, I gave considerable thought to my data 
presentation. In Chapter Four, I provide the reader with a detailed sociohistorical description of the 
research participants and case study. Chapter Five zooms in on the daily work of Resettlement with 
Development practice, and highlights actor experiences and micro-interactions at the coalface between 
NGO practitioners and household members. Chapter Six showcases a detailed rendering of how people 
feel about the practice, and draws prominently from interviews with research participants. Chapter 
Seven contrasts what people said in the previous chapter, and focuses instead on what they do and how 
they interact. The chapter brings actor interactions alive through the description of three vignettes, or 
scenes of action. 
A fourth credibility procedure is an audit trail. Making an audit trail supports the integrity of 
findings (Creswell & Dana, 2000). The researcher documents the methodological decisions and 
activities so that a reader can understand how analysis connects to the data (Creswell & Dana, 2000) 
process. I have used my fieldwork diary to document my inquiry process; it provides a log of my 
research activities, emerging analysis, and reflections. I have also developed an audit trail through the 
use of Nvivo. In addition to assisting me with data organisation, the computer software can also be 
used to confirm the research findings as grounded in the data (Beekhuyzen et al., 2010).  
 
Research ethics 
This study received ethical clearance as required under the University of Queensland policy on 
ethical human research. As part of this review, I identified the question of confidentiality as a pertinent 
ethical issue in the context of this case study (Blaikie, 2009, p. 31). Fieldwork data was stored in 
password-protected devices to protect the identity of research participants. Quotations were de-
identified, and names replaced with generic descriptors in the findings chapters as per the following 
examples: 
• C_M17 = company, male, interview seventeen 
• LI_F11 = local informant, female, interview eleven 
• NGO_M16 = NGO, male, interview sixteen 
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De-identifying the research participants guarantees external confidentiality; it protects an 
informant’s identity to an outsider. I could not, however, guarantee “internal confidentiality” (Tolich, 
2004). Given the small size of each actor group, I deemed it possible that informants could potentially 
make an educated guess about the identity of another participant. For example, most company staff will 
immediately recognise the identity of management quoted within this thesis. Before initiating 
interviews, I informed participants of the risk of internal confidentiality and asked them not to share 
highly confidential information. Notwithstanding this, participants did share sensitive information with 
me during fieldwork, such as inefficiencies in the Project processes, a disjuncture between project aims 
and practices, and abuses of confidentiality. I have tried to treat this information with sensitivity and 
exclude data that I deemed would have repercussions for individual participants.  
 
Chapter Summary 
This chapter has charted the development of a methodology firmly based in the social 
constructivist-interpretivist paradigm and qualitative methods of sociology. It furthermore draws 
insights from actor-oriented theory, and cross-cultural and practice research. The paradigm and 
exploratory research questions suggested the value of undertaking an in-depth single case study 
analysis. Selection of the La Granja case study is justified on the basis of strategic and purposive 
criteria, which also serve as the basis for future opportunities for comparative analysis. Qualitative 
interviews were conducted with a cross-section of participants, including company and NGO 
personnel, household members, and qualified informants. Observational data were recorded in a 
fieldwork diary and secondary documents were collected. Data analysis was an iterative, recursive, and 
dynamic process that occurred in parallel to data collection. Themes were developed and categorised 
systematically as the study proceeded. The following four chapters provide a narrative supported by 
secondary data analysis, verbatim extracts from participant interviews, and my observations. This 
narrative accounts for the main themes emerging from an analysis of actor perceptions, experiences, 
and interactions at the interface of Resettlement with Development practice. The following chapter 
provides an in-depth account of key sociohistorical, political, and economic contexts in which the 
practice is situated. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: LA GRANJA; THE PLACE, THE COMMUNITY, THE PROPOSED MINE 
 
Introduction 
This chapter lays a foundation for understanding how Resettlement with Development policy 
intent was operationalised in the La Granja case. The chapter is the first of four to provide an in-depth 
exploration of the empirical findings, and responds to the research question: What are the key socio-
historical, political and economic contexts in which the practice is situated? As outlined in Chapter 
Two, actor-oriented theory recognises development practice as inevitably influenced and constrained 
by wider social and institutional structures (Long, 2001; Long & Roberts, 1984). For this reason, an 
analysis of Resettlement with Development practice must initially consider the factors bearing upon 
actor interpretations and interactions at the social interface. This chapter presents important background 
information over four sections. 
The first locates the La Granja case within a context of “new extraction” in Latin America 
(Bebbington, 2009). As an economic policy model, new extraction has enabled mining, oil, and gas 
companies to rapidly expand into the resource-rich territories, often previously untouched by industrial 
development. Within the Peruvian Andes, this expansion has spurred significant social and economic 
transformation, with implications for campesino peasant communities, land tenure rights, and agrarian 
livelihoods (Veltmeyer & Petras, 2014).  
The second section of the chapter introduces the La Granja mining project, the locality, and the 
communities living in the core project area of influence. The La Granja project is a significant driver of 
economic investment in the area and broader district. In addition to local jobs, the Project team have 
invested millions of US dollars towards social development since arriving in the area in 2006. 
Nonetheless, poverty and extreme poverty persist in the area and region. The majority of people 
continue to derive their primary livelihood from agricultural and cattle farming activity.  
The third section provides a narrative of prior company–community engagement in La Granja, 
and recounts key events in the collective social memory of local people. The account centres on local 
experiences of forced displacement, resistance, return, and temporary resettlement as a result of three 
mining companies: Cambior, BHP Billiton, and Rio Tinto.  
The fourth and concluding section turns to the period in which this case study is focused – on 
Rio Tinto’s plans and preparation activity for acquiring land in La Granja. The Intervention is 
introduced as part of the company’s land acquisition and resettlement framework. The Resettlement 
with Development practice is identified as motivated by a business case rationale, which links the 
social acceptability of resettlement with the risk of denied land access. 
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New Extraction in Latin America 
The La Granja case study is located within the broader political economy of rapid social and 
environmental transformations in Latin America as the result of “extractivism”. Extractivism is a model 
of economic growth based on the large-scale and intensive exportation of raw materials such as 
hydrocarbons, metals and minerals, agriculture products, and biofuels (North & Grinspun, 2016; 
Veltmeyer & Petras, 2014). Since structural reforms in the 1970s, Latin American economies have 
largely oriented towards extractive or rent-based activities; Svampa (2015) describes this trend as a 
“commodities consensus” (p. 66). Both conservative (Peru, Columbia, and Mexico) and progressive 
(Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela) governments endorse extractivism as a primary driver of national 
development and poverty alleviation (Burchardt & Dietz, 2014; Gudynas, 2010). Notwithstanding that 
Latin America has a long and contentious history of extractive activity (see Galeano, 1971), in recent 
decades the unprecedented scale of extractive development has led some scholars to argue that the 
continent is transitioning into a phase of “new extraction” (Bebbington & Bury, 2013; Bury & 
Bebbington, 2014). Technological innovation, more sophisticated engineering and logistics, and access 
to capital have spurred an unparalleled increase and expansion of extractive activities across the 
content. 
Critics argue that the fast-paced process of new extraction has specific social and environmental 
implications. Acosta (2009) and Svampa (2015) find that Latin America is becoming consolidated on 
the periphery, in a recursive relationship of dependency on foreign direct investment and the export 
economy. From the perspective of involuntary displacement, new extraction deepening “dynamics of 
dispossession” (Harvey, 2004), as large corporations work in alliances with Latin American 
governments to accumulate land, resources, and territories often occupied by peasant farmers and 
indigenous peoples (Svampa, 2015). These critiques have resonance in Peru, where hydrocarbon and 
mineral concessions are being granted by the Peruvian government at an unprecedented rate (Cuba et 
al., 2014). 
 
Peru and the mining sector 
Peru represents an important country context for examining the role of the private sector in 
human displacement and resettlement for mining. Over three decades, the country has become a 
“global centre of mining expansion” (Bebbington & Bury, 2009, p. 17296). In 2016, Peru was the 
world’s third-largest producer of copper and silver, and the sixth-largest producer of gold; the country 
has significant reserves of coal, iron ore, silver, tin, sulphur, and zinc (KPMG, 2016). In 2015 there 
were 43, 603 existing mining concessions over 18.2 million hectares (14 per cent of the land area of 
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Peru) (MIMEM 2015). The recent and rapid development of Peru’s mining sector is historically linked 
to economic and political reforms instigated by President Alberto Fujimori in the early 1990s.39 
Fujimori restructured the Peruvian state and economy according to neoliberal principles: market 
deregulation, privatisation of state-owned companies, and the removal of investment and trade barriers 
(Bury, 2004; 2005). The effect was to integrate the country into global markets and encourage foreign 
direct investment (Arellano-Yanguas, 2011).40  
Almost three decades later, the mining sector is widely recognised to have increased the 
revenue of the Peruvian government, leading to greater economic stability and decreased inflation 
(ICMM 2008, Bebbington et. al. 2007, p. 3). The sector has also triggered a steady rise in social 
conflict (see for example Bebbington & Bury, 2013; De Echave, 2005, 2007; Slack, 2009). According 
to the Peruvian Ombudsman (Defensoría del Pueblo), in April of 2016, 43.5 per cent of a total 209 
active and latent social conflicts across the country related to mining (Defensoría del Pueblo, 2016; 
GRUFIDES, 2015). Disparities between macro-economic growth and the lack of socio-economic 
development outcomes for host communities has led to protest, violent conflict entailing the loss of 
life, the destruction of property and suspended mine development. According to one study, mining-
related social conflicts generally centre on the inequitable distribution of benefits to communities, 
government absenteeism, poor company-community engagement, lack of information sharing, and 
environmental liabilities (Ashton, 2015). 
Mining developments largely encroach on the lands of Peru’s Andean campesino and 
indigenous communities, who perceive the extractive industries as having a predominantly negative 
impact (Bebbington et. al. 2007; Himley, 2014; World Bank, 2011, p.13). Bebbington et. al. (2007) 
document that by 2010, over 50 per cent of Peru’s Andean campesino communities lived in mining 
affected areas, a statistic which is liekly to increase. The Peruvian government is increasingly awarding 
mineral and hydrocarbon concessions that directly intersect with Andean agricultural regions. In 2011, 
the government had awarded 38 per cent of Andean agricultural lands for mineral or hydrocarbon 
concessions, 35 per cent of these concessions directly overlapped with titled indigenous communities 
(Cuba et al., 2014). Importantly, the body of legislation that regulates and distributes sub-surface 
concession licences is distinct from that which governs access to, and use of, surface lands (Himely, 
                                                 
39 Subsequent presidents Toledo, Garcia, and Humala have upheld these reforms and actively encouraged foreign 
direct investment in the extractive industries (Arellano-Yanguas, 2011). 
40 Between 1990 and 1997, exploration investment in Peru increased by 20 per cent. By 2003 mining already 
“accounted for 57 per cent of all exports in Peru, and 37 per cent of foreign direct investment between 2001 and 2003” 
(Bebbington et. al. 2007, p. iv). By 2014, mining continued to account for just over half of all exports (51.74 per cent) (EY, 
2016). The largest foreign investors in mining are China, followed by the US, Canada and Australia (EY 2016, p. 25). 
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2016). The state issues sub-surface rights, however surface land tenure and rights are held informally, 
privately or communally by people living on the land (Del Castillo & Castillo 2003).  
In this Peruvian legal context, multinational mining companies and Andean people are 
commonly placed in direct confrontations over surface land use. The Peruvian law has not allowed for 
the expropriation of surface lands since the 1990s. According to Himley (2016), this was an outcome of 
Fujimori’s neoliberal reforms, which served to strengthen property rights making expropriation less 
feasible. The mining sector has thus centred lobbying efforts towards transforming Peru’s land tenure 
institutions, to accelerate the pace of formal transactions in the context of mine project development 
(Bury, 2005). The Peruvian government has played an instrumental role in expediting property 
formalisation with the Special Program for Land Titling (Programa Especial de Titulación de Tierras, 
or PETT) (Glave, 2008). The Program is administered by the Ministry of Agriculture and supports land 
titling processes to transfer communally managed, or informally negotiated land tenure to private 
ownership. Mining firms can then proceed with private land sale negotiations.   
In 1995, the government introduced the Land Law (Ley de Tierras) which aimed to regulate 
“the relationship between surface and subsurface rights by requiring the holder of a mineral concession 
to come to an acuerdo previo (prior agreement) with the owner(s) of surface lands for mining to 
proceed” (Himley, 2016, p. 215). Following objections from the mining industry, the Law was 
modified in 1996 to include a new mechanism: la servidumbre minera (mining easement). This new 
legislation means that uncooperative landowners can be obliged to allow mining companies temporary 
surface land access in exchange for monetary compensation. Kuramoto and Glave (2002) argue that 
from a legal standpoint, the mining easement privileges the interests of the sub-surface concession 
holders. Under the mining easement, the government sets the rate of monetary compensation which is 
generally understood to be far less than the amount of compensation that a landholder would receive by 
directly negotiating with a mining company. As such, mining companies rarely invoke the legal 
measure in practice; the threat of the Law’s enactment is instead used as a leverage for mining 
companies in land sale negotiations (Salas Carreño, 2008). As will be elaborated below, this was the 
case in La Granja, when Canadian mining company Cambior threatened local people with the Law, and 
consequently convinced many to sell their lands, and relocate.  
Peru does not have any national legislation on involuntary resettlement. As such, the main 
bodies of instruments that govern private sector positions and approaches to resettlement are 
international standards (set by the World Bank and IFC); industry standards; and corporate policies. 
For the remainder of this Chapter, I explore the socio-historical dimensions of the La Granja mining 
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project, and ground many of these aforementioned tensions and dynamics within the context on an 
empirical case.  
 
The Rio Tinto La Granja Mining Project 
Within this broader context, this thesis examines the Rio Tinto La Granja mining project. Rio 
Tinto was awarded the La Granja concession licence in 2005. The Project covers an area of 
approximately 3,900 hectares in a remote and rural area of the Cajamarca department and Querocoto 
district (see Figure 7). Rio Tinto is a British–Australian multinational mining company with projects 
and operations in 35 countries across six continents. The multinational comprises four mining and 
metals portfolios; aluminium, copper and diamonds, energy and minerals, and iron ore (Rio Tinto, 
2008). The copper and diamonds portfolio has four operating mines; Kennecott Utah Copper in the US, 
Oyu Tolgoi in Mongolia, Escondida in Chile, Grasberg in Indonesia. The portfolio also comprises two 
pipeline projects: Resolution in the US and La Granja in Peru. 
 
 
Figure 7. Location of the Rio Tinto La Granja mine project in Peru. 
The La Granja project team are accountable to the Rio Tinto global headquarters based in 
London. At the global headquarters, an investment committee periodically reviews the Project progress 
and decides on how to proceed given social, technical, and financial risks and opportunities. In-country 
project activities are overseen by a Lima-based project director whose team comprises a group 
managing the social aspects of project development and another that works on the technical aspects. 
Data collection for this thesis was focused on the activities of the La Granja social project team 
(henceforth the “social project” or the “La Granja social project”). The social project manages the 
communities’ dimensions of project development, and comprises five thematically focused teams: CR, 
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LA&R, Social Studies and Systems, Regional Development, and Employment and Procurement. Figure 
8 illustrates a simplified organisational structure.  
 
Figure 8. Organisational structure of the La Granja project. 
La Granja: The place, the people 
The La Granja project is named after the village of the same name, which is located in the heart 
of the concession. As depicted in Figure 9, the La Granja village and project camp are located one 
kilometre apart. Approximately 2,600 people or 520 households live in the La Granja village and 
surrounding areas (Flynn & Vergara, 2015, p. 4). I refer to this region as “La Granja” or the company’s 
“core area of influence”, as the area is expected to be directly affected by the development of a mining 
operation. The company has proposed that the entire population will need to be resettled. Prior to the 
1920s, La Granja was uninhabited and known as “Paltic” after the river system that flows through the 
landscape. The first recorded landholder in the area is Cecilio Rómulo Montoya (1911–1946), who 
established the La Granja hacienda (“La Granja” meaning the farm in Spanish) (Castillo, 2015).41  
The hacienda system was dismantled in 1969 when President Juan Velasco Alvarado instigated 
the Reforma Agraria (agrarian reform) in Peru (see De Janvry, 1981, p. 963; Kay, 2007). Under this 
reform, lands comprising the La Granja hacienda were redistributed to peasant workers and their 
families. Many residents living in the region have inherited the land from family members who worked 
                                                 
41 Deere (1990) describes the hacienda system as supporting “feudal class relations” (p. 24) between peasants and 
landlords in Northern Peru. 
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in the original hacienda (Castillo, 2015). Since the agrarian reform, many households have gained 
access to private land titles.42  
 
 
Figure 9. The La Granja mine project and village. 
As the population has increased in the area, five smaller villages or “communities” have formed 
around the La Granja village. In Peru, peasant communities or comunidades campesinas is a title 
formally granted to populations in the southern regions of the country. While the La Granja 
communities are not formally recognised by the government, I use the title in recognition that local 
people self-identify as such. Therefore, the six comunidades campesinas in the core area of influence 
include: La Granja, La Pampa, La Iraca, La Lima, La Uñiga, and Checos. La Uñiga and Checos are 
relatively new communities, in the sense that prior to the arrival of Rio Tinto in 2006 these areas 
formed part of La Lima and La Pampa. A seventh community, El Sauce, is also located within the core 
area of influence; however, the community was excluded from the land acquisition and resettlement 
process and, therefore, the scope of this research. Map 2 depicts the location of communities in the core 
area of influence.  
 
                                                 
42 There is no communal land tenure at La Granja, unlike in the southern Andean region of Peru. 
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Map 2. Communities located in the La Granja project’s core area of influence. 
Livelihoods and Poverty 
Campesino communities in the Andes have historically relied on a broad range of activities to 
sustain their income, including pastoralism, horticulture, livestock production, petty trading and 
migrant wage labour (Bury 2007). Land is a central livelihood resource. In La Granja; local people 
derive their primary source of subsistence and income generation through small-scale agriculture and 
cattle farming (Ormachea, 2014). Sixty-three per cent of households in the Querocoto district were 
involved in these combined activities in the last census (INIE, 2007). One study estimates that 
approximately 2,800 hectares or 9,000 plots of land are used for agriculture and cattle farming in La 
Granja (Ormachea, 2014). While the terrain is rugged and sits at approximately 2,000 metres above sea 
level, farmers have developed techniques to manage the plots at different altitudes, and they make best 
use of available land with crop rotation. Utilising vertical archipelagos, i.e. using land in different 
altitudinal zones and spatial niches, has always been central to Andean agriculture (Borsdorf & Stadel, 
2015; Braaten, 2014). Staple crops grown in La Granja include local fruits such as “yunga”, corn, 
legumes, potato, and other root vegetables. Crops are typically organic and inexpensive to produce as 
local people participate in seed saving and exchange; crops are also rain fed and do not require 
chemical inputs. Grasses are also grown and dried to feed livestock and for guinea pig farming. Some 
farmers produce cheese for household consumption. Excess produce is frequently sold at a small 
market held in the La Granja village on Sundays (Figure 10) or in the district capital of Querocoto. 
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Figure 10. Sunday market in the La Granja village.  
While agriculture and cattle farming form the historical basis of livelihood generation in La 
Granja, the mining project is the main driver of economic and livelihood development in the area and 
district. Rio Tinto has played a significant role in providing local employment opportunities over the 
years. Company baseline data highlights that local jobs have made a substantial impact on household 
income levels. For example, between 2010 and 2013, 15.4 per cent of the La Granja population 
acquired salaried jobs with the Project or a company-contracted business. During this same period, the 
average monthly household income increased by 134 per cent, suggesting that much of this income was 
reinvested into the local economy. Local people have created small businesses − transportation, 
infrastructure development and maintenance companies − to support project activity. The La Granja 
village also boasts basic hotels and restaurants which cater for project staff and contracted workers 
visiting the area. Nonetheless, local people have learned that they cannot depend on employment 
opportunities with the Project as they tend to fluctuate. Agriculture and cattle raising continue to be the 
principle basis of livelihood for the La Granja communities, who depend on their land for subsistence.  
A substantial portion of households living in the core area of influence have poverty-related 
challenges. The most recent government census suggests that approximately 78 per cent of the regional 
population live in poverty, and further 42 per cent live in extreme poverty (INEI, 2007). Poverty levels 
are a measurement of a household’s capacity to meet basic needs around access to water and sanitation, 
education and health care, adequate housing, and economic independence. A widespread local 
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perception is that the district government authorities refuse to invest in La Granja, believing that it will 
eventually be destroyed and that the company will address the issues. 
The regional La Granja population has been provided with a primary school and a small health 
post. Informant interviews suggest, however, that the facilities are under-resourced and in a constant 
state of disrepair. Many local people prefer to address health-related challenges through medicos del 
campo (traditional doctors) who use a combination of herbal and spiritual healing, as is a tradition in 
some parts of the Peruvian Andes. Access to water and sewage facilities is another poverty-related 
challenge in La Granja. Households generally source their water directly from small streams and water 
holes that feed into the Paltic River. The regional government has assisted some communities with 
water and sewage facilities; however, others have no direct access. Most households were provided 
with electricity in 2010, following significant pressure from the mining company. 
 
Social and political structures 
Three authorities govern communities in La Granja: two government authorities and a “peasant 
patrol”. The highest-ranking government authority is the Lieutenant Governor. The duty of the 
Lieutenant Governor is to represent the district Governor, a state representative tasked with ensuring 
the implementation of government policy in Querocoto.43 The second governmental authority is the 
village mayor, who is democratically elected by the local population as a point of contact for the 
district municipality. These authorities oversee government-funded projects and provide support to 
judicial and police authorities. They also work closely with a third authority, the ronda campesinos 
(also “ronda”) or peasant patrols. The patrols are a formally recognised local authority under Peruvian 
law (Law 27908, 1987) and are also regarded as the local governance institution in La Granja by 
community members and mining company personnel.  
Ronda campesinos are civil society organisations that formed in Cajamarca during the 1970s to 
protect rural communities against cattle theft and petty crime (Munoz et. al. 2007). As the Peruvian 
government’s policing efforts have historically centred on urban localities, the patrols emerged in 
Cajamarca to defend community assets. In time, the governance mandate of peasant patrols in the 
department has gradually expanded from policing to a broader range of community interests. For 
example, patrol representatives will participate in community conflict resolution, development 
initiatives, and the supervision of government authorities at the local, district, and departmental level.  
                                                 
43 Each community has a Lieutenant Governor who is chosen by the Governor from a list of trusted candidates 
proposed by each village. 
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In La Granja, every community has its own peasant patrol that is represented by an elected 
president. Several communities in La Granja have male and female patrols; however, the male patrols 
are highly regarded and have the largest membership. The La Granja project company–community 
engagement strategy works closely with the peasant patrols to consult and inform people in the area on 
project related activity. The La Granja project team holds regular dialogue tables with patrol presidents 
and members. It is at these tables that company and community representatives communicate on the 
Project’s trajectory, development contribution to the area, local employment, and conflict resolution. 
The peasant patrols are also responsible for managing the company’s local employment rotation 
scheme. The scheme was designed to ensure that local people are provided equal opportunities to 
benefit from job opportunities with the Project. The rotation scheme is, however, a point of contention 
for many community members. Some local informant interviewees have reported corruption in the 
scheme; some were never offered an opportunity to work in the Project while immigrants acquire 
positions, reportedly by paying a fee to the presidents of the peasant patrols. Women are rarely 
provided opportunities for employment through the scheme. In general, the authority of peasant patrols 
is questionable to more marginalised people who have been unable to benefit greatly from the 
company–patrol engagement. 
It is noteworthy that the peasant patrol leadership broadly supports development of the La 
Granja mining project (Ormachea, 2014). This support is significant because at the departmental level 
of peasant patrols, anti-mining sentiment is strong. Cajamarca is the only department in Peru with a 
regional president belonging to Patria Roja (roughly translated as the Red Motherland party). The party 
promotes anti-mining discourse and in recent years successfully targeted, and helped to suspend, 
multinational mining company Newmont’s proposed Conga extension worth US$4.8 billion (Franks et 
al., 2014). Patria Roja has a widespread support base including political ties within the Querocoto 
district and at each level of the peasant patrols. If given reason, the peasant patrols could be mobilised 
against the La Granja project development. Thus far, company–community relations at La Granja have 
remained relatively calm, with tensions resolved between local-level representatives and company 
staff. Company–community relations at the Project site are also influenced by significant company 
contributions made to local and regional social development. 
 
Company–community engagement  
As part of the concession licence agreement with the Peruvian government, Rio Tinto commits 
to enhancing socioeconomic development in the Querocoto district. Company data suggests an 
approximate US$17 million was invested in the district between 2007 and 2016. Most of this 
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investment was expended on local employment (US$6.12 million), followed by infrastructure 
(US$4.11 million), education (US$3.83 million) and development of the district economy 
(US$3.48 million). The La Granja project team also invested approximately US$3.23 million on social 
programs, administered either directly by CRs personnel or by company-contracted organisations. 
Social programs include livelihood training, health awareness workshops and campaigns, cultural 
activities, and environmental management. A small percentage of this investment has reached 
communities living within the core area of project influence. Local informants described local 
employment and infrastructure development as the most significant company contributions to La 
Granja. Many had also participated in social programs, namely, livelihood initiatives on farming and 
livestock. Local people have also been offered computing classes, and training in small business 
development and health promotion.  
In addition to this direct social investment, the La Granja project also provides funds to the 
Fondo Social La Granja (henceforth the La Granja Social Fund or Social Fund). The Social Fund was 
established in December 2008 as a further condition of the company’s contractual agreement with the 
Peruvian government (Balcazar et al., 2011). The Social Fund is managed by government and 
community representatives at the district level, and two company representatives also sit on the 
advisory panel. The panel makes decisions on how best to support local and regional development 
initiatives in the district. According to Rio Tinto, US$34.5 million was transferred to the Social Fund 
between 2006 and 2016. Approximately US$30 million has already been invested, primarily in the 
development of core infrastructure including roads, water, health and sanitation, education, and energy 
facilities. In La Granja, the Social Fund has supported some projects. A small number of households 
have received eco-friendly pit latrines. Others have acquired materials to assist cattle breeding and 
passionfruit and coffee farming.  
It is important to recognise that in La Granja, social investments made directly by the company, 
or through the Social Fund, have tended to adopt a service-delivery approach. Participants have been 
provided services and goods − training, workshops, farming tools, and supplies − free of charge. As 
will be described in the next findings chapter, prior company investments had implications for 
Resettlement with Development practice. Local people in La Granja have formed expectations about 
the kind of development assistance they hope to receive from company personnel. Local expectations 
are also shaped by a legacy of mining company activity, which occurred prior to the most recent land 
acquisition and resettlement process. 
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La Granja: a Greenfield Project, a Brownfields Resettlement Scenario 
While a mine has never been developed at La Granja, several mining companies have attempted 
and abandoned the development of a mine. From a technical viewpoint, La Granja remains a 
“greenfield” project. From a social lens, however, the Project has “brownfield” characteristics (Owen 
& Kemp, 2015). Residents have experienced several decades of company activity, including forced 
displacement and relocation. In this section, I review key historical events that have shaped the 
collective social memory of local people in La Granja. Timeline 1 highlights the events to be discussed 
and can be used as a reference in reading this section. The account draws a narrative garnered from my 
review of secondary documentation and interview transcripts. The findings provide context for 
understanding why the La Granja project team sought to invest in Resettlement with Development 
practice, and how actor perceptions and experiences of this practice have been shaped and influenced 
by the legacy of prior company activity. These dynamics are discussed in greater length within the 
proceeding findings chapters. 
 
 
Timeline 1. History of mining company activity at La Granja (1980–2007). 
Senior community members in La Granja recall two foreigners arriving in the area in the early 
1980s. Historical records confirm German geologists from exploration company Sondi discovered a 
copper deposit in La Granja around this time (Castillo, 2015). These geologists established a small 
project base and spent several months surveying the area and collecting mineral samples; this base 
would later become the Rio Tinto La Granja project camp. In the 1990s, the Peruvian government 
began an aggressive campaign aimed at attracting foreign direct investment in the Peruvian mining 
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sector. The early exploration data on La Granja was used by the government to promote a potential 
mine development. The government’s campaign was eventually successful.  
 
Displacement and diaspora: The period of Cambior 
In 1994, Canadian-owned Cambior Incorporated (henceforth Cambior) obtained a concession 
from the Peruvian government to undertake exploration activities over a period of five years (see 
Timeline 1). The concession covered an area of 3,900 hectares and granted the company access to 
subsurface resources; under Peruvian law the company was required to negotiate surface land access 
directly with title holders. Between 1994 and 1995, company representatives embarked on an 
aggressive land purchase strategy aimed at relocating all households in the communities of La Granja, 
La Iraca, and La Pampa (see Timeline 1). What took place during this period stands out in the 
collective social memory of community members as a significantly traumatic ordeal from which some 
more senior members have never recovered.   
Families were presented with the option of selling their lands to Cambior in a commercial 
agreement (cash for land), or having that land forcibly leased under the threat of the Peruvian 
government’s Mining Easement Law 26505. Local informants recall that police from Querocoto were 
paid to personally deliver these options via an official letter to each household. Local informants 
described the fear that family members had experienced seeing a police officer present at the home. 
Many people were illiterate and unable to read or understand the letter; the presence of government 
officials gave many the impression that they had no choice but to leave the area. 
The majority of people decided to sell and relocate to rural and urban areas in the coastal and 
jungle regions, where many had extended family networks.44 Families were motivated to sell their land 
for different reasons; some believed they were receiving a good deal, others felt that losing their land 
was inevitable, and still others perceived that city life would present greater livelihood opportunities 
(Glave et al., 2008, p. 14). On purchasing the land, company personnel demolished household 
infrastructure, destroyed productive crops, and stripped fertile topsoil from agricultural plots to 
disincentivise returnees. The company also shut down key social infrastructure, including the local 
school and health post, in a bid to drive locals out of the area. Local informants recalled the fear and 
stress that families experienced as a result of their interaction with Cambior. Many witnessed their 
homes being destroyed against their will. Two elderly women reportedly committed suicide, drowning 
                                                 
44 Some households moved north and in particular to the city of Jaén, considered part of the high jungle region of 
Peru. The majority of households are recorded to have moved to the coastal region and in particular the city of Chiclayo, 
capital of the Lambayeque department. 
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themselves in the Paltic River in the belief that they could not survive outside the area. Approximately 
10 per cent of the population resisted Cambior’s land acquisition proposal and remained living in the 
area despite constant threats and intimidation by company personnel and government officials 
(Ormachea, 2014). 
Local experiences with Cambior afforded the La Granja population a significant lesson in 
company land acquisition tactics and strategies. The process was perceived by local informants as 
unfair and lacking in transparency. Attempts to derive better land sale prices were not always rewarded; 
local interviewees recall that those who quickly sold to the company obtained a better deal, and those 
who “held out” were offered proportionately less as time went on. Land sale prices did not always 
reflect the size of a plot. Local informants explained to me that peasant patrol leaders were paid more 
money for their land, a historical fact which continues to shape a perception of mistrust towards the 
peasant patrol leadership in current times.  
The relocation process was very challenging for the majority of people who left La Granja; 
most struggled to adjust to city living or secure a stable livelihood. A minority of families invested 
monies into small businesses, and with the help of familial ties, went on to establish relatively secure 
urban lives. Most were unable to purchase new lands equal to their previous holding. Given land 
scarcity and price inflation in the city, many families continued migrating as opportunities presented 
for work. Some illegally inhabited lands on the outskirts of the city or rural areas nearby La Granja. 
This common experience of the rural and landless poor of Cajamarca has been documented in depth 
elsewhere (Bebbington & Bury, 2009, p. 17298; Bury, 2007). 
Re-establishing a livelihood base was a particularly salient challenge for the displaced families. 
Many bought plots for agriculture and invested in cattle, stables, and pastures, yet these activities 
demanded a much larger financial investment that expected. In La Granja, farming is relatively 
inexpensive as it does not require pesticides and water is free. In the coastal regions, in particular, 
families were forced to pay for these resources up front. Land sale monies quickly ran out. To 
supplement household expenditure, many family members sought new livelihood options. In general, 
men began working as day labourers, carriers, drivers, and labourers. Women also joined the formal 
workplace washing clothes, starting small businesses, and cleaning (Glave et al., 2008). Seniors were 
unable to establish their “routine culture”; they were displaced from their daily agricultural activities 
and social networks (Downing & Garcia-Downing, 2009). Many suffered because the coast and jungle 
areas were extremely hot and humid in comparison with the Andes.  
Back in La Granja, households who stayed in the region organised a resistance group against 
the practices of Cambior. The group, named the Pacific Self-Defence Committee (Comité Pacífico de 
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Autodefensa) were later accused by Cambior and Querocoto authorities of engaging in terrorist 
activities (Ormachea, 2014). To understand the significance of these accusations, it is important to 
recognise that President Alberto Fujimori was at the same time pushing anti-terrorism policy measures 
to curb the activities of guerrilla organization Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) and the Cuban-
inspired Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru) (on this 
history see Borsdorf & Stadel, 2015, p. 229; Burt & Mauceri, 2004). Terrorist accusations in La Granja 
placed community leadership in fear for their lives and the lives of their families. There is a sense 
among some community members who stayed in La Granja during the time of Cambior that they have 
a greater entitlement in land negotiations because of the hardship they have endured. After four years 
of exploration activity, Cambior ultimately deemed the Project unfeasible in 1998. The company 
returned the concession rights to the Peruvian state.  
 
Return and buyback: The period of BHP  
In late 2000, Australian mining company BHP (later BHP Billiton) bought the La Granja 
concession from the Peruvian government (see Table 1). The company paid Cambior US$35 million 
for the existing studies and surface land rights totalling 2,600 hectares (Flynn & Vergara, 2015, p. 3). 
Within a period of six months, however, project development was again deemed unfeasible. From a 
technical standpoint, the quality of the deposit was low grade with a high acid concentration. Mine 
development would require advanced technology and a tailings dam that rendered the Project 
economically unviable. A qualified informant explained to me that La Granja was considered a “dog of 
a project” inside BHP Billiton; there were at least 10 higher grade and more accessible copper reserves 
undeveloped in other parts of the world. From a social viewpoint, La Granja was also deemed to have 
high social risks given the legacy of Cambior.  
Company management quickly became privy to the experience of households who had been 
threatened, displaced, and generally left worse off as a result of Cambior’s land access approach. 
Households living within the core area of influence and those who had moved just outside of the region 
or to the costal and jungle areas were found living in relative poverty. Figure 11 depicts the situation of 
many families, living in basic conditions without electricity or running water.  
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Figure 11. Household forcibly displaced by Cambior. Source: Photo credit Ruth Warner, 2000. 
As part of the BHP Billiton social closure plan, the company management provided displaced 
households with an opportunity to buy back their land in La Granja and established the Paltic 
Foundation to assist with community reconstruction efforts.45 According to qualified informant 
interviews, project management at La Granja were willing to accept Cambior’s social legacy as their 
own and address ongoing social harms. At the time, BHP Billiton was already a target of international 
media over the social and environmental impacts at the Ok Tedi mine in Papua New Guinea (see 
Kirsch, 2014). The Project management wanted to avoid additional reputational damage. Moreover, as 
part of BHP Billiton’s agreement with the government, the company was required to expend three 
million US dollars within a year of purchasing the concession rights. Therefore, one and a half million 
dollars was dedicated to environmental remediation and the other half to the social closure plan. 
Returning households to La Granja was the most cost-efficient option because reconstruction efforts 
could be centralised in La Granja. Company management decided that addressing household livelihood 
and poverty-related challenges across a dispersed population would be too expensive and time 
consuming.  
The Peruvian government initially resisted the company’s proposed social closure plans. 
Government officials were concerned that returning land title to the previous occupants would 
undermine future attempts to develop a mine at La Granja. According to Castillo (2015), company 
                                                 
45 The fund was named La Fundación para el Desarrollo Sostenible de la Cuenca Alta del Paltic, or, The 
Sustainable Development Foundation of the Upper Paltic Basin. I refer to it as the Paltic Foundation. 
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personnel successfully persuaded government officials of the “social convenience” of returning land 
title to local people. In 2001, BHP Billiton personnel provided displaced families an opportunity to buy 
their land back at a reduced price. Informant interviews suggest that the repayment was 10 per cent of 
the land value. Approximately 75 per cent of the previous landowners bought their land back (Castillo, 
2015). Others declined and instead received a payment of 3, 5000 soles (approximately US$10,780).  
The buy-back process ultimately altered social relations between households within La Granja. 
Initially, this was because displaced families did not use the buy-back scheme as envisaged by the 
company; the majority did not return as expected. Between 2002 and 2004, displaced families were 
invited to return to La Granja. BHP Billiton offered them logistical support, materials, and farming 
seeds to assist in the transition. While two hundred and eight families repurchased their land, not all 
families returned to the area – some bought and maintained land title as an asset (Ormachea, 2014, p. 
171). Only 25 per cent of households re-established themselves as complete families in La Granja. The 
majority, an estimated 55 per cent, maintained connection to the places where they had been living; 
they kept a house, farms or businesses running; children remained in urban centres for school (Castillo, 
2015). Twenty per cent of households regained their land title and never returned. The impact was to 
create a mixed “community” in La Granja. Some families had never left the others, some were split 
between localities, while others left land plots vacant and continued their lives in the city.  
Company restoration did not go to plan either. BHP Billiton established the Paltic Foundation to 
support ongoing maintenance and social development programs in La Granja. The company donated all 
land payments to the Paltic Foundation, and provided households with mortgages with the view that 
ongoing payments would supplement community restoration efforts. While the Foundation was 
governed by local community leaders and government officials, most households never repaid their 
mortgage loans. The governing body did not enforce loan repayment, and returnees quickly realised 
nothing would happen if they simply did not pay.46  
The return process exacerbated social tensions between households in La Granja. Returnee 
families were perceived to have gained free lands and materials while households who had stayed and 
resisted Cambior did not benefit. Those who had stayed were left for several years, struggling to get 
access to basic services including health and education facilities. Returnee households were now in a 
stronger financial situation. Some had gained considerable business knowledge and skills as a result of 
their exposure to urban living. Young men also returned to the area with “city women” who they had 
                                                 
46 Though land titles remained with the Paltic Foundation, after a period of ten years land occupants in Peru can 
legally gain entitlement, regardless, under Peruvian Law.   
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married while living in Chiclayo (Ormachea, 2014). The demographic mix of people in La Granja was 
changing, and it is understandable that some people who stayed in La Granja perceived that BHP 
Billiton unfairly rewarded returnees. In our interviews, local informants expressed a sense of injustice 
over the extent of trauma and suffering they experienced under the auspices of Cambior. They 
questioned whether they, too, should be provided with compensation, such as free land, cash, and/or 
materials. This dynamic continues to play out in the current context of the Rio Tinto La Granja project 
as local people have formed expectations around entitlements that are shaped by the legacy of prior 
company engagement.  
Despite ongoing challenges with the Paltic Foundation − including community accusations that 
the governing body embezzled all funds − local people in La Granja generally regard BHP Billiton 
very highly. The company’s social closure plan brought about a change in local perceptions of mining 
companies; which would later influence their willingness to accept the presence of Rio Tinto 
(Ormachea, 2014). In 2005, BHP Billiton completed the closure process, withdrew from the region, 
and returned the mining concession to the government. Around this time the district mayor of 
Querocoto, Aníbal Pérez, held an assembly in La Granja to decide whether to allow another mining 
company into the area. Positions for and against were discussed and the proposal was accepted. The 
Peruvian government agency for the promotion of private investment (ProInversión) began a public 
bidding process and Rio Tinto was the successful candidate.  
 
Temporary displacement and resettlement: The early years of Rio Tinto La Granja  
In late 2005, the Peruvian government awarded Rio Tinto a concession licence to initiate 
exploration activities in La Granja (see Table 1). Company management immediately placed the 
Project on an accelerated development trajectory; however, to make progress the Project team required 
access to privately owned land for roads and infrastructure. Local people were initially reluctant to 
cooperate; families had only recently returned to the area and were still in the process of re-establishing 
their homes, livelihoods, and community. According to company informant interviews, local people 
were extremely distrusting of company interests, some expressing hostility towards personnel. The 
Project team decided that it would be easier to negotiate a land-leasing arrangement with local people, 
rather than attempt to purchase property rights. The latter of these two options was deemed by 
personnel to trigger company-community tension, and potentially lead to denied land access. 
A company negotiator agreed to exorbitant monetary and non-monetary compensation in order 
to speed up access to the land (Abdul Azeez, Saini, & Negi, 2014). Sixty households were 
economically displaced as part of the leading arrangement and 21 families were assisted in temporarily 
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resettling to nearby coast and jungle region or other areas in La Granja. Temporarily resettled 
households were provided restitution for affected houses and infrastructure, monetary compensation to 
support relocation, and ongoing compensation for leasing land (Flynn & Vergara, 2015, p. 6). The 
extensive compensation paid to some households through the leasing agreement became a source of 
tension for the La Granja communities, who perceived Rio Tinto was fuelling inequality. This sense 
has translated as a heightened expectation that Rio Tinto should provide more benefits to people living 
in the area: employment, business opportunities, and development interventions. Moreover, the 
experience demonstrated that Rio Tinto would be willing to provide significant cash compensation to 
access land. Leasing as opposed to selling land provides for ongoing household income.  
By October 2008, the onset of the Global Financial Crisis and unanticipated technical 
challenges in the Project led to a suspension of company activities in La Granja. The suspension 
strained the local economy, which had flourished with small businesses as a result of increased cash 
flow in the area. The Project workforce was drastically downsized and young local workers left the 
area in search of employment. The suspension disrupted company–community relations and prompted 
company management to undertake an internal review of the La Granja project development strategy. 
As part of this review, the social project team commissioned a review of their land-leasing agreements 
and the condition of households temporarily resettled two years earlier. The evaluation concluded that 
the lives and livelihoods of temporarily resettled households had drastically deteriorated as a result of 
the land-leasing arrangement and ongoing payments. 
The social project team engaged a regional NGO to assist temporarily resettled families with 
poverty alleviation and livelihood assistance.47 The families did not possess the skills and capacity to 
manage compensation monies. The evaluation suggested they were living payment to payment and 
immediately expending revenues on household needs and those of the extended family network. In 
2010, a livelihoods manager in the company’s LA&R team proposed a pilot intervention which, if 
successful, could be used to assist the broader plans for land acquisition and resettlement of all 
communities in La Granja. The Programa de Acompañamiento y Fortalecimiento Familiar or the 
Accompaniment and Family Strengthening Program was a people-centred and empowerment-style 
intervention that focused on building household capacity and self-reliance. For simplicity, I have 
referred to this program as the “Household Empowerment Intervention” or the “Intervention” within 
                                                 
47 The contracted NGO was established in 1979 in the coastal city of Trujillo. Prior to the La Granja project the 
NGO had worked exclusively with government and international aid organisations. In 2002, NGO staff were invited to 
provide technical assistance for cattle farmers in La Granja. The training was paid for by the Paltic Foundation. In 2010, a 
livelihood manager from Rio Tinto’s La Granja project heard of the training, and invited the NGO to work with the 
temporarily resettled households.  
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the thesis. As will be elaborated, the development practice associated with the broader application of 
this Intervention in La Granja is the focus of this research. 
Rio Tinto’s Proposed Land Acquisition and Resettlement Process: Operationalising Resettlement 
with Development  
In 2008, the Global Financial Crisis spurred volatility in the global commodity prices, with 
implications for the La Granja project. The Rio Tinto headquarters placed fast-track development plans 
for La Granja on hold.48 By mid-2010 the LA&R team initiated plans for acquiring all lands in the 
Project’s core area of influence. The global economy was recouping and Rio Tinto headquarters 
advised the La Granja project team to recommence drilling activities. As Rio Tinto did not have any 
prior experience with human resettlement in Peru, the La Granja social project team decided to widely 
consult external experts in the design of their land access approach. The LA&R management 
established a panel of experts to provide initial and ongoing advice on the business and social risks of 
involuntary resettlement. The panel included specialists from the World Bank and government and 
representatives from prominent Peruvian and international NGOs. Drawing from this expert advice and 
learnings from other resettlement projects in Peru, the LA&R team established a framework for land 
access at La Granja. 
This framework was underpinned by a business case rationale which addressed three key social 
risks that threaten the Project development, according to LA&R team personnel. According to 
Rio Tinto’s (2011) Social Risk Analysis Guidance Note, social risk “covers a range of threats and 
opportunities for the business that may result from how the business impacts upon and interacts with 
communities and stakeholders”. This interpretation conflates social risk as risk to business and risk to 
people, as is common in the mining sector (Kemp, Worden, & Owen, 2016). As a point of difference, 
the LA&R team articulated social risk from a business-centric perspective. They developed a business 
case rationale for their land acquisition and resettlement planning, which focused on the risk local 
people pose to the development of the La Granja mine. 
The first social risk centred on the likelihood that company plans for land access would trigger 
company–community conflict. Local people were distrusting of company plans given their prior 
experience of forced displacement and return. The La Granja peasant patrols could mobilise anti-
mining support through their governance network across the Cajamarca department. Company–
                                                 
48 During this time, technical project staff continued examining their drilling results and made the unexpected 
discovery of a second, much larger copper deposit with sections of moderate-grade ore. The implication of this discovery 
was to double the La Granja mine life from 20 to 40 years, and increase the project’s land acquisition needs exponentially 
(Arbelaez-Ruiz & Kemp, 2014). The La Granja project footprint would likely require all land in the core area of influence, 
and necessitate the resettlement of every community to make way for an open-pit mine. 
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community conflict could ultimately result in suspending project activity, or denied land access. The 
second social risk identified as a threat to land access plans was exorbitant compensation demands. 
Landowners had already expressed to company personnel an expectation for significant cash 
compensation, many preferring to lease rather than sell land given the amount of ongoing support 
provided to the temporarily resettled families. Such demands would render land acquisition and 
resettlement economically unviable, and potentially exacerbate the likelihood of a third and related 
social risk: the risk of ongoing dependency and reputational harm. Prior experience of resettlement in 
La Granja (including that of the temporarily resettled families) suggested that local people did not have 
the capacity and skills to effectively navigate livelihood restoration. Without adequate support, families 
would likely form a dependency relationship with the La Granja project. They could escalate demands 
for ongoing assistance which would lead to budget blowouts and, potentially, reputational harm.  
Taking into account these social risks, the LA&R team established the La Granja Land 
Acquisition and Resettlement Framework (henceforth, the Framework) (see Figure 12). The 
Framework outlined the company’s vision and principles for land access, which centred on creating a 
“mutually beneficial partnership” between the company and communities in La Granja (Flynn & 
Vergara, 2015, p. 14). This Framework outlined an intention for peaceful and voluntary land transfer 
and improved household wellbeing as a result of resettlement. Of this Framework, the final page of a 
company pamphlet circulating in the La Granja communities stated, “in conclusion, resettlement is an 
opportunity to improve the future of families in the area” (see Figure 13, emphasis added by author). 
The sentiment of the Framework reflects the LA&R team’s aspiration to deliver Resettlement with 
Development and describes development as a certain outcome of the process. The emphasis on 
Resettlement with Development in the Framework also recognises that, in the words of the social 
project management, “to be attractive to households and landowners, any land acquisition and 
resettlement arrangement would have to be holistic with a focus on livelihoods to build better 
opportunities for household’s post-resettlement” (Flynn & Vegara, 2015, p. 9). If the prospect of 
resettlement was not attractive enough, the company could be denied land access altogether. 
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Vision • To secure the future of both resettled communities and the La 
Granja mine through continuing partnership to improve the well-
being of communities and households, and the peaceful and 
voluntary transfer of land ownership 
• Leverage resettlement investment to benefit host communities and 
contribute to regional development 
Principles • Peaceful and voluntary = agreements and consent  
• Equity, fairness and transparency  
• Community participation  
• Affordability and timeliness 
• Net benefit to livelihoods 
Figure 12. The La Granja land acquisition and resettlement framework. 
 
 
Figure 13. Company pamphlet stating: “Resettlement is an opportunity to improve the future of 
families in the area”. 
In June 2012 the La Granja project director held a public meeting in the La Granja village and 
announced the company’s plan to acquire land and resettle all 520 households living in the core area of 
influence. Though it was not publicly announced, the LA&R team had organised their Framework 
around two streams of work. The first stream of work was administered by the LA&R and CR staff and 
focused on dialogue and agreement-making with households and title holders. The second stream of 
work was the Household Empowerment Intervention, which had been piloted with temporarily 
resettled households and administered by the NGO. The Intervention aimed to address poverty-related 
challenges and build local capacity for resettlement and livelihoods transition and was offered to all 
potentially displaced households in the core area 
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The Household Empowerment Intervention 
The Household Empowerment Intervention was underpinned by a people-centred theory of 
social change, which draws from an empowerment approach to community development (Alsop, 
Bertelsen, & Holland, 2006). Within the DCDR literature, the empowerment of displaced people is 
resettlement processes is identified as fundamentally important from the viewpoint of ethical and 
sustainable practice (Aronsson, 2009; Drydyk, 2015). Empowerment is about assisting people to 
“control their own lives and resources, to create their livelihoods from those resources, and to direct 
and pursue their [own] development as human beings” (Korten & Klauss, 1984, p. 4). In the context of 
the Intervention, the practice centred on building householders’ human (health, knowledge, skills) and 
social (networks and relationships of trust and reciprocity) capital so that they could enhance and 
acquire additional material, natural, and financial capital. Human and social capital is particularly 
important in a context of livelihoods transition, where displaced people must adapt and respond to 
changing circumstances and draw upon their individual and group resources in a process of adaptation 
(Downing & Garcia-Downing, 2009).  
The Intervention was not an explicit resettlement program per se, but rather it focused on 
household development needs and interests, irrespective of whether these interests coincided with 
company land acquisition and resettlement plans. As an empowerment program, household members 
were expected to actively drive the Intervention activity and contribute their own resources to the 
process activities.49 While the Intervention was administered by an NGO, company personnel played a 
role in the ongoing monitoring and evaluation of the development practice as indicated by the 
organisational structure (see Figure 14). The terms and conditions set out in the contractual agreement 
included that NGO personnel would report back on household progress and adhere to company 
operational standards. Internally, some informal rules of engagement were established. A salient point 
was that because the Intervention was advertised as voluntary and confidential, household information 
was to be collected and exclusively used for the Intervention. The importance of maintaining household 
confidentiality was highlighted as paramount to the integrity of the process by the author and Professor 
Kemp in an evaluation of the Intervention pilot in early 2012 (Kemp & Ramsay, 2012). 
                                                 
49 In some special circumstances, households were able to apply for additional funding support such as in the case 
of vulnerable households (e.g., elderly and people with disabilities).  
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Figure 14. Organisational structure of the Intervention. 
The Intervention was structured around a set of activities that comprised a household “Life 
Plan”. In the Life Plan, NGO practitioners worked to detail household strengths, needs, and future 
aspirations with the view to seeing the plan realised by households over time. The Life Plan comprised 
three main stages. The first stage involved a household diagnostic. The diagnostic would determine 
baseline levels of household strength and vulnerability. The second stage was the household vision, 
whereby household members articulate a collective development agenda. The third stage was a family 
plan, where the development agenda becomes translated into action items. The LA&R team expected 
that the NGO would continue the Intervention post-resettlement and provide a baseline to monitor and 
evaluate livelihood reconstruction and household wellbeing. Importantly, as the practice of the 
Intervention worked with the time and interest of households, stages of progress varied between 
households.  
 
Project uncertainty and suspension 
By early 2014, the land acquisition and resettlement process was progressing well. All activities 
of the predisplacement phase had been completed. According to company personnel, 97 per cent of 
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households had agreed to “sit at the table” and negotiate land access. The Intervention practice had 
advanced; the majority of households had progressed stages of the Life Plan, with some already 
mobilising on development agendas. Before moving on a final land acquisition and resettlement 
agreement, the entire La Granja project proposal was sent to the Rio Tinto London-based investment 
committee for approval. The Project teams were confident that the proposal would be accepted. A 
senior staff member commented to me that there was no plan B. To the surprise of company personnel, 
however, their proposal was rejected in May 2014. The investment committee deemed project costs too 
high, with unresolved technical issues and social risk. These challenges were largely exacerbated by 
volatility in the global commodity market. The La Granja project plans were suspended. Timeline 2 
depicts the suspension of company activity and the timeline of other processes, including the 
milestones in the dialogue and agreement-making process and Intervention work.  
 
 
Timeline 2. Project suspension.  
83 
In June 2014, funding to the La Granja project was scaled back with an immediate implication 
for the workforce. Similarly to the Global Financial Crisis, project teams were rapidly reduced. 
Remaining personnel were required to re-evaluate planning activities and produce new planning 
options within a timeframe of six months. I arrived at the La Granja project site in August 2014 to 
conduct fieldwork. In the months that followed, the company personnel began announcing the 
suspension of land access plans in La Granja. In the following chapters, I account for the dynamic of 
development practice, and the final suspension and cancellation of the Intervention as a result of 
uncertainty in the La Granja project.  
 
Chapter Summary 
This chapter provided an in-depth account of the socioeconomic, political, and historical 
contexts in which the Resettlement with Development practice is situated. The case is located within 
the broader political economy of new extraction in Latin America. Since the early 1990s, Peru has 
undergone significant social and economic transformation on account of the rapid expansion of 
extractive industries throughout the country. Within the Andes, multinational mining companies have 
expanded exploration and mine development activities into regions previously untouched by industrial 
development. The Peruvian government has played an instrumental role in formalisation of property 
rights and providing legal mechanisms to assist companies in gaining access to surface land. At the 
same time, the absence of national involuntary resettlement regulations means that private sector 
positions and approaches to resettlement are instead governed by international and industry standards, 
and corporate policies. 
Taking a longitudinal view, the La Granja case highlights the kind of complex historical 
legacies and social dynamics that can result from over 20 years of company engagement at one site. As 
previously argued, brownfield resettlement scenarios are characteristic of the mining sector (Owen & 
Kemp, 2015). In the La Granja case, repeated company attempts to develop a mine failed. Nonetheless, 
segments of the population have experienced intimidation and forced displacement. They were returned 
to the Project area and temporarily resettled as part of company exploration and preparation activities. 
Today, the configurations of households and communities in La Granja have been fundamentally 
altered as a result of multiple counts of economic and physical displacement. Local people have gained 
considerable knowledge of, and experience with multinational mining companies, and the kinds of 
corporate–community engagement strategies and contributions. The costs and benefits of company 
engagement have not been evenly distributed across the population, leading to a sense of greater 
entitlement to company benefits among some segments of the population. Against this backdrop, the 
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Intervention has been designed by the La Granja project team to enhance the acceptability of Rio 
Tinto’s most recent plans for land acquisition and resettlement. The following three empirical chapters 
explore actor perceptions and engagements with the Resettlement with Development practice, and 
consider the implications of prolonged and suspended preparation activities. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: ENROLLING THE HOUSEHOLD INTO A DEVELOPMENT PATHWAY: 
EXAMINING FRONTLINE DEVELOPMENT PRACTICE 
 
Introduction  
When Juan applied to work in the Intervention, he was not aware that the NGO had been 
contracted by a multinational mining company. Like all other applicants, Juan had never worked in 
association with the mining sector and had limited knowledge of human resettlement. Juan was a 
trained psychologist and had spent most of his career working in social programs funded by 
international aid organisations. It was during the job interview that Juan and his colleagues learned the 
Intervention was aimed at assisting some Andean households to prepare for a proposed resettlement. 
NGO management explained that the population living in the area earmarked for resettlement had 
significant development needs. Around one-fifth of households were identified by the company as 
vulnerable. In addition to being economically disadvantaged, many people were unfamiliar with the 
government social infrastructure. Some did not even have state-sanctioned identification and were 
unable to access government social services or citizen entitlements, such as free health insurance or the 
pension. Juan and his colleagues were employed primarily due to their experience and expertise in 
social development programs with Andean peasant communities. It was immediately apparent that 
without strengthening people’s basic capability, households would be unlikely to prosper in a 
resettlement scenario. The shock to living standards and livelihoods would simply be too great. 
This is the second of four chapters providing an in-depth exploration of the empirical findings, 
in response to the research question: What are the everyday practices that aim to achieve 
“development” within this context? Resettlement with Development practice is underresearched in the 
field of DCDR, particularly MCDR. The IFC endorses the incorporation of social development 
programs to encourage participatory and inclusive resettlement outcomes (IFC, 2002). How this 
guidance is interpreted or applied within the predisplacement phase is not well documented, although it 
is acknowledged that this period involves extensive engagement and expectation-setting between actors 
(Perera, 2014b). 
This chapter contributes to gaps in the literature by “zooming-in” at the coalface of resettlement 
practice (Nicolini, 2013). The focus here is to open up the “black box” of frontline implementation, and 
examine the interaction between so-called development experts and their intended beneficiaries (Lewis 
& Mosse, 2006; Mosse, 2004). The analysis is derived from intensive shadowing and observations of 
five practitioners in their daily work activities, over a period of two and a half months. Observations 
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are supplemented by targeted interviews with active and previously employed practitioners on the 
formal and informal dimensions of their work.50 
Prominent practitioner voices represented within this chapter are those of Beatriz, Andrea, Juan, 
Gabriel, and Miguel.51 Their perspectives are important for this analysis, given their expertise and 
longstanding engagement in the frontline of the Intervention. They were the last remaining practitioners 
actively working with households when I arrived to conduct fieldwork during August 2014. NGO 
management had retained them, following staff reductions in June 2014, as some of the “best workers” 
in the Intervention (NGO_M2). Each held an in-depth and longitudinal understanding of the issues, as 
most had been with the NGO since 2012. Furthermore, Beatriz, Gabriel, and Miguel had been team 
leaders before the demobilisation of project activity. Apart from their own direct liaison with 25 houses 
each, they had been in charge of overseeing the duties of approximately eight other practitioners. As 
such, their perspectives comprise extensive firsthand experience and a broader understanding of the 
generic enabling and constraining factors that influenced implementation work over the period. 
Integral to an actor-oriented analysis is an understanding of how policy intent becomes 
translated and transformed in the implementation process (Long, 2001). Nicolini (2013, p. 7) suggests 
that it is only when “we appreciate the set of practices involved in a scene of action that we can ask 
what sort of agency and ‘actor-ship’ is made possible by these specific conditions”. In this way, the 
findings presented here demonstrate how practitioners translate the Intervention in practice. They also 
lay a foundation for the following chapters, which consider what meaning actors ascribe to the work, 
and additionally the extent to which they can navigate interests and expectations through the process.  
The insights presented within this chapter highlight development practice as operationalised 
through three key domains. The first key insight is to recognise the structural barriers practitioners 
faced in initiating an empowerment intervention alongside a mining project. As will be explored, to 
overcome household distrust practitioners had to employ an adaptive relational approach in their work. 
One important dynamic of gaining household trust was to disassociate from the mining company and 
demonstrate their commitment to a pro-local agenda. A second key insight of development practice 
was the presence of various tensions that arose in attempts to progress intervention activity. These 
tensions manifest as a result of the disconnection between practitioners’ interest to progress formal 
components of the work as opposed to the households’ (lack of) interest and capacity to actively 
participate as “expected”. A third insight was to demonstrate how practitioners manage household 
                                                 
50 The following key indicates a percentage of practitioners’ perspectives: All = 100%, Most = >75%, Many = 50 
% - 75%, Some = 25% - 49%, A few = < 25%, None = 0% 
51 Pseudonyms are used in place of practitioners real names. 
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critique of their work. The finding demonstrates the limitations of applying a “pure” empowerment 
process within the context of a mining project.   
 
“Winning the Family” – Gaining Household Trust 
The first domain of practice associated with the implementation of an empowerment process 
entailed gaining household trust and confidence. One of the first activities of the Intervention involved 
practitioners approaching household members at their home and inviting them to participate (see Figure 
15). Practitioners would travel in the NGO utility car and visit hamlets scattered across the area. They 
soon learned that people were rarely in the home during sunlight hours. Most families worked plots of 
land in the surrounding hills, where they had livestock and food crops. Practitioners worked through 
the local social network to locate the whereabouts of community members, including those living in 
more remote sections of the direct area of influence. The practitioners took to their feet and walked 
along small dirt paths into the hills in the hope of meeting and engaging with local family members to 
discuss the Intervention.  
 
 
Figure 15. A practitioner approaches an Intervention recipient.  
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In reflection of early engagement, practitioners describe a sense that local people were not 
always pleased by their presence. Household members did not easily trust practitioners; they were 
extremely cautious of their motivations. In their words, practitioners described local people as being 
“closed”, “suspicious”, and “hard” with them. Of his early engagement experience, Gabriel said that 
“people resisted us” and some were initially “really afraid” to see practitioners at their home 
(NGO_M7). One critical issue identified by all practitioners was that local people believed they came 
from the mining company. For example, while Beatriz always informed people that she was from an 
NGO, they asked: “are you from Rio Tinto?” and “does Rio Tinto pay you?” (NGO_F11). 
Practitioners learnt in time that households were concerned about sharing information with 
them, a concern that remained for some households until the very end. Practitioners perceived that local 
people did not want the company to know details of their lives. Some local people had questioned 
Juan’s motives. They said to him “this Intervention is nothing but a spy program, and it’s just trying to 
get information from us to give to Rio Tinto […] why would you ask us to be involved in this?” 
(NGO_M15). It is noteworthy that households were ultimately right to suspect that information sharing 
would occur, as will be explained in the next chapters. Here, Miguel explains that when he was trying 
to initiate the Intervention, household members had been reluctant to engage in honest conversations 
with practitioners, once again indicating the level of mistrust: 
It was difficult for households to believe that we would not just give information to the mining 
company, many times we would knock on their door, and they would give us skewed 
information, information that wasn’t concrete, [or] distorted. (NGO_M17) 
During interviews, practitioners consistently stressed high levels of local distrust as a key 
barrier to progressing the Intervention. Without householders’ confidence, practitioners struggled to 
gain an in-depth or meaningful insight into householder’s development aspirations and available 
resources. Intervention recipients could keep practitioners at an “arm’s length”. Practitioners 
unanimously attribute high levels of distrust to local people’s prior experience with mining companies. 
Gabriel stressed this point with me in our interview. He explained that doing community development 
at La Granja was very different to his experience of “usual social programs” (NGO_M7). Previously, 
Gabriel had worked with international aid donors on a wide-range of rural livelihood interventions. The 
Intervention methodology and tools were similar to his previous work, yet he found that “working in 
the vicinity of a mining project creates a distinct set of conditions” (NGO_M7). The development 
practice was greatly influenced by the presence of Rio Tinto, and the legacy of prior mining company 
activity in the area. 
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As a result of the low trust dynamic in practitioner’s work, I observed practitioners casually 
differentiate between those households that were already “won”, from those who they were still 
winning (NGO_M17). Miguel explained that when a practitioner “wins” a family, it meant he had 
finally established a meaningful dialogue with members of the household; he had won their trust. 
Breaking down the barrier between the practitioner and household member was emphasised to a great 
relief. As household members gained confidence in the motivation of a practitioner, the work activities 
would flow more easily. Two key practices were associated with winning household trust. The first was 
to adopt an adaptive relational approach in household engagement. The second was to disassociate 
from the mining company and demonstrate a commitment to a pro-local agenda. These are discussed in 
turn. 
 
Accessing the household life world  
The work of gaining household trust required that practitioners employ an adaptive relational 
approach to breaking down the structural barriers between the practitioner and household member. In 
this respect, the practice of working in local people’s interests and time was widely acknowledged by 
practitioners as important. The practice was to enable households to assume control over the content 
and pace of activities. The practice was a marker of respect, which, all practitioners stressed, was 
fundamentally necessary for bottom-up empowerment. The work was, however, frustrating. At times, 
practitioners would arrive at a household only to be told to return another day. Beatriz explained it was 
important to conceal frustrations at “constant changes in plans” and maintain an obliging and 
“optimistic” stance (NGO_F11). Most practitioners were of the view that up to 30 visitations could be 
necessary before household members would be open to initiating Intervention activities. As explained 
by Miguel, when it came to working with households:  
We never push them ... each one has their natural speed ... some are faster, some are really slow, 
but we have a process, and we always need to respect that process, its pace. We have to respect 
their will and their decisions ... [so that] then they feel respected, so that they feel heard. 
(NGO_M16) 
Helping household members to feel respected required persistence, technique, and creativity. 
Practitioners worked to reduce the divide between their “expert” and “recipient” status through 
interaction. Local people relate to the practitioners as “engineers”, which in the Andes implies a gesture 
of respect and, depending on the context, a mark of superiority. In the work of bridging the social 
divide between them, practitioners communicate symbolic and verbal cues to demonstrate that they are 
accessible to household members. I observed practitioners adjusting both the pitch of their voice and 
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their language, namely by including slang or cutting or accentuating their accent to replicate local 
norms. Beatriz described her approach as “casual”. She would try “joking” with household members 
and respond to their mood (NGO_F11). Miguel described adjusting his physical stance when 
interacting with local people to place them in equal standing (see Figure 16). The physical symmetry 
communicated a likeness between them and reducing a perception of power asymmetries. On this 
point, Juan commented that over time “you learn to adjust your style, [you] adapt to the household” 
(NGO_M14).  
 
 
Figure 16. A practitioner and farmer casually converse. 
Having established some familiarity with households in the area, practitioners worked to 
integrate themselves into family life and interests. Most practitioners spoke of attempting to “see 
through the eyes of the other”, also described as “entering the household world of experience”. 
Households’ world of lived experience can be likened to what Long (2001) terms a “lifeworld” as 
described in Chapter Three. Practitioners spoke at length and with great passion about the challenge 
and reward of accessing the inner life or “heart” of the household (NGO_M16). It was apparent that 
practitioners view their capacity to do so as a kind of skill enabling a genuine connection with the 
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Andean people and their particular needs and interests. Miguel likened the process to a journey into the 
unknown, as explained: 
You arrive in a world that you don’t know and you have to face this world, this world is made 
up of the household leaders and members of the home. It is a process where you continue 
interacting until you feel that they open their doors to you, they open their hearts […] once a 
practitioner enters this world and begins to know it [the practitioner can] generate confidence. 
(NGO_M17)  
According to practitioners, some households were easily won, and others were temporarily or 
consistently resistant to their presence and the work activity. A clear tipping point described by 
practitioners was when members began to open up and share their “secrets”. Secrets were people’s 
knowledge of infidelity, incest, rape, domestic violence, and other private matters. The sharing of 
secrets was perceived by practitioners to be an indicator of an established bond and helped to enable 
Intervention activities. In the case of resistant households, practitioners describe the need to identify 
more creative avenues through which to gain confidence. In one example, a senior woman continued to 
receive a practitioner at her home but remained uncooperative. Conversations rarely moved beyond 
greetings. Miguel went to visit the woman and was ultimately able to gain her confidence by focusing 
upon what she saw as important in her life. 
I had been […] demonstrating that I was dependable and open […] then on this day, the Senora 
welcomed me, “Good morning Engineer”. [Finally] I knew I was making ground. So I 
observed, and I saw something … that the Senora’s world was the girl. So I decided to enter 
through the girl. I began to play with the girl, converse with the girl, and I saw that [the Senora] 
began to change her attitude with me, through Rosa I arrived in her heart, I began to open her 
heart. (NGO_M17) 
The above quotation demonstrates one example of the kind of persistence and creative thinking 
and action necessary to build household trust within this context. As illustrated in this and the above 
examples, practitioners emphasised the common challenge involved in initiating their work. The nature 
of the development practice within this context required that they remain adaptable in their job, to tailor 
their relational style with individual households, and remain persistent and optimistic even in the face 
of resistance. After establishing a relationship, practitioners worked to strengthen and maintain their 
connections. The following section describes how practitioners sought to depoliticise the development 
practice by managing an external perception of the NGO’s independence from the company. 
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Managing perceptions of NGO independence and practitioner intent 
Building household trust involved constant work. Practitioners sought to strengthen and 
maintain their relationship throughout the process. Observation and interview data suggest that 
practitioners were keen to legitimate themselves as worthy of household confidence. One important 
practice associated with this work was to demonstrate their commitment to a pro-local agenda. In part, 
practitioners did this by showing that their priority was to champion household interests and not 
necessarily those of the mining company. Three key practices were identified to assist this work. The 
first was to depoliticise their work by externally concealing the institutional relationship between 
organisations. The second was to assume ignorance of business activities, and the third was to maintain 
a neutral stance on business development. The following is an elaboration on these dimensions of 
practice. 
Local people’s suspicion of the internal arrangement between the NGO and the company 
caused a tension in practice. One practitioner explained it had been a “huge challenge” that had 
generated “limitations” on practitioners’ ability to find the “best possible way to gain people’s 
confidence” (NGO_M8). As previously highlighted, practitioners generally perceived the connection as 
a concern to local people, who worried that the work was ultimately directed at “generating what Rio 
Tinto wants [and] needs” (NGO_M15). To progress the work, practitioners purposefully downplayed 
the company association. NGO management explained that it had been important to depoliticise their 
work by maintaining an external perception of independence from the company. As explained, this was 
“for the purpose of generating confidential dialogue” with households (NGO_M1). Unlike the 
company, the NGO was “a new institution with a different type of personnel and work approach” 
(NGO_M1). As an NGO, they had greater legitimacy as agents of local-level development. As 
explained by NGO management, the company Community Relations (CR) staff: 
… just cannot do [this development work] They cannot do it because of the historical friction 
and because their fundamental approach to relations has been about assistance, which has led to 
increasing demands. We have arrived with a different optic, with a different logic. (NGO_M1) 
The above quotation highlights a widespread view that NGO independence was decisive in 
separating the empowerment work from the legacy of company–community experience. The NGO was 
suggested to be a “neutral” actor, devoid of historical friction and a legacy of local demands for jobs, 
services, and goods. NGO personnel sought to encourage a local perception that they were autonomous 
from the company as a means to enable practice. This interest was supported by the NGO’s and 
company’s physical presentation as separate organisations. In the La Granja village, NGO personnel 
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worked from a rented house in the centre of town, consumed their daily meals at a local restaurant, and 
participated in town life. Company personnel were mostly restricted to the confines of the Project camp 
that provided all necessary accommodation, meals, and leisure activities. They wore different attire: 
NGO workers were casually dressed in a vest or hat exhibiting the NGO logo while company personnel 
consistently wore a complete uniform. 
Another distinct characteristic of this autonomous presentation was that NGO practitioners and 
company personnel rarely associated in the public sphere until the final closing of the Intervention. The 
parties undertook a different scope of work and did not always cross paths in the public arena. 
Practitioners suggest that a concerted effort was made not to associate if possible. As explained by 
Miguel and Gabriel: 
We have tried where possible to maintain and also demonstrate our independence to the 
community ... In general, we never crossover in an activity together [in public]. (NGO_M17) 
In the various meetings that we have had, [NGO management] have always stated to 
demonstrate, in whatever way possible, the separation between [the NGO] and Rio Tinto. That 
we do not mix in the community meetings, we present ourselves, and they present themselves 
[we want] people to see that we are different, we are here to work for the families, to gain their 
confidence and that information they give us will not be given to the company. (NGO_M8) 
Field observations suggest that feigning ignorance of company plans also helped to distance any 
association with the mining company. In a general sense, practitioners were ignorant of business plans 
and activities. They were not privy to detailed planning information, nor were they able to anticipate 
unfolding events. In another sense, practitioners had more information in comparison to households. 
They received general information – such as updates on the progress of the negotiation dialogue – 
through combined NGO and company staff meetings. They also learned about company–community 
dialogue during household visitations. Local people were encouraged to confide in practitioners about 
their dealings with company personnel, including on the proposed benefit-sharing arrangements. When 
asked by household members to clarify details about company plans and activities, however, I observed 
that practitioners generally maintained an ignorant stance. Maintaining neutrality was one way to 
demonstrate practitioner independence from the company. As explained by Miguel: 
I have been working with an elderly man […] one day he said to me, “engineer, you are 
informed, tell me, is it true that they [the mining company] are not going to recognise a land 
purchase of one hectare for one hectare?” They ask you like this [I stated] “it gives me great 
pleasure that you have asked me this question Pablo, because look, I do not know”. 
(NGO_M16) 
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Miguel explained that the question had been a “pleasure” because he was able to demonstrate 
that, like this man, he was not privy to company activities, no more so than anyone else in the 
community. This had been a lie. Miguel was aware the company had proposed a two-for-one-hectare 
land deal. In our interview, Miguel justified his response as an obligatory part of his work contract. 
NGO personnel were not permitted to talk about the company land access negotiation. At the same 
time, my observation of practitioners feigning ignorance suggests it helped workers to place them on 
the side of the locals, who were also uninformed on business plans. Another potential option for Miguel 
would have been to explain that practitioners were unable to clarify company activities because of the 
contractual rules between the NGO and mining company. Ultimately, it was in practice easier to feign 
ignorance and create distance from the company.  
Practitioners maintained a neutral stance on mine development despite that their livelihood 
depended on the Project progressing. Their ability to preserve effectiveness in the community was 
linked to households seeing their role as neutral, if not pro-local. While shadowing practitioners into 
visitations, I observed practitioners receive frequent comments about company activities and the 
uncertainty that local people were experiencing. The land acquisition and resettlement proposal was a 
source of anxiety and confusion for many households. In general, practitioners were noted to maintain 
neutral or affirming responses in all cases. It was common to hear a practitioner respond to household 
frustration with “good” or “very good” regardless of whether the person was positive or negative about 
the company and the prospect of resettlement. When questioned about the function of maintaining this 
stance, the general standpoint was that practitioners wanted households to see that corporate interests 
did not incentivise them. Despite all efforts made, household members often remained suspicious of the 
relationship between organisations. 
As already highlighted, the relationship between the NGO and the mining company was of 
interest to households. When prompted, practitioners offered various explanations. One common 
practice was to frame a response by drawing attention to the NGO’s organisational history. For 
example, during one visitation Juan and I walked for 45 minutes along a muddy track to meet a father 
and his daughter in their small earth-brick house with a tin roof. It was surrounded by various food 
crops, as the family were farmers. Soon after our arrival the father began to inquire about Juan’s 
association with the mining company. He asked who had paid his salary. I observed Juan explain that 
he works for a not-for-profit organisation with 35 years of experience in community development. He 
stated that the organisation had a contract with Rio Tinto but his boss was from the NGO, and the NGO 
paid his wage. It is worth noting that I observed NGO management encouraging practitioners to 
emphasise that the Intervention was part of the NGO’s broader program of humanitarian work. While 
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Juan’s explanation may have been technically correct, my impression was that the father wanted to 
understand what connection, if any, Juan had with the company.  
Another distorting explanation I observed was when practitioners talked at “cross-purposes”. 
Talking at cross-purposes describes the act of directing dialogue towards certain subject areas over 
others. For example, while shadowing Andrea, a mother of three had casually asked, “Is the 
information you are recording here really for Rio Tinto?” Andrea explained, “No, we really record this 
information for our work in this Intervention”. While households’ information was used by the 
practitioners to track the progress and activities of families in the Intervention, the answer once again 
concealed that information was exchanged between the NGO and mining company. As will be 
explained in subsequent chapters, all household information was ultimately absorbed by the LA&R 
team following management’s decision to shut down the Intervention in December 2014. While 
practitioners were cognisant of some information exchanges, the above example suggests that in 
answering household questions, practitioners sometimes offered a literal interpretation. By talking at 
cross-purposes, the practitioner could avoid confrontation or loss of trust. 
An analysis of this domain of implementation work suggests that the process of winning the 
family was an essential step in the operationalisation of the Intervention. Practitioners worked to 
access, strengthen, and maintain household confidence despite high levels of mistrust. They sought to 
disassociate themselves from the mining company’s activities and interests, and in the process, 
depoliticise their presence and the legitimacy of their empowerment work with households.  
 
Consolidating an Improvement Agenda 
Having established a level of trust with household members, practitioners could then focus on a 
second domain of mobilising the empowerment process. This process was formally guided by a series 
of structured activities collectively termed the “Life Plan”. The Life Plan was staged around three key 
phases described in Chapter Two. The first was an in-depth household diagnostic; the second phase, a 
family vision comprising development priorities, future goals, and an action agenda. The third phase 
was the enactment of this agenda. While the Intervention was ultimately cancelled in December 2014, 
households worked with practitioners on these various Life Plan activities over a period of two and a 
half years. Three main tasks were important in this work. The first was to locate opportunities to 
initiate a household empowerment process. The second was to educate households in their strengths 
and deficits. The third was to consolidate a family vision. As will be discussed, each task presented 
different challenges for the practitioner, which are discussed in turn. 
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Planting the seed for development 
Practitioners described the early stages of Intervention activity as involving frequent household 
visitations with “no agenda”. While at the residence, practitioners did not undertake formal activities. 
Rather, they held prolonged conversations about interests and life experiences. In doing so, 
practitioners engaged in a culturally appropriate way of expressing friendship within the context of 
Andean Peru. As the same time, visitations formed an important function in identifying opportunities in 
which to instigate an empowerment process. Practitioners used dialogue to determine household 
interests and generate shared working agendas. The process is one of guiding an individual to consider 
“problems” that could be addressed. All practitioners offered examples of how they approached this 
task. Andrea explained that in one case she sat with a mother who confided that her husband was 
having an affair and the mistress was soon to have a baby. The woman was afraid to leave; she had 
become dependent upon her husband’s small income and was suffering with a number of health 
problems. Andrea saw this conversation as an opportunity to initiate the Intervention activities. She 
suggested a first step could be to visit the medical post and address her health issues. Though the 
woman was shy about talking with a doctor, Andrea assured her that she would be by her side, 
accompanying her in the process.  
A practitioner’s ability to consolidate a development agenda and legitimise their role as 
“expert” facilitator varied from household to household. Practitioners described some individuals as 
extremely forthcoming with problems and seeking guidance. Others were more cautious or even 
confused; they appeared to be grappling with the kind of assistance practitioners were offering. This 
sentiment was aptly summarised by Juan, who described being confronted with a sceptical response: 
household members said to him, “What is this? You go with us? Are you saying we are people who 
don’t […] know how to do things on our own?” (NGO_M15). Practitioners had to find creative ways to 
relay the long-term value of household empowerment. For example, when asked what the Intervention 
would give, Gabriel was in the habit of explaining the empowerment process as follows: 
I am not going to give you seeds, [...] materials, [or] guinea pigs. What’s the point in me giving 
you these things, if you do not have the capacity to manage them? Without the capability, you 
will eventually lose these things. (NGO_M7)52  
Storytelling and the use of examples constitute an important way in which practitioners sought 
to demonstrate the value of household empowerment. Several practitioners described examples of how 
                                                 
52 Guinea pig consumption in the Peruvian Andes dates back to pre-Columbian times. The animals are also used by 
“medicos de campo” or traditional doctors to cure human illness.  
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young children first learn to undertake a task, and are then able to teach their siblings what to do. The 
example was not intended to patronise, but to highlight capacity-building as a fundamentally important 
part of the human experience. I noticed that many examples focused upon how one might feel when 
facing new tasks. Because more vulnerable households had limited exposure to the state bureaucracy, 
practitioners appealed to the kind of fears and concerns they could experience in accessing these 
services for the first time. Their concerns included not knowing where to go for help within a hospital, 
feeling ashamed to talk with a doctor, or feeling hesitant to sign an official form. Throughout the 
process, the practitioner proceeded to indicate their suitability as a facilitator in this work and sought 
verbal agreement to commence Intervention activity.  
Building an optic on household strength and deficits 
Having gained verbal consent to progress activities, practitioners explained the need to establish 
a household “diagnostic”. The diagnostic took the form of two surveys; one accounted for the 
socioeconomic status of the household and the other was an in-depth examination of human and social 
capitals. According to interviews, the diagnostic would help to determine the resources (or capitals) 
available to a household for development. The process was one of enlightening members about their 
strengths, as well as an education in the kind of deficits, challenges, or barriers holding them back from 
reaching their development potential. For example, households were asked to map their social network 
and the quality of relationships with individuals and organisations. Furthermore, practitioners sought to 
evaluate how well household members access information, make collective and informed decisions, 
and use their existing resources efficiently. The collected information provided practitioners with a rich 
overview of the household’s physical, financial, natural, human, and social resources, in addition to 
internal household dynamics and the strength of their external relationships.  
Information gathering was intended to help practitioners identify options to target household 
improvement; nonetheless, the process was awkward. Beatriz explained information gathering as “the 
most uncomfortable” activity of the Intervention (NGO_F11). Household members did not always 
understand the need to record such personal details. The practitioner’s probing questions on the internal 
household dynamic was at times a source of aggravation, undermining the established relationship. As 
emphasised by Miguel, “the people do not like to be questioned at all” (NGO_M16). A previous 
quotation highlights the perception that households could conceal information or provide illusive or 
generalised answers. In an attempt to overcome resistance, practitioners sought to use data collection as 
a means of establishing trust.  
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One practice aimed at alleviating the data collection process was to record only the literal text 
or exact wording of what people stated. For example, when an individual blatantly lied about their 
physical assets, the practitioner would write down the false response even in the face of contradictory 
evidence. For example, Juan described sitting with a senior man on a bench outside his house. 
Chickens were pecking at the dirt floor surrounding their feet and a number of cows were chewing on a 
patch of grass nearby. When Juan asked how many cows the farmer owned, he replied, “We do not 
have any cows” (NGO_M15). As explained, “I could see the cows were there in the front yard [but] I 
wrote in the family file, no cows. [the farmer] could see that, he saw what I wrote. I wrote exactly what 
he told me” (NGO_M15). Juan and other practitioners explained to me that it was important to 
demonstrate the Intervention was voluntary, participatory, and confidential in nature. Juan completed 
the “diagnostic” without raising friction and showed respect for household wishes. Practitioners 
explained, however, that data collection was always an iterative process. Over time, individuals would 
often “open up” and be willing to build upon or correct information recorded in their file (NGO_M14). 
By collecting information in this way, they were ultimately able to document in-depth household 
profiles while at the same time maintaining rapport. Miguel explained: 
If today someone tells me that he has two cows and one hectare of land, I found that after 
chatting and earning trust, one day this same individual will tell me they have five hectares and 
on another day, that they have six. You then fill that information into their profile. (NGO_M16) 
“Naturalising” the data collection process was another way in which practitioners sought to 
alleviate the challenge of data collection. Frequent household visitations assisted practitioners to 
directing conversations in a way that would result in information sharing in lay conversation, rather 
than through direct questions. Miguel held the view that collecting information “without questions 
[was] generally the best approach” because it was possible to generate a dialogue that felt “more 
natural” (NGO_M16). Having documented a baseline understanding of the household situation, the 
next area of work involved consolidating a household improvement agenda, in the form of a tangible 
plan.  
The family vision 
Getting to the “family vision” (or the vision) was an integral focus of the Intervention during 
the predisplacement phase. In the course of fieldwork, NGO management explained that the main focus 
of activity preresettlement was the completion of as many family visions as possible. The vision 
comprised three activities: an assessment of how households define their quality of life, the mapping of 
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household progress in achieving development interests, and finally, a description and itemised account 
of household development aspiration into the next 5 to 10 years. 
In theory, the vision was intended to represent how members self-define the meaning and 
content of their improvement. As will be illustrated, however, practitioners confined household 
aspirations for development through skilful facilitation. The ordering of activities in the Life Plan 
worked to structure and limit a household’s development interests to those realistically possible on the 
basis of their existing resources and any external opportunities available to them. Formation of this 
vision was central to the functioning of the Intervention. The content formed the basis of ongoing 
activity, a journey between the household’s current situation and their ideal (but realistic) future state. 
Practitioners facilitated the vision process with participatory rural appraisal (PRA) methods. 
PRA methods are widely adopted within the sphere of international development for their reported 
strength in empowering households and communities to drive bottom-up and inclusive social change 
(Chambers 1997). The role of the practitioner is that of a facilitator, working to guide an individual 
who is interested in altering their situation. Observation of and interviews with practitioners on the use 
of PRA methods suggest that three main tensions arose in practice. First was the difficulty practitioners 
faced in supporting a “genuinely” participant-driven process; second was household members’ 
perceived lack of understanding about or interest in altering their situation; and third was household 
sensitivity to sharing future interests and plans. These challenges are discussed in turn and highlight 
once again the challenge of undertaking development practice within this context.  
Practitioners describe a difficulty in facilitating a “genuinely” participant-driven process. 
Specifically, they had to balance their intent to guide an inductive process with their perspective on 
what they felt would be best for households. As mentioned, practitioners were seeking to assist 
households in self-identifying their development interests. In practice, however, these interests did not 
always flow freely. My observations of the visioning exercise suggest challenges in translating key 
concepts integral to the empowerment process. Specifically, by way of initiating the vision task, 
members were invited to map those elements comprising household “quality of life” on a large piece of 
butcher’s paper. The question, however, appeared confusing. In one example, Miguel elaborated what 
he meant by quality of life in detail. Household members continued staring at him blankly. In a follow-
up interview, Miguel confessed that making a family vision was a kind of “abstract process” and that in 
his experience, local people “find it difficult to think about their life in that way” (NGO_M17).  
Practitioners structured the family vision process by bridging their “expert” knowledge of 
development with the lived experience of household members. As highlighted by Miguel, “You try to 
help them think about what is important, you might say, Don Alberto, I remember that when your wife 
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was sick […] Do you think that good health might be something important to this household?” 
(NGO_M17). During interviews, a few practitioners explained that prompting occurred as a result of 
their pre-established familiarity with members. My data suggests, however, that practitioners had 
guided household answers towards generic sociodevelopment categories deemed relevant by their 
expertise. For example, quality of life was consistently – almost every time – associated with 
education, health, and livelihood.  
The flow of activities and practitioner “prompts” helped structure household members’ 
articulation of future goals. In getting to the vision, practitioners filled in a large table with those 
attributes identified as quality of life. They asked household members to consider the current status of 
each attribute (livelihood, health, education) and articulate an improved version. For example, where 
income flows were inadequate, gaining secure income through small business was identified as a way 
to improve. In general, ideas of improvement related to more of the same kind of resources. Increasing 
a herd of cattle from 5 to 10 cows was deemed an improvement, as was the expansion or diversification 
of crops and so forth. A “better life” was also associated with improved physical and human capital, for 
example, better housing and facilities and access to institutions such as a university so that the children 
could become professionals.  
Not all households readily collaborated in the process of constructing a vision; some were 
uninterested in “improving” their situation through the Intervention. A few practitioners explained that 
households could be narrowly focused on selling land to Rio Tinto. For example, Beatriz spent months 
working with a woman, explaining the methodology and encouraging her to initiate the vision. 
Ultimately, however, the woman “was just waiting for the resettlement to go ahead, so she could sell 
her land and make money. Her objective was to just sell and leave” (NGO_F5). Practitioners appeared 
to accept that not all households would understand or value the empowerment work. In their 
experience, household members could be difficult to work because while some remained focused on 
land sale, others did not perceive any “progress” to be made.  
Two kinds of households fell within this category. The first were those who considered 
themselves adequately “developed” and did not require assistance. The second were households who 
were perceived to lack motivation to act upon their interests. A widespread view among practitioners 
was that households could be “very comfortable in their lifestyle”, “living day to day”, and “difficult to 
work with because they do not want to change” (NGO_F5). In Andrea’s experience, men had been 
more challenging to work with than women because mothers were more inclined to “think and worry 
about the future and their children” (NGO_F5). Miguel commented that seniors often “recognise 
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circumstances that could be better” but nonetheless are “not interested” in doing anything to change the 
situation (NGO_M17).  
A final and significant challenge involved in the work of building the family vision was a 
requirement on practitioners to ask every household about their interest in participating in the proposed 
company resettlement. Before constructing the final description of what the household vision would 
entail, practitioners were required by management to ask all households the following: “Given that Rio 
Tinto has announced a possible land acquisition and resettlement, how do you see the position of you 
and your family in the next five years?” Practitioners suggest this question was a source of tension. As 
explained by Miguel, “what you need to understand is that we are undertaking a process of obtaining 
the family vision, but specifically, […] it is not natural to force, in the form of a plan what the mine has 
to know” (NGO_M17). This question on resettlement plans was perceived to reveal the “true” purpose 
of the Intervention. Until this point, practitioners had avoided talking about company interests as a 
matter of technique. According to Miguel, farmers had accused him of being a mining company 
employee. In one case a man proclaimed that it was “clear” he had “come here and play[ed] dumb, but 
you are trying to find out things” (NGO_M17). The man consequently declined further involvement 
with the NGO. 
The work of consolidating a development agenda involved some “unnatural” or even “forced” 
elements. To consolidate a development agenda, practitioners worked to bridge households’ interests 
and the Intervention intent with an aim to improve their lives. They worked to reconcile progressing 
Intervention activities despite tensions that arose in the process. Within the predisplacement phase, one 
fundamental tension was dealing with household sensitivity to information sharing. Another was the 
perceived disinterest of households in “improving” their situation according to the Intervention logic. 
The final section of this chapter examines a third domain of practice associated with frontline practice. 
This was the work of managing failure and containing critique of the Intervention.  
 
Managing Failure and Containing Critique 
The Intervention logic and activities were sometimes confused or perceived to fail household 
members in their stated objectives. The third domain of practice describes how practitioners sought to 
maintain household engagement by rectifying failures, masking contradictions, and containing the 
critique of the Intervention. Three practices were associated with this work. They include the work of 
attributing households with ownership over the Intervention process, focusing on household strength 
and achievements rather than failure, and shutting down household critique by referring individuals to 
the Intervention rules. Each is discussed.  
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Attributing ownership 
As explained, household members were sometimes confused about activities, or unable or 
unwilling to respond to practitioner questions. While practitioners might ideally have sought to work 
with members in gaining a better understanding of the process, practical time pressures meant that 
sometimes they would rush activities to “get the job done”. In the final months of the Intervention, in 
particular, practitioners were under pressure to complete outstanding Life Plan activities within a short 
time frame. 
In a bid to encourage household members to engage with the process, practitioners would 
sometimes emphasise activity outcomes as “owned” by the local people even in the face of 
contradictory evidence. For example, in one particularly rushed visitation by Gabriel, I observed that a 
couple hardly contributed to their visioning exercise. The senora had been silent throughout most of the 
process. When asked about her aspiration to improve household income, she did not reply. Gabriel 
questioned the senora about her interest to start a guinea pig business. She explained that they had tried 
it once before, but she found it too time consuming in addition to her pre-existing livelihood activities. 
The guinea pigs had fallen sick and died. As the senora gave this explanation, Gabriel loomed over the 
butcher’s paper with pen in hand; it was evident that he wanted to fill in the blank column and 
complete the household vision. He asked if she would like to start a guinea pig business in the future. 
The senora appeared hesitant and repeated that she had already been unsuccessful in the endeavour. 
Her body language, soft tone of voice, and evasive answer suggested she was disinterested in the idea. 
Nonetheless, Gabriel wrote, the senora would like to start a guinea pig farm. The couple were 
photographed with their household vision on completion. 
In this example, time pressures and household members’ attitudes towards the process appear to 
have undermined the capacity of the practitioner to facilitate a genuinely people-driven outcome. The 
couple had indicated they would receive Gabriel for no longer than an hour; NGO management had 
instructed him to complete a number of outstanding visions by the end of the week. The extent to 
which household members had understood the process – whether the vision accurately captured their 
aspirations, or whether they would be willing to commit their resources to activities – was negligible. 
On completion, however, Gabriel congratulated the couple on a job well done. The following quotation 
highlights the work of attributing ownership to household members. Gabriel sought to “help” 
household members gain ownership over their household vision, he explained in reflecting on the visit: 
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I stated to Don Sergio “you have so many ideas but they are loose, running around in your 
mind. Today we have had the opportunity to transfer them onto the paper and look what you 
have produced. What we see here, this is not mine, this is yours, this is what you have done, 
these are your projects, your ideas”. (NGO_M8) 
The quotation appeared at odds with my observations of the process. I questioned Gabriel about 
why he had praised the man over this task. He explained that delivering praise was a source of 
“satisfaction” to the participants (NGO_M8). At the same time, the function of praise appeared to be an 
attempt to smooth over or frame the processes as participant-driven, a practice that seemed to 
strengthen an otherwise tentative connection between a household and their vision. The act of 
photographing the household members with their completed activity may have contributed to the 
attribution of ownership. The photo symbolises both an official record of activities undertaken and 
potentially that the final product was an achievement of the household.  
Rendering failure as temporary and rectifiable 
Sometimes household members deemed practitioners’ guidance through the Intervention 
unhelpful. Such cases threatened the legitimacy of practitioner “expertise” and the Intervention logic 
more generally. In the face of a failed initiative, I observed that practitioners generally focused on the 
household member’s achievement and demonstrated their failures as superficial and rectifiable. The 
practice was aimed at diverting attention away from more fundamental questions about the value of 
their work and maintaining household engagement. By way of example, practitioners explained that 
many families in the area were accustomed to seeking medical assistance from “medicos del campo” or 
a kind of “traditional doctor” who provides natural remedies for their health ailments. Practitioners 
explained that these “doctors” were taking advantage of farmers’ ignorance, for example, by claiming 
to cure epilepsy with herbs. In one case, Juan had encouraged an elderly farmer to visit the medical 
post, rather than his usual traditional doctor. During our later visitation to his home, I observed the man 
complaining that it had been a waste of time; his medical problems had persisted. In his response, Juan 
focused on what he saw as being the critical learning. He praised the man’s health-seeking behaviour 
and drew upon a metaphor to demonstrate that his frustration was temporary and rectifiable. As 
recalled by Juan in a follow-up interview: 
I gave an example so the farmer could understand, with his own knowledge, using the topic of 
agriculture … I stated, when you plant new seeds, sometimes not all of them come up well, so 
what we need to do is find the right seeds in order to obtain the best product, this is the same 
with doctors, because the doctor you’ve seen is not a good one, so what we need to do is look 
for a better one. It’s the same with seeds, sometimes one seed doesn’t give a good result, but 
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this doesn’t mean we give up altogether; we look for a stronger seed. I give this explanation to 
help the farmer understand why we don’t just give up on doctors. (NGO_M15) 
The quotation represents one example of how a practitioner worked to resolve tension 
associated with “failed” advice. In this example, he congratulated the man on positive actions (health-
seeking behaviour) and demonstrated his experience as inconclusive rather than unsuccessful. The 
practitioner worked to maintain the legitimacy of his expert status; the problem was that this doctor had 
been a “bad seed”. My observations suggest that practitioners were not always able to divert or smooth 
over tensions in this way. The following section illustrates how practitioners responded in such cases.  
Shutting down household inquiry 
The final practice associated with managing failure in the Intervention was to close down 
household complaints by externalising responsibility to management and referring them to the 
Intervention policy. This practice was employed when practitioners were effectively “backed against 
the wall”, unable to defend the Intervention logic or actions undertaken. A chief complaint, recognised 
in all practitioner interviews, was a perception that household members felt entitled to particular forms 
of assistance. For example, all practitioners noted the limitation in their capacity to assist households 
who were “really poor” or dealing with a crisis (NGO_F6). As part of the empowerment logic, 
households were required to draw upon their resources to support activities. This restriction meant that 
in cases of emergency, practitioners were often unable to offer support. In one example, Beatriz had 
driven to a more remote area. In her path, she saw one of her recipient families walking with a pregnant 
woman in labour. The family members pleaded with Beatriz to provide a lift to the medical post; 
however, she explained that despite having an empty car, she was not permitted to do so. The family 
members were visibly distressed. She explained to them, “I’m telling you this only because that is part 
of my job, but personally I am not saying no, I will ask my boss” (NGO_F11). 
Practitioners found ways to overcome the ethically fraught work of trying to “assist” people 
within the constraints of their own resources. In the above example, the practitioner describes calling 
the NGO management who initially declined permission to break the Intervention rules on account of 
the crisis. In addition to wanting to “help” the family, Beatriz also faced the challenge of lost 
confidence; as explained, she feared “the family would never receive me again” (NGO_F11). By 
involving management, Beatriz worked to maintain an empathetic stance with the family members. She 
externalised the decision to help upon management and in doing so was able to maintain the family 
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confidence in her intentions to help, while at the same time shutting down further pleas that she do 
something. 53  
In another example, Miguel described the experience of one of his predecessors. This 
practitioner had visited a vulnerable family who needed to transport a sick and fragile woman to the 
health post as a matter of urgency. They did not own a car. The practitioner called the NGO 
management who reminded him that the Intervention is about supporting households to draw upon their 
own resources. They said, “What would this senora do if the NGO wasn’t in the area?” (NGO_M16). 
Miguel was frustrated by this practitioner’s experience. He said, “When the problem is there this is not 
a time to philosophise, but to act” (NGO_M16). The practitioner explained to the family that for 
security reasons it was not possible to assist. The following day, the household withdrew from the 
Intervention. This example illustrates limitations faced by practitioners working with a people-centred, 
as opposed to a service-delivery approach. It was neither practical nor relevant for this practitioner to 
explain the importance of empowering households to do it themselves. As a last resort, practitioners 
closed down household inquiry by referring them to the Intervention rules. They reminded individuals 
of the participatory and voluntary nature of the Intervention and that they were welcome to withdraw at 
any time. Repetition of the Intervention policy appeared to serve a function in closing down further 
discussion. As mentioned, the practice was a last resort for practitioners who had run out of resources 
to counter criticism.  
The nature of development practice within this context meant that practitioners dealt with 
failure and household critique in their day-to-day activities. The insight suggests that people’s “buy-in” 
to the process could be tentative and fragile. Practitioners were viewed to have fallen short on their 
expressed intention to help household members improve the quality of their lives. When this occurred, 
practitioners worked to direct household members to take ownership over the process or view failure as 
temporary. In other cases, however, practitioners were constrained in their ability to address household 
interests or concerns. They managed a process of attempting to maintain household confidence and the 
“authenticity” of their intent within the confines of the Intervention rules. As a last resort, the 
practitioner externalised blame and closed off further inquiry. 
 
                                                 
53 It is important to note that on this particular occasion, the NGO management did finally agree to break security 
protocol after Beatriz pushed back on this decision and, finally, Rio Tinto was consulted and gave explicit permission. This 
breach of policy was an “extreme case”, and the pregnant woman was required to sign a waiver relinquishing the NGO of 
any responsibility (NGO_F11). The example highlights how practitioners worked to externalise critique and maintain 
household confidence.    
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Chapter Summary 
This chapter has considered the interactive dynamics and practical activities of the Intervention, 
situated at the social interface of company–community engagement at La Granja. The findings provide 
an in-depth insight into the nature of frontline practice, and the kind of formal and informal strategies 
adopted by practitioners to translate the intent of their empowerment work and to advance the Life Plan 
activities. The chapter has brought to light three key practice domains, and each presented practitioners 
with a unique set of challenges.  
The first domain of practice was referred to by practitioners as “winning the family”, and 
involved rapport building between the practitioners and household members. Practitioners sought to 
gaining legitimacy as household confidants and expert development facilitators. Practitioners were, 
however, faced with a significant structural barrier; local people had a heightened distrust of outsiders 
and building household trust involved significant persistence, adaptation, and creativity. Practitioners 
deemed it to be problematic that local people associated them with the mining company. Consequently, 
NGO personnel sought to depoliticise their presence and externally disassociate the practice from 
company interests as a matter of technique. As will be explored within the following Chapters, this 
technique ultimately caused an ethical conundrum for practitioners, when household trust was broken 
and all family Life Plans were transferred to the mining company without consent. 
The second domain of practice centred on practitioners consolidating a household improvement 
agenda. The importance of household empowerment within a DCDR setting is established within the 
literature (Drydyk, 2015). This chapter suggests, however, that the logic of self-empowerment was not 
easily translated within the La Granja context. Practitioners were faced with a significant gap between 
their expert knowledge and the lived experience of household members, who did not necessarily 
resonate with the activities or logic of a people-centred development process. Local people, as 
highlighted in Chapter Four, were instead accustomed to, and held expectations for, a more 
paternalistic and transactional development approach. Consolidating a household improvement vision 
was thus not a straightforward process for practitioners, who were capable of prompting, and 
sometimes forcing, the Life Plan activities in order to progress. The approach enabled practice but must 
be recognised as at odds with the Intervention intent to empower household members. 
This chapter highlights a third and final practice domain aimed at managing practice failure and 
containing critique by Intervention recipients’. The findings demonstrate that household members were 
not merely benign recipients, but actively resisted the implementation process and practitioner bids to 
encourage their initial and ongoing participation. The data suggests that some household members were 
very tentatively engaged; their participation was fragile, if not tokenistic. Practitioners sought to 
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maintain local legitimacy and found creative ways to externalise responsibility for failures. As a last 
resort, they deflected and shut down household critique. Having provided this nuanced picture of daily 
practice, the following chapter introduces another layer to the analysis of Resettlement with 
Development practice. The chapter considers how households, the NGO and company personnel 
understood the intent and value of the Intervention, at the social interface of company-community 
engagement.  
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CHAPTER SIX: DISCONNECTED DEVELOPMENT: EXAMINING ACTOR INTERPRETATIONS 
OF DEVELOPMENT PRACTICE DURING THE PREDISPLACEMENT PHASE  
 
Introduction  
In the previous chapter, I elaborated on challenges associated with development practice during 
the predisplacement phase of a company-managed land acquisition and resettlement process. The 
evidence suggests the nature of frontline development practice as rife with tensions and ambiguity, a 
general finding that has been confirmed in prior research within other contexts (see for example 
Lipsky, 1980; Nicolini, 2013). Within the context of this case study, the findings highlight that to 
progress development activity, NGO practitioners deemed it necessary to dissociate their work from 
company interests altogether. They focused upon legitimising their role as facilitators of household 
improvement and employed a range of practices to gain and maintain household members’ buy-in of 
the people-centred development process. This examination has raised questions about the extent to 
which household members meaningfully participated in the Intervention. Having described the granular 
dynamics of frontline implementation work, in this chapter I therefore zoom out of day-to-day 
development activity and consider how three actor groups − the mining company, households, and the 
NGO − attributed meaning to the people-centred development work. 
This is the third of four chapters providing an in-depth exploration of the empirical findings, in 
response to the research question: How is the meaning and value of the practice understood by actors 
engaged in predisplacement activity? The actor-oriented approach draws attention to how meanings 
associated with development become produced, contested, and reworked through the implementation 
process (Bebbington, Lewis, Batterbury, Olson, & Siddiqi, 2007). In this chapter, I examine how actors 
perceive the intent and value of the development practice, which gives rise to an understanding of their 
expectations and interests. I do this by initially examining individual actor perceptions and follow this 
by exploring the tensions and heterogeneity that exist within each of the three groups as they interact 
through the work of the Intervention. I then summarise some of the strongest points of contrast across 
actor groups.54 The findings highlight that the intent of the Intervention evolved as mine development 
priorities changed over time.  
                                                 
54Findings presented within the chapter reflect majority themes within the dataset. Perceptions across actor groups 
are indicated by the following: All = 100%, Most ≥75%, Many = 50% –75%, Some = 25%–49%, A few ≥25%, None = 0%. 
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Company Perspectives  
Here, I explore the perceptions of company personnel on the intent and value of the 
Intervention.55 Company informants described the Intervention as assisting households in preparing 
and building capability to manage, and prosper, through a resettlement process. Household livelihoods 
were a major concern. Informants identified the disruption to household livelihoods as “one of the main 
risks of the resettlement process” (C_F2). An LA&R manager explained to me that the proposed 
resettlement design involved moving the majority of households “from the Sierra to the coast”, a 
process that would greatly “increase the risk of impoverishment to the families as a result of the huge 
changes in livelihoods” (C_F2). For farmers, this change was anticipated to involve a shift from 
subsistence and small-scale farming to industrialised agriculture. A CR practitioner explained that local 
farmers would benefit from this change by tripling their annual crop yield. At the same time, 
industrialised agriculture required them to invest in and manage irrigation systems, chemical fertilisers, 
and pesticides. Without adequate training and assistance, the shift could be challenging to manage. 
From the company perspective, the Intervention was thus aimed at assisting households in preparing 
for and following through a livelihood transition. An LA&R manager explained that the Intervention 
“helps to ensure that families can reproduce, manage, or look for livelihood alternatives in the 
destination sites […] so that they can be successful in their resettlement” (C_F4). In this way the 
Intervention was thought to “give flesh” to the company’s “vision” or “promise of improvement” 
through resettlement (C_F12). A CR practitioner elaborated: 
The objective of the Intervention is basically to prepare families for the resettlement phase, to 
do this the [NGO] work with the family life plans, to know what is their vision, their mission. 
They were planning for this, working out what their capabilities were and how to strengthen 
them to achieve their [livelihood interests]. (C_M9) 
For company personnel, the intent of the Intervention formed part of a broader community 
engagement strategy aimed at generating social consensus for mine development and mitigating the 
risk of denied land access. Interviewees explained that the company was operating in a context where 
local people were very cautious of corporate motives and activities. During my interviews, company 
informants recalled their experience of visiting households in the direct area of influence following the 
land acquisition and resettlement announcement in early 2012. CR practitioners quickly discovered that 
                                                 
55 The analysis is primarily drawn from 21 interviews undertaken with 17 company personnel across the La Granja 
social project team. The sample comprises a director and five senior managers from the Social Data, CR and LA&R units. 
An additional 11 site-based CR and LA&R staff contributed to my analysis. Where possible, analysis was cross-references 
with data collected through unstructured interviews and observations. 
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they had underestimated the impact of the company’s announcement. Having approached every 
household in the direct area of influence, they found that the prospect of a company-managed land 
acquisition and resettlement process had triggered fear and anxiety among the population. A minority 
of households refused to receive CR practitioners altogether. According to company personnel, local 
people were particularly anxious that Rio Tinto would conduct a similar process to Cambior. Through 
these early conversations with households, CR practitioners “found out that the people have many, 
many traumas as a result of leaving the zone [with Cambior. And that] Cambior had placed pressure on 
people so that in the end they felt obliged to sell their lands” (C_M13). As a result, one CR practitioner 
explained that “people were very worried [and] spoke of having health-related problems due to anxiety 
they were experiencing over the announcement” (CM_11). The Project team became cognisant that 
land access “wasn’t going to be so simple and that we would have to do things really different 
[because] people’s experience with the previous company has stayed with them and left a strong 
impact” (CM_11). 
In reflection on households’ initial response to the company proposal, some informants 
described the Intervention as helping to raise the profile of Rio Tinto as a developer of choice for the 
La Granja deposit. While the relationship between Cambior and local actors had been defined by 
abusive and exploitative relations, Rio Tinto personnel were seeking to differentiate their approach as 
characterised by respectful relations and good-neighbourly behaviour. The approach reflects Arelleno’s 
(2011) observations of the shift from “old” to “new” mining in the Peruvian extractive sector in recent 
decades. Within the context of new mining, the Intervention was a mechanism for enhancing local 
perceptions of fairness. Cambior was perceived by households to disregard their needs and interests. In 
contrast, Rio Tinto had dedicated the Intervention to empower households in decision-making over 
their future lives, including with respect to how they might improve their lives through the land 
acquisition and resettlement process. A CR practitioner stressed to me that the work of the NGO was 
important because “to gain land access, it was necessary that people believe the process would be fair 
and just, unlike with the previous company” (CM_11).  
The Intervention was also described by company personnel as an important way for households 
to process and overcome their fear of and anxiety about resettlement. CR practitioners described some 
household members as being “extremely shy” and afraid to talk to them about “what will happen in 
their life, what they would do” in a resettlement scenario (C_M13). The Intervention was perceived by 
interviewees to play a role in “mitigating the impact and risk of those fears” (C_M13). The risk being 
that household members would decline the company proposal as a result of their concerns. Through the 
Intervention work, households were invited to “open up” to NGO practitioners and work through their 
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“fears”, “vulnerabilities”, and “dreams” for the future (C_F3). Though CR practitioners generally 
claimed to have good relations with local people, a few expressed to me that it would be challenging to 
do the development work directly. Unlike the NGO, their relationship was “more commercial” 
(C_M9), and doing so could potentially “distort the vision of the negotiation space” (C_F2). An LA&R 
manager commented to me that company people “cannot directly do this [Intervention] work [because] 
they have an element of interest” in household land (C_F4). This was because when local people saw 
the Rio Tinto uniform, they were more inclined to think they would have “an opportunity to get a job in 
the Project” (C_F12). A further challenge raised by company staff on land access was that many 
households had formed misconceptions over what the land acquisition and resettlement process would 
involve.  
From the company viewpoint, the legacy of mining company activity at La Granja had shaped a 
local perception that resettlement should be an opportunity to maximise financial gains. During our 
interview, a senior Project staff commented that in Peru, prior resettlements had largely been “defined 
in commercial terms rather than focused on livelihoods” (C_M17). As such, affected people tended to 
be “focused on money and something to secure income, like jobs or providing services to the mine” 
(C_M17). He explained that this dynamic was present at La Granja, in part as a result of Rio Tinto’s 
own early land access strategy. As explained in Chapter Four, when the company first arrived in the 
area in 2005, the Project team agreed to pay unprecedentedly high rental payments to gain quick access 
to land. The experience generated awareness among locals that Rio Tinto could be willing to offer 
significant financial incentives to purchase land in the area. The intent of the Intervention was therefore 
described by a few interviewees as educating local people in the process of resettlement. NGO 
practitioners were said to be helping household members think through the practical experience of 
establishing their lives and livelihoods elsewhere. The work would assist in broadening household 
members’ understanding of resettlement. Company informants explained that when land acquisition is 
reduced to economic terms, resettlement becomes unsustainable from both the corporate and 
community viewpoints.  
Company informants expressed mixed views on the value of the Intervention work. Most were 
of the opinion that the NGO had been effective in helping more vulnerable households to address 
immediate poverty-related issues. In particular, a few interviewees described achievements made with 
respect to helping household members attend the clinic or obtain identification. A few CR practitioners 
explained the most notable feature of the Intervention was its emphasis on sustainable development. 
One confessed that she had tried to establish a craft group with women in the area, only to find that the 
women were unable to continue the work without her ongoing assistance. The value of the 
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empowerment approach taken in the Intervention was that local people ultimately drive the 
development initiatives. The work helped to reduce dependency on the company and simultaneously 
familiarise local people with state services and responsibilities. During interviews, company people 
also described the value of the Intervention as helping the company to raise household expectations for 
resettlement. On this point, a senior member of the social project stated his opinion as follows: 
I think the work is really good, [the NGO] did a good job because households were saying 
“when are you bringing the final proposal? Where are the houses going to be on the coast?” So 
we raised local expectation which is what we had hoped for. (C_M17) 
Company personnel also described two prominent viewpoints about how the Intervention had 
not met their expectations. The first was a concern that household members had frequently complained 
about the NGO work. The second was that local people appeared confused about how the work was 
connected with the company land acquisition and resettlement process. On the first perception, a 
widespread perception among company personnel was that households were generally unhappy with 
the Intervention. During the course of daily work in the communities, CR practitioners received 
frequent commentary on the failings of the NGO. One key issue was that local people appeared 
confused about what the Intervention did. A CR practitioner stated in our interview that “families do 
not understand the goal of the Intervention” (C_F12). In her view, the empowerment approach was 
great in theory but had not translated well within the local context. She said “the challenge is that we 
have been imposing an idea of development and we haven’t [adequately] shared it with them” (C_F12).  
Another CR practitioner explained to me that local authorities had stated that he could 
accompany his own father to the health post and asked why Rio Tinto has to pay an NGO to do this. In 
the practitioner’s view it was “clear that the population don’t understand the nature of the Intervention” 
(C_M11). The view was shared by management in the LA&R unit. As explained, “the concept [of 
people-centred development] is really complicated to understand, that is why families are confused, 
and I think that’s one reason why they don’t value the Intervention” (C_F2). The CR unit had received 
formal complaints about the NGO. Community members claimed that NGO practitioners were wasting 
resources and that the company “should stop contracting the NGO and give them the money directly” 
(C_M18).  
A second concern raised by company personnel was that households did not appear to 
understand how the Intervention connected to the land acquisition and resettlement process. During our 
final interview, the LA&R manager described feeling “hugely confused”, having recently reviewed the 
final feedback provided by households on their experience of the Intervention (C_F2). She had been 
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surprised to find that after two and a half years with the Intervention, households “didn’t know what the 
NGO did, what the Intervention did” (C_F2). Further to this, it was clear that households “did not agree 
with the work” and she was left trying to understand how this major “gap in the families 
understanding” had come about (C_F2). In her analysis of the situation, the LA&R manager concluded 
that households were not provided with “a clear understanding that the work is connected to 
resettlement. [They] were simply informed that the work was about livelihoods” (C_F2). The company 
and NGO had “failed to adequately communicate the Intervention [as] focused upon resettlement”.  
From the company perspective, this communication failure had undermined the value of the 
work. A longstanding CR practitioner suggested that households are first and foremost interested in 
“connecting their lives with the mine” (C_M18). He explained that people desire direct interaction with 
the company because, in his words, “the marriage isn’t with the NGO, the marriage is with Rio Tinto” 
(C_M18). This sentiment reflects a view expressed by a few company personnel that during the course 
of preparations activities, the NGO became more of a liability to their land access strategy than an 
asset. A few CR practitioners perceived that they should be the ones to administer the Intervention and 
not NGO staff. As explained: 
I do not understand why the NGO is working with these households when it should be us in the 
CR team. The NGO is raising expectations and making promises and commitments but do they 
follow up on all of them? Once they are gone, we are the ones who will have to deal with 
unfulfilled promises ... and yet they are loose in the plaza. (C_M9) 
With the demobilisation of the La Granja project in May 2014, the value of the Intervention was 
broadly rejected by the company. As described in Chapter Two, the land acquisition and resettlement 
process was ultimately suspended after two and a half years, primarily as a result of a downturn in 
global commodities prices. Within the company, this suspension led to changing priorities for the 
LA&R and CR units. Within several months, their focus moved from preparing households for 
impending resettlement to “damage control” (C_M17). Senior management explained to me that the 
staff would now be working on building local “interest in developing the Project, and maintaining the 
relationship and trust” (C_M17). Within this operating context, the Intervention work became largely 
inconsequential. As explained by senior management, “if we continue the process while we are 
working with uncertainty, we will raise expectations in the communities and yet we do not know 
exactly which families we will eventually need to resettle” (C_M17). The point was elaborated in my 
interview with the livelihoods manager who had been placed in charge of the Intervention following 
the suspension. He explained that the NGO work was good “if the footprint remains covering those 
[same] areas, because if it changes, then [the work] doesn’t have any value anymore” (C_M9). 
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In summary, company informants locate the original intent of Intervention as part of a broader 
community engagement strategy aimed at gaining initial and ongoing social consensus for mine 
development. Given the legacies associated with prior company activity, the social team had identified 
a risk to land access where landowning households refuse acquisition or demand exorbitant and 
unsustainable agreements. The work of the Intervention was thus originally intended to prepare and 
educate households in Resettlement with Development by educating them in sustainable livelihood 
transition. Notwithstanding this, company informants raised concerns over the value of the work. 
Households did not appear to understand the intent of the work; furthermore, the Intervention had 
become dissociated from the land acquisition and resettlement strategy. With the ultimate suspension of 
the land acquisition and resettlement process in 2014, the relevance of the Intervention became 
negligible. The work was inconsequential in comparison to a more pressing need to maintain positive 
company–community relations.  
 
Household Perspectives  
Having explored company perspectives on the Intervention’s intent and value, here I turn to the 
viewpoint of the targeted beneficiaries: households living within the company’s direct area of 
influence.56 During my interviews, household members expressed two broad interpretations of the 
intent of the Intervention. The first was that it responded to a need for targeted development assistance 
in the area. According to household informants, the local and regional government had been reluctant 
to invest in a locality earmarked for resettlement. As explained by a mother of three, the local 
government “doesn’t want to provide social programs because they say we are in a mining zone […] 
and the company are almost ready” (LI_F15). In the period of eight years of waiting for this mine, local 
informants acknowledge several contributions made by the mining company via the La Granja Social 
Fund and direct initiatives.  
Nonetheless, a widespread view was that households required greater assistance with their 
ongoing poverty-related challenges. Inflation was a key issue. Most informants were concerned that 
“everything is more expensive because of the mine [project]” (LI_M5). At the same time, women and 
senior residents were rarely offered job opportunities at the Project, and it had become increasingly 
difficult to afford farm help. Young men had become accustomed to Project wages, which the farmers 
were unable to match. Given these challenges, the Intervention was described as supporting vulnerable 
                                                 
56 This analysis is primarily drawn from 23 interviews undertaken with 38 household members and key informants, 
and cross-referenced with unstructured interviews and observation data. 
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sectors of the population. In particular, local informants described how NGO practitioners had helped 
poor people to access formal documentation and government services, including public health 
insurance and the pension.  
A second prominent interpretation of the Intervention’s intent was that it worked to support the 
company land acquisition and resettlement process. In general, community leaders described the 
Intervention as targeted at preparing households for resettlement. In one example, a ronda president 
said the Intervention was about “making a diagnostic of households” to assist their preparation for 
resettlement and reporting back to Rio Tinto “what the population thinks” about the prospect (LI_M2). 
In contrast, household members were generally aware of a contractual relationship between the 
organisations but were not always clear about the purpose of the work. During interviews, I asked 
household members about their experience in the Intervention. A common response was that local 
people had enjoyed “nice chats” with the NGO practitioners (LI_F17).  
My impression was that household members had generally not understood the Life Plan 
activity. Few could explain what the activities had aimed to do, or why planning for long-term 
development aspirations would be valuable or necessary. In one example, a single mother expressed 
her concern that the NGO practitioners were collecting a lot of information in the sessions. She told me 
that “every time the NGO comes here I ask ‘is this information for Rio Tinto?’. ‘No,’ they told us, they 
say ‘we are a business that was sent by the state’. That is why they do not live in the camp” (LI_F15). 
In addition to highlighting the confusion some household members expressed about the origins of the 
Intervention, I have included this quote to indicate the suspicion some household members articulated 
about the Intervention and their distrust of the NGO’s intent. 
While in fieldwork, I observed local people seeking clarification on the real purpose of the 
work, both with NGO practitioners and during my interviews with them. I found these interactions 
challenging. Some household members were satisfied to raise the question as a rhetorical statement, 
whereas others were of the opinion that the Intervention aimed to alienate people from their land. In 
one example, a mechanic asked me to confirm his suspicions by candidly asking: “this Intervention is 
about working out if we want to go right? If we want to sell our lands, isn’t that what is does?” 
(LI_M19). While household members described different views about the intent of the Intervention, 
most did not consider the work as a meaningful contributor to local-level development.  
A chief complaint was that the Intervention had “not given anything” (LI_F17). Before turning 
to this point, it is important to recognise that a few interviewed household members had very positive 
perceptions of the work. Nonetheless, even when perceived as beneficial, this understanding was 
generally couched with an appreciation that NGO practitioners were limited in their capacity to deliver 
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what might have been more helpful. In one example, a female community leader spoke highly of her 
experience within our interview; the household was described to have “taken maximum advantage” of 
what had been offered (LI_F7). Nonetheless, the following quotation highlights that the response was 
taken in the understanding that organisational rules had prohibited practitioners from doing more. She 
explained: 
We put the question to them, can’t they at the least help with food basics for undernourished 
people, we asked them this a few years ago, but they told us that the company does not allow 
them to do it, they said this is an [Intervention] that accompanies people, this is to say, they will 
follow people in their sickness, go with them but they can’t give any other type of benefits. 
(LI_F7) 
The practical benefit of an empowerment process, or “being accompanied” as household 
members called it, was either not understood or valued. During interviews some household members 
expressed their frustration with the experience. They could not understand why NGO practitioners 
would not do more to help them when they had clearly empathised with their poverty-related 
challenges. As news of my research began to spread through the communities in the direct area of 
influence, a farmer and his wife came to find me in the La Granja village to insist on an interview. He 
wanted me to know that his sister-in-law was desperately in need of assistance because “she is poor” 
and a widow with no income. The NGO practitioners claimed to care about her situation, yet they had 
not helped her because “they don’t offer money” (LI_M4). During another interview, another farmer 
and widower with four children described his experience working with the Intervention to address his 
health concerns. On reflecting on the experience, the man complained, “they help us to identify our 
illnesses, but then why not help us with the [costs of the] doctor? So we can cure it. Because if a doctor 
identifies an illness and I don’t have money, all the doctor and Rio Tinto has done is fill me with worry 
that I could die” (LI_M5).  
Yet another farmer described being disappointed with her experience of the Intervention. A 
practitioner had encouraged her to start a small food garden for the family but did not offer any “help” 
to establish it. The practitioner had encouraged her to “do the garden” but would not assist with any of 
the materials or labour (LI_F11). To her disappointment and confusion, the practitioners “will only 
explain [what to do], but they never say ‘I’m going to contribute something’, not at all” (LI_F11). 
Importantly, local informants did not appear to understand that practitioners had sought to empower 
them in building capacity to achieve their development interests. The following quotations represent 
common explanations given about the Intervention process. As with the prior examples, these quotes 
highlight the frustration households expressed about the perceived lack of help: 
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My son has epilepsy, and I worked with the Intervention to try to help the situation, they 
accompanied me to the clinic in Chota, but then they said I had to pay my own way. I cannot 
afford this! I don’t have the money […] No one gives me any help, the NGO said they were 
going to help, but they do not give me anything. (LI_F8)  
In the moment you need it, they don’t help, because they will only come with you to the clinic 
and make sure that you are seen to well, but afterwards they won’t help you [with the costs]. 
(LI_F17) 
At the same time as discounting the value of the Intervention, household members highlight a 
range of interests and expectations about the kind of assistance they perceived would address their 
practical needs. In one example, a farmer said “for the good will of Rio Tinto they help us with 
something […] but if it could be with employment, with work or some economic support, this would be 
much better” (LI_M5). In other cases, household members compared the Intervention with more 
“useful” initiatives such as those provided by the CR team and the Social Fund. Unlike the 
Intervention, these initiatives had at the least provided some form of goods and services. For example, 
two senior women emphasised their satisfaction with a company-sponsored guinea pig farming 
program. One was keen to show me the cage materials she was provided for free (see Figure 17). She 
said her experience was good because “when the guinea pig got sick, [professionals] came and cured 
them” (LI_F11).  
 
Figure 177. Senior woman stands proudly with her guinea pig farm. 
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It is noteworthy that households’ interests reflect prior experience with “service-delivery” style 
interventions. This approach has been the traditional basis of development assistance promoted by state 
and private sector proponents in the Andes since the late 1970s (Burt & Mauceri, 2004; Escobar, 1995). 
Experience with prior service-delivery interventions in La Granja had helped to shape a perception 
among households that development programs should “give something”. 
Household members also expressed a view that they wanted greater certainty about company 
plans. In this respect, the Intervention had not helped. During interviews and strategic conversations, 
household members conveyed their frustration and anxiety about news of the suspension of land 
acquisition and resettlement. Household members described a sense that their lives were left in a period 
of limbo. In one example a mother confided her sense that the communities “are stuck” and “have been 
forgotten” by the company (LI_F21). Another farmer expressed her sentiment that the company had 
“left us in the air” and perhaps it would be “better if they go, [if] they can’t even offer work” (LI_F7). 
The president of one ronda complained that the company was “playing with the people”, and news of 
the suspension was best read as a strategy to reduce compensation claims (LI_M12).  
A major challenge facing families after the news of the suspension was that many had already 
“let go of their farm work” (LI_M10). The reduction in Project activity meant that young people were 
leaving La Granja to find alternative sources of income. Those accustomed to farming were 
undertaking the “arduous” process of returning to the fields to “grow the corn, yuccas and beans” 
(LI_M2). A few interviewees highlighted that households in the direct area of influence had made 
arrangements in anticipation of the resettlement, which was scheduled to proceed the following year. A 
mother raised her concern that “many [families] haven’t planted this year because they were expecting 
the company [offer]” (LI_F15). She said that “people are confused, [and] no one has made 
improvements” (LI_F15).  
In summary, household members had mixed impressions of the Intervention’s intent. The 
majority perception was that the work aimed to help vulnerable households address poverty-related 
challenges. Another widespread view, and suspicion, was that the Intervention aimed to support 
company interests to resettle the population within the direct area of influence. Ultimately, however, 
household members expressed dissatisfaction with their experience; they did not accept empowerment 
as a meaningful approach to improving their lives. They were instead focused on gaining greater 
livelihood security, receiving goods and services, and addressing the impact of the resettlement 
suspension. On all three counts, the impact of the Intervention was largely inconsequential. 
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NGO Perspectives  
In the previous chapter, I focused on how NGO practitioners sought to operationalise the 
Intervention and the kind of barriers and enabling factors associated with the work. Here I examine 
NGO perspectives on the intent and value of the work. As will be demonstrated, the Intervention 
workers attribute different meanings to their practice, further highlighting the myriad of co-existing 
interpretations of the development practice.57 NGO informants unanimously describe the Intervention 
as serving humanitarian aims. During our interviews, they explained the work in emancipatory terms, 
as supporting the empowerment of vulnerable peoples struggling with immediate and systemic poverty-
related challenges. Among these, a lack of skills, low or insecure income, low literacy and numeracy, 
inability to access health or education facilities, and domestic violence were acute problems. I was 
struck by the general explanation provided about the Intervention aim. For example, it was common for 
NGO practitioners in particular to entirely drop any reference to the mining company and explain that 
the work simply “helps families take advantage of opportunities to develop and improve the quality of 
their lives” (NGO_F9). In this way, NGO interviewees generally framed their work as forming part of 
the broader national poverty-alleviation agenda in Peru.  
A widespread viewpoint among NGO informants was that in addition to being vulnerable, 
communities in the direct area of influence had become trapped in a patronage-style relationship with 
external actors. In particular, households had become dependent on company support. One practitioner 
explained that “what has happened here is that the culture has become one of expecting to receive 
something; [households] are accustomed to receiving, because before, other companies always gave” 
(NGO_F6). As a result, households were always complaining that the Intervention “gives nothing” 
(NGO_M7). In the view of NGO personnel, the value of the empowerment approach was to disrupt this 
expectation for service delivery and promote greater self-reliance and autonomy via the people-centred 
approach. During our interviews, practitioners were adamant that local people had underestimated their 
capacity to improve the quality of their lives. The Intervention was explained to be “filling a major 
gap” because “there is a total ignorance of the opportunities present in this community” (NGO_M16). 
On the other hand, the work had helped people “to understand that developing capability is critical and 
you do not need money to do it” (NGO_F9).  
It was striking that during interviews, frontline practitioners in particular rarely mentioned the 
Intervention as forming part of the company’s land access strategy. When asked directly about the 
                                                 
57 The perspectives raised within this findings section are primarily drawn from 17 interviews undertaken with 12 
NGO informants. Of this sample, three individuals formed part of the NGO management team, and nine were frontline 
practitioners. Findings have been cross-referenced with unstructured interviews and observational data. 
120 
connection, most said the work supported livelihoods planning but at the same time were quite 
dismissive of company activity. In one example, a practitioner explained that multinational mining 
companies were obliged to offer development programs as part of their corporate social responsibility 
policy. Another explained that she did not know anything about resettlement, which was a company 
matter, and that simply “the objective of the NGO is to help families” (NGO_F10). A more extreme 
view was taken by a male practitioner who told me that he simply didn’t care what was going on with 
the company because his only priority was helping families. Despite this, all NGO informants 
recognised their work was complementary to business interests.  
Household empowerment was viewed to support a resettlement process. NGO informants 
expressed two main views on the matter. The first was that building households’ capability would help 
“families in the process of adaptation” post-relocation (NGO_M16). The second was that the 
Intervention helped address the extreme power asymmetry between local and corporate actors. As 
explained, “a negotiation with a company this powerful will be very challenging. So we work with 
families so [they] can sit at the table with more knowledge, maybe not as equals but at least with more 
capability” (NGO_M7). Practitioners described working to help household members understand their 
human rights, including the right to refuse a land sale. Informal conversations suggest few practitioners 
believed households would be in a position to reject a company proposal. Practitioners perceived that 
the work would at the least help them make the best of their current and future situation, including in 
the instance that resettlement did not go ahead.  
In our interviews, most NGO informants noted that their work was limited by the NGO 
contractual arrangement with Rio Tinto. The mandate of NGO work became increasingly company-
centred over the course of the Intervention. A manager explained that “since the beginning, there has 
been an imposition placed upon [the NGO] at the level of operational management” (NGO_M1). 
Members of the LA&R team were described to “control what the NGO does” and maintain awareness 
of their “day-to-day” activities (NGO_M1). During fieldwork, I came to understand this “control” was 
exercised via three main avenues: by requiring NGO management to seek company approval when 
allocating financial and human resources, by requiring NGO personnel to abide by company health and 
safety protocol, and finally, to respond to company directives about where to focus their work.  
On this last point, NGO personnel described the intensification of directives over their work 
following the suspension of land acquisition and resettlement activity in mid-2014. As explained in 
Chapter Two, the organisational structure of the La Granja project was reduced and reorganised 
following the demobilisation of activity. In the process, three key internal champions of the NGO work 
left the company. These individuals had originally endorsed the vision of the Intervention and “stood 
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up” for the people-centred focus of work, which came under threat with new leadership by June 2014 
(NGO_M16). According to NGO informants, remaining company staff did not “seem to have much 
information [or] understanding about what [the NGO] have been doing” (NGO_M7). In time, the 
Intervention became more of a company-centred program of work. NGO practitioners described the 
challenge associated with working under new leadership: 
The Intervention is now in the hands of people who do not understand it. [Before] there were 
many defenders [inside the company]. But now […] it’s as though the radio channel has 
changed, before we were listening to rock, and now it’s pure salsa. (NGO_M16). 
[Rio Tinto personnel] don’t understand the Intervention and they are making demands of […] of 
practitioners without understanding what we do and the effect that this has on the work, on the 
daily work of the practitioners. (NGO_M2). 
As suggested by the last quote, changes in company leadership and priorities led to a new 
orientation in the NGO following the suspension of the land acquisition and resettlement process. The 
practitioners’ people-centred methodology had emphasised a relational and process-oriented approach 
to household development. The new livelihoods manager, however, set a different “operational 
direction” that focused on quantifying the outcomes of the Intervention (NGO_M8). Under this new 
direction, practitioners were instructed to focus on completing household Life Plan activities and 
quantifying the progress of the Intervention to date.  
Practitioners described their concern that “the new focus on results” concealed and undermined 
the value of their work (NGO_F10). For example, although a trip to the clinic was counted as an 
outcome of the Intervention, practitioners’ work helping traumatised families process anxiety over the 
proposed resettlement could not be enumerated and thus did not get counted. The emphasis on 
quantification meant that weeks of work spent helping a senior to obtain a birth certificate was counted 
as an achievement equal to escorting a teenager to the clinic. The dynamic and qualitative nature of 
practitioners’ relational work was lost in the figures. The nature of the empowerment process had not 
been understood by new management. Practitioners complained that the emphasis on generating figures 
around the progress of intervention undermined relationships that had taken years to establish. Two 
NGO staff reflected upon the final months of the Intervention practice:  
Our methodology is to prioritise people-driven development […] so from this viewpoint, we 
sometimes have to visit five times before we can initiate an activity with them […] now we are 
focused on getting families through the [Life Plan] activities without respecting their time. We 
are less tolerant of them. We are forcing meetings because of the operative directives that 
pressure us to complete the activities. (NGO_M8)  
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Sometimes it has been difficult to respect the pace of people … In these last moments of this 
resettlement process, we have practically forced our Life Plan activities, no? So this has kind of 
distorted everything because now we’re not really working with people’s agendas, we are 
working with our agenda and this should have never happened. (NGO_M16) 
Following the suspension of plans for land acquisition and resettlement, the Intervention shifted 
from a people-centred to a company-centred program of work. In the final weeks of my fieldwork, 
practitioners complained that they had been instructed by NGO management to focus on certain 
households over others. One practitioner explained to me that these directives had come via members 
of the LA&R unit. Company personnel wanted to maintain good relations with certain households 
deemed to hold land tenure in a “strategic zone” (NGO_F4). The implication was that in the final 
months of the Intervention a practitioner could be working with one household, only to be instructed by 
NGO management to drop that work and focus on another household. A practitioner described his 
frustration with this experience:  
You get to a point where you win a connection with the family […] only to later receive the 
order that now you have to go and work with another … so all of that conversation, the rich 
dialogue, it was practically a waste, the agenda is left in the air. All of this development work, 
all of the time invested well […] I’ve had to ask myself, do they really want the methodology, 
or are they using it for some outcome which isn’t about development at all. (NGO_M16) 
From the practitioners’ point of view, directives over their work were originating from within 
the mining company. One practitioner commented, “It seems like our [NGO] work is constantly being 
dictated ‘move to this family’, or ‘collaborate with that family’” (NGO_M15). I was unable to ascertain 
a clear picture of whether these directives were indeed coming from company personnel, and if so, 
why. My observations of the NGO–company dynamic following suspension of the land acquisition and 
resettlement suggests that members of the LA&R team exercised a significant amount of influence over 
the NGO management. LA&R management maintained frequent contact with the NGO management 
via email and phone throughout my fieldwork. I observed private meetings between personnel from 
both organisations and was struck by the level of micromanagement that company staff exercised over 
NGO practitioners, who were often annoyed by this dynamic. Some confided to me that the uneven 
power dynamic between organisations was not so much a result of company personnel, but more a 
failure on the part of the NGO management who did not push back on company directives. 
NGO informants described the Intervention as being aimed first and foremost at the 
emancipation of vulnerable populations. At the same time, the work supported the company’s 
resettlement process by helping households build capability, resilience, and greater self-reliance. These 
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attributes would assist local people in negotiating with the company, in livelihood transition, and in 
coping with changes in plans for land acquisition and resettlement. Nonetheless, changing corporate 
priorities and control were said to limit the potential of the work. The NGO shifted the focus of its 
work from the people to the company, sometimes at the expense of the practitioner’s relationship with 
household members. The practitioners were placed in the position of servicing the directives of 
management, over those of the people they had originally sought to help.  
 
Points of Contrast Between Actors 
Having counterposed how the actors attributed meaning to the Intervention work, here I briefly 
compare the strongest points of contrast between them. Findings highlight divergent interpretations 
within and between groups, which are surmised by themes in Table 7. One major point of contrast was 
how actors attributed meaning to the intent of the NGO work. Strikingly, company personnel generally 
interpreted the Intervention as forming part of a risk mitigation strategy aimed at land access. In 
contrast, NGO and household informants viewed the work as primarily focused on poverty alleviation. 
When prompted about the connection with company plans, NGO personnel understood the work as 
supporting a resettlement process. Local informants had mixed views, local leaders perceived the work 
as contributing to the resettlement process, and household members could only speculate on the 
purpose. 
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Table 7. 
Actor Perceptions Across Themes 
 
The co-existence of multiple interpretations between and within actor groups highlights that 
contradictory messages had formed in the dynamics and relationships between them, over time. The 
previous chapter provided some explanation for this disconnect. A dynamic of frontline practice was 
that, to gain household trust, practitioners purposefully dissociated their work from the company 
agenda as a matter of technique. On the other hand, following the suspension of the land acquisition 
and resettlement process, the Intervention became centred upon servicing company interests. The effect 
was to create a sense of confusion and distrust between all actors.  
Theme  Company personnel Household members NGO personnel 
Intent  Mitigate risk of denied land 
access 
 
Prepare households for 
resettlement  
 
Gain social consensus for 
project development 
 
Addressing poverty-related 
challenges faced  
 
Gain insight into household 
resettlement interest and 
plans 
Humanitarian aims/ 
empowering peasant 
farmers 
 
 
Means  Address legacy issues 
(trauma and fear) 
 
Build household capacity 
for resettlement, focus on 
livelihoods 
Do not accept means in 
which Intervention 
contributes  
 
 
Help households to build 
upon their resources and 
act on external opportunity 
 
Reduce external 
dependency  
 
Core 
interests 
and 
expectations 
To gain initial and ongoing 
land access  
 
To enhance and maintain 
good company–community 
relations 
 
Meet practical livelihood 
needs 
 
Secure jobs, services, and 
goods 
 
Gain certainty about the 
future 
 
To help vulnerable people 
build local capacity for 
achieving their 
development interests 
including through 
resettlement 
 
Prominent 
issues 
dismissed by 
other 
groups 
Focused on project phase 
requirements: disconnected 
with interest and 
expectations of other actors  
Other groups dismiss 
practical need for certainty, 
interest to secure improved 
livelihoods via “practical” 
avenues – jobs, goods, and 
services 
NGO working in a 
vacuum: “ignoring” 
company–community 
relationship, and the 
context of uncertainty 
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At the same time as NGO informants advocated the people-centred empowerment approach as a 
means for generating sustainable development, this research suggests that the Intervention sponsor and 
recipients were ultimately unconvinced. While company personnel recognised that the work was 
important for helping households transition, the value of the work was brought into question with 
feedback that households had not understood the purpose of the work or its connection with the land 
acquisition and resettlement process. Indeed, interview data suggests that household informants did not 
accept empowerment as a meaningful form of development. They focused on addressing immediate 
and practical needs relating to the security of their livelihoods and gaining certainty about plans. At the 
same time as NGO practitioners worked to convince local people that they could drive their own 
development agenda, households maintained their interest in seeing the company provide jobs, service-
delivery-style development, and information on land access plans. 
In time, the NGO’s attempts to depoliticise the development work unravelled. While 
practitioners spoke of working with the people’s agenda, changing company priorities meant 
practitioners’ jobs were reoriented. Householders’ prominent concerns were ignored by the NGO, 
which focused on progressing company directives. The effect was to undermine the relationship 
between NGO practitioner and household, and to disrupt the relational focus of their work. It is perhaps 
not surprising, then, that households deemed the Intervention to be ineffectual. In the final months 
following the suspension of activity, practitioners were giving mixed messages about the intent of their 
work. The findings of this chapter highlight discrepancies in the actors’ core interests during the 
predisplacement phase. Divergent and changing priorities impacted both the capacity of NGO 
practitioners to deliver upon their empowerment process, and the relationships between all actors.  
 
Chapter Summary 
This chapter has sought to examine how the meaning and value of development practice 
became understood by actors engaged in the predisplacement phase of a company land acquisition and 
resettlement process. The findings illustrate discrepancies in actor perceptions of the practice intent and 
the means to achieve it. Contradictory messages had formed in the dynamics and relationships between 
them in time. NGO personnel attempted to conduct their work in a vacuum, by dissociating from the 
company and instead focusing on local-level empowerment. The Intervention was ultimately unable to 
address households’ core expectations, which were instead for livelihood security and certainty over 
future plans. Changes in company priorities result in LA&R management discontinuing the 
Intervention, and led to diminished trust between all actors.  
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The La Granja case illustrates multiple interpretations of Resettlement with Development 
practice, and fluidity in how actors ascribe value and meaning to the work. While household members 
demonstrated a willingness to contest the value of the practice, NGO and company personnel relayed 
their own interpretations, which were prone to change according to company business priorities. The 
findings highlight many factors impacting upon the direction of work, and raise questions about the 
best configuration for preparing affected people in a land acquisition and resettlement process. In the 
following chapter, I consider how actors navigated and mobilised on these interests and expectations at 
the social interface.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN: NAVIGATING ACTOR INTERESTS AND EXPECTATIONS THROUGH 
THE DEVELOPMENT PRACTICE 
 
Introduction 
The actor-oriented approach suggests that development interventions are sites in which 
actors negotiate, accommodate, and contest their interests, values, and power (Long, 2004). Having 
described the actors’ multiple interpretations and expectations of the development work, this 
chapter is focused on how actors used the Intervention to pursue some of these interests in practice. 
This is the fourth and final chapter providing an in-depth exploration of the empirical findings, in 
response to the research question: How do actors navigate heterogeneous interests and expectations 
of the Resettlement with Development practice? Following the traditional presentation style of 
actor-oriented research, in this chapter I describe three vignettes at the social interface between the 
company, NGO, and household actors.  
In the first vignette, recorded in August 2014, I detail my observations of an NGO 
practitioner’s failed household visitation. The account provides context for the second main finding, 
that while households did not generally accept the empowerment model as a valuable contribution 
to development, they nevertheless demonstrate capacity to fulfil some strategic and pragmatic 
interests through their engagement. The second vignette, recorded in September 2014, describes a 
company–community suspension meeting held in the La Uñiga village within the direct area of 
influence. The scene of action illustrates the first main finding: that the Intervention became a 
strategic resource for company and community actors in the process of renegotiating relations 
between them as a result of changing company priorities. In the third and final vignette, I describe 
an NGO-run workshop held with company staff at the La Granja project camp in December 2014. 
The interaction between actors highlights the third main finding: over time company priorities 
changed, with significant implications for development-oriented work.  
 
Vignette One: August 2014, the Household Visitation 
Chapter Five presented an in-depth account of the practices associated with the Intervention. 
The findings highlighted how practitioners worked to progress empowerment activities despite 
barriers in the implementation process. Nonetheless, data presented in Chapter Six highlights a view 
that the Intervention did not meet households’ core interests or expectations. At the same time as 
practitioners claimed to progress empowerment activity, households did not necessarily accept or 
value the work. The finding raises two questions: why then did households continue to engage in 
the Intervention at all, and were they able to derive benefit from the process? In the following 
section, I demonstrate how households pursued their interests in the implementation process. On the 
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one hand, they were able to obtain access to some goods and services by working through the 
formalities of the Intervention. On the other hand, household members found other uses for the 
Intervention work that did not necessarily sit within the Intervention’s formal mandate. To 
demonstrate this dynamic, the following vignette describes an NGO practitioner’s attempted – and 
failed – household visitation.  
-OOO- 
It was a hot Tuesday afternoon. Andrea and I were on our way to La Iraca, one of the larger 
villages in the direct area of influence, north-west of La Granja. Sergio, a local man hired by the 
NGO, drove us along the winding dirt road in a hired utility. Sergio and Andrea sat in the front 
seats, while I watched on from the back. As we ascended into the hills, families walked by en route 
to La Granja. Andrea waved at an elderly couple with a donkey. She motioned for Sergio to stop, 
having recognised a young woman resting under a tree. Andrea promptly exited the car to greet her, 
and Sergio and I watched as the two exchanged a brief conversation. Having recommenced our 
journey, Andrea explained that the woman was from one of Miguel’s families, and he had been 
trying to contact them for weeks to secure a visitation. As we neared La Iraca, Andrea asked Sergio 
to update her on any news of the households we intended to visit. I knew this to be a routine 
practice. As a local man, Sergio was often in a position to provide updates and gossip circulating 
the communities.  
Sergio dropped us at the top of the mountain. From there we looked back down on the La 
Iraca village (see Figure 18). Andrea pointed to the mountains in the background and explained that 
many roads had been constructed to assist company exploration activities over the years. Behind us, 
the valley opened up around the Paltic River. The iron roofs of a small cluster of homes could be 
seen some way down the valley. Andrea explained that our first visitation was with a family who 
lived there (see Figure 19). We set off with walking sticks in hand; Andrea was in high spirits. In 
preparation for our visit, she had called each household to verify their appointment and seek 
permission for my attendance. Everyone agreed and confirmed our arrival time. Along the route, we 
passed a number of modest dwellings and small children looked curiously from the windows. 
Within five minutes, we arrived at our preplanned first home stop. Andrea walked up alongside the 
house while I stood at the entrance to the property and waited for an invitation to approach. 
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Figure 188. La Iraca village. 
 
Figure 19. An NGO practitioner en route to a household visitation. 
Andrea approached the front door and knocked before standing back. She called loudly 
“Senora, it’s Andrea from the NGO”. The door was closed; however, people could be heard inside 
the dwelling. Children were laughing and running around, and we could smell that food was being 
cooked. Andrea paused for a few moments before approaching the door again. “Senora, Hello?” 
Andrea stood back from the dwelling and faced away from the house; she glanced into the distance. 
Several minutes passed (see Figure 20). Eventually she approached once more, this time looking 
through cracks in the wooden door to see a small child of around six years old looking back at her. 
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Andrea said, “Sweetheart, is your mother home?”. The girl replied that her mother had already gone 
to the garden. Andrea motioned for me to join her back on the path. It was clear that this visitation 
would not happen today. Despite accepting the appointment, the household head and mother of 
three had failed to receive us in the home. 
 
 
Figure 20. An NGO practitioner waits for her scheduled appointment. 
As we walked away, I asked Andrea whether she thought it was safe to leave small children 
alone in the house. Her response surprised me. She said that the mother was most likely inside the 
whole time. As we walked back along the dirt path, I pushed the subject: “Why would the woman 
confirm a visitation, only to hide in the house the following day?”. I was concerned that perhaps she 
had been afraid to receive a foreigner at her home. Andrea explained that local people often failed 
to receive practitioners at the scheduled visitation time. Sometimes, they would agree to visitations 
over the phone to be polite, but had no intention of following through. Other times, people did leave 
the house earlier than expected to work in their garden or move cattle in anticipation of a storm. She 
explained that the most frustrating situation was when local people simply had no interest in 
receiving practitioners but nonetheless continued to book visitations and not receive them. Andrea 
said that households in the area were sometimes “playing” with the practitioners, stringing them 
along but with no interest in progressing any of the activities.  
-OOO- 
In the course of my fieldwork 42 per cent, or 14 of a total 33 attempted visitations, were 
unsuccessful. On these occasions, the household head was absent, or we were told to return at 
another, more convenient time. Practitioners explained that some households were not serious about 
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the work. One estimated that only 40 per cent of households “truthfully” participated in the 
Intervention (NGO_F6). Practitioners exchanged stories of household avoidance. At one staff 
dinner, a few laughed about attempting to visit a family, only to witness the household head run into 
the home on sighting the practitioner and pretend to be away. One practitioner explained in an 
interview that “sometimes you are out the front of the house yelling ‘Senores! Senores!’ [but] They 
don’t come out [because] they know your voice” (NGO_F11). Even when practitioners were 
received, household members sometimes made excuses to avoid initiating activity. They were “too 
busy” and asked the practitioner to “return another day” (NGO_M8). I inquired why practitioners 
felt households were playing with them when perhaps they were just busy. Most explained that it 
was obvious from the context. Sometimes a practitioner could return a fourth, fifth, or even sixth 
time, but it was always “the same thing, a mountain of excuses” (NGO_M8). One practitioner said: 
They give you an exact hour and day; you go, and they are not home. They give you another 
time; you go and they ask if you can explain the Intervention again. So you explain and ask, 
“Senora, would you like to proceed with the activities in our next visit?” “Yes” they tell you, 
but in the next visit, they say that they had not understood, and ask you to explain again. At 
this point, you understand that they are playing with you. (NGO_F6).  
Household members were broadly dismissive of the Intervention work in my interviews 
with them. According to NGO records, however, the majority continued receiving workers over a 
period of two and a half years. My interpretation of this pattern of engagement was that households 
had pragmatic and strategic reasons to stay superficially engaged. From a strategic viewpoint, by 
staying enrolled in the program of work, households maintained a connection with the company 
benefit stream. An NGO practitioner agreed with this analysis. In an explanation of why households 
would “play” with practitioners, he said, “there are families that think that if they say no to [the 
Intervention], they will not receive any form of benefits” (NGO_M17).  
By staying engaged, households were at the very least aware of the kind of benefits on offer, 
and potentially able to influence changes to the Intervention content. For example, on several 
occasions I observed local people express an interest in receiving financial support for project ideas. 
They were aware that those households involved in the pilot Intervention had been provided with 
financial support, so it seemed reasonable that this option would also be available to them. My 
analysis is that the comparison was directed at influencing changes to the Intervention. Moreover, 
by staying engaged with the work, households also retained a potential leverage point with 
company personnel. During the company–community suspension meeting, local people refuted CRs 
practitioners’ claims that Rio Tinto was helping the population and insinuated that the NGO had 
reaped the financial benefits. Ultimately, staying enrolled in the Intervention was easy for 
households. The NGO policy was that practitioners continue working with families until they 
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verbally decline the work. In this way, people could maintain a superficial engagement in the work 
because practitioners were obliged to return until refused.  
Some household members also used the Intervention to gain insight into company plans and 
activities. The previous chapter highlighted the predisplacement phase as characterised by 
uncertainty and local speculation over business activities. NGO practitioners explained that local 
people were frequently talking about rumours they had heard. In particular, I noted three 
widespread perceptions that I verified with all actor groups. The first was that a land access 
negotiation would go ahead within a matter of months. The second was that the suspension notice 
was a company strategy to reduce local land prices as people became increasingly desperate to 
leave. A third was that Rio Tinto wanted to back away from developing an operation and sell the 
concession to Chinese mining company Chinalco.  
Household members attempted to clarify the “facts” in their interactions with practitioners. 
During household visitations, I observed people pose statements or questions and wait for the 
practitioner to confirm or deny their proposition. For example, one farmer said, “Did you hear, 
engineer, Rio Tinto is selling to Chinalco, isn’t it?”. The practitioner responded by stating that he 
had heard this rumour; he implied with his facial expression and tone of voice that to his 
knowledge, the information was false. Household members also drew upon their social capital with 
practitioners to appeal for help. Practitioners claimed to be working in the interests of local people, 
so households drew upon this mandate. The following quotation is an example of how one 
practitioner recounted this interaction:   
[Household members say] “Engineer, I believe that you would not do bad things to me, nor 
would you permit bad things to happen ... you have heard about what’s going on, tell me, is 
it true that they [the mining company] are not going to offer us hectare for hectare?”. 
(NGO_M16) 
That household members persistently questioned practitioners during household visitations 
suggests to me that information sharing did occur between these actors. Though practitioners 
claimed to restrict the flow of information about the mine development, local people found ways to 
access their knowledge. At the same time as practitioners worked to build trust-based relationships 
and progress the empowerment work, household members were capable of leveraging this same 
resource to their benefit, for example, by appealing to the practitioners’ duty of care to them and 
asking for clarity on company activity that would affect the household. In this way, household 
members maintained engagement with the work because they were able to find informal ways to 
pursue their interest, even if these did not align with the original intent of the Intervention.  
Households were also resourceful in other pragmatic ways. Many people were able to 
maximise their experience of working with practitioners to obtain tangible and relatively quick 
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benefits, for example, to acquire a birth certificate, the government pension and/or health insurance. 
While these activities could be time consuming, they did result in immediate and ongoing results. 
Those activities involving significant investments in household time, labour, and/or finances were 
less popular. For example, a few household members complained about working with practitioners 
to build food gardens. After all the time spent planning, they also had to fund and do the work. The 
food would take several weeks and months to grow. In the process of implementation, households 
found creative ways to use the Intervention to meet more immediate interests. In one example, I 
observed young adults call practitioners to check in on their senior family members. The reduction 
in economic activity at the La Granja project meant that many young adults had moved to the city to 
pursue work and educational opportunities. This was a strain on family relations. A local man 
explained: 
In the past, people would work with the seniors in the fields, to help them, many still do, but 
a lot have left. The practitioners visit [the seniors] and check on them, that’s good. Most of 
them don’t have phones; so many people call the practitioners to get an update on how they 
are going. (LI_M3) 
Young adults used the Intervention and their relationships with practitioners to manage or 
reduce family obligations. As seniors rarely used mobile phones, their relatives could instead call 
practitioners to receive updates on the state of the household. Given their regular visitations, 
practitioners were in a position to act as conduits of information and pass messages between them. 
This informal practice was a form of service delivery. Practitioners were effectively taking on a role 
as intermediaries between family members, rather than encouraging them to find a more sustainable 
solution that would not rely on their presence in the area. Practitioners justified the activity to me by 
suggesting that they were helping to strengthen the household network in the short term. 
Practitioners also wanted to maintain the legitimacy of their presence in the lives of the families. I 
noted that young adults often had very positive views of the Intervention concerning the work 
undertaken with seniors. For example, they spoke highly of how practitioners would “look after the 
parents” and “take them to the clinic”, or “encourage them to take their medications” (LI_F14). At 
the interface between households and NGO personnel, I found that households and practitioners 
demonstrated informal uses of the Intervention to maximise their interests. I have described how 
household members had practical reasons to stay engaged with the work despite claiming that it was 
not helpful. They pursued their respective interests within the limits of what was available to them 
through the Intervention.  
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Vignette Two: October 2014, the Community Suspension Meeting 
In September and October 2014, the LA&R team held a series of community meetings to 
announce the suspension of their plans for land acquisition and resettlement. Ten meetings were 
held across the direct area of influence. NGO staff members were invited to present an evaluation of 
their work at each of the 10 meetings. I attended eight of those meetings. The LA&R manager 
explained to me that the meetings were also an opportunity for community members to provide 
feedback on their experience with the NGO. She was in the process of evaluating whether to renew 
the NGO contract, and NGO personnel were aware of this. The following vignette describes the 
dynamic interaction between actors at one of the eight suspension meetings I observed. This session 
was chosen because it had the largest number of attendees and all actor groups actively participated. 
The event demonstrates how the Intervention was used by company and household actors in the 
renegotiation of their relationship and obligations to each other.  
-OOO- 
Gabriel and I arrived in La Uñiga around 3:50 pm, in anticipation of a 4 pm start. The NGO 
driver dropped us at a large, double-storey, mud-brick house at the entrance to the village. The 
house belonged to the President of the La Uñiga Ronda, who made the lower level available for 
community meetings. Gabriel began setting up inside while I waited out the front and greeted some 
of the arriving community members. By 4:10 pm, around 25 community members had gathered at 
the house. The women sat on one side of the room, the men on the other. Twenty minutes later, two 
CRs staff arrived, and the meeting commenced.  
The CR practitioners, who introduced themselves as Felipe and Rafael, apologised for the 
delay and thanked the authorities and local people for attending (wee Figure 21). They announced 
that the meeting would cover two agendas: the first, an update on the mine project, and the second, 
an overview of the Intervention results. Over a period of 10 minutes, Felipe explained that 
following two and a half years of dialogue, unfortunately, the land acquisition and resettlement 
process would be suspended until further notice. Two key reasons were provided: the decline in 
global commodity prices had affected Rio Tinto’s bottom line and it was not economically feasible 
to progress at this time. Further to this, though the La Granja project team had worked hard on their 
proposal, the investment committee in UK rejected their plan. The “business case” had not been 
convincing, there were still too many social risks. The Project team would need to reassess options 
and design a more financially attractive proposal. At this point, Felipe sat down and Rafael 
addressed the crowd. I had come to see this routine played out in several of the other suspension 
meetings; Rafael was about to give the “hard line”. What people needed to understand, he 
explained, was that Rio Tinto is a business and if the Project was deemed to have too many risks, 
then Rio Tinto was not going to invest. It was now up to all of them, the La Granja project team and 
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local people, to strengthen the business case going forward. The communities needed to be 
reasonable with their demands, because La Granja was not a mine – it was only a project and had 
not generated any income. Rafael continued, “Would Rio Tinto be here tomorrow?” – he could not 
say, but as a company that “respects local people”, their team had deemed it important to provide 
this update directly and to clarify any concerns. 
 
 
Figure 191. CRs practitioners address community members to announce the suspension of their 
land acquisition and resettlement activity. 
A series of questions flowed from the audience. Some people wanted to know when the land 
purchase would happen. Felipe stressed that they could not say. If the footprint changed, Rio Tinto 
might no longer require all lands in the direct area. As a “responsible company” they would only 
initiate conversations with local people once they had certainty of plans. The comment angered 
some community members; one man yelled “it is not up to Rio Tinto to decide that the process is 
suspended” because the community was “part of the process as well”. Another man yelled that local 
people were “confused”. They had already attended many meetings about the purchase of their 
lands, and if the company could not stick to their plans, it would be “better that they leave”. Two 
men stated angrily that they would “not wait another eight years for Rio Tinto to make up its mind”.  
Rafael interjected to remind the people that this is “how business works”, and the only 
option was to “continue with daily life”. He explained that “as a responsible company”, they were 
concerned with the opinions of local people. For this reason, the company had sponsored an NGO 
to work with them and assist even the most vulnerable households in the area. Rafael signalled for 
Gabriel to start his presentation. Gabriel stood, but was quickly interrupted as additional questions 
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for Rafael flowed from the audience. With a tone of sarcasm, one man congratulated Rafael on his 
“really good speech” and began listing a series of issues. Among these, he claimed that Rio Tinto 
had not made enough social investments in the area, the company had caused local inflation, and 
life had become unaffordable. Many people were upset that they had not received a job in the 
Project. Rafael waited for a pause, thanked the audience for their comments, and motioned for 
Gabriel to begin. 
At this point the atmosphere was tense. Gabriel introduced himself and initiated an overview 
of the Intervention. Within five minutes, some community members interjected. On the suggestion 
that the Intervention aimed to help people gain access to education, a senior woman asked why Rio 
Tinto had not invested more funds in the La Granja primary school. She said the school was in 
“disrepair” and other towns nearby had received help from the La Granja Social Fund. Another 
woman pressed Gabriel when he suggested that the Intervention helped local people to access health 
care. She had ultimately paid for the treatment she received and wanted to know why. After a series 
of complaints, Gabriel explained that the Intervention was never meant to deliver services and 
goods, and they worked with household resources to progress their development goals. The 
president of the ronda stood to give his analysis of the NGO work (see Figure 22). His view 
resonated so strongly with the audience that the crowd broke into applause. The president said: 
Excuse me engineer, what is happening here is that you are making money instead of us, 
you are abusing our innocence with your education and cheating us […] yes there is 
progress, but it is progress [aimed at] filling your pockets. You come [to our homes] using 
our time, telling us what to do and we do it, for you to work.  
 
 
Figure 202. A ronda president provides candid reflections on the Intervention, and NGO 
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practitioners.  
Over a period of five minutes, Gabriel worked through his remaining slides. He was 
desperately appealing to community members, calling out individual examples of people who had 
been helped by the NGO in the audience. The meeting concluded after one and a half hours. Rafael 
invited people to sign a summary, which would be kept on record by Rio Tinto. The summary 
stated that people were unhappy about the suspension and they wanted to know how much longer it 
would take. Jobs were a key priority and it was noted that the Intervention had failed to help in this 
regard. A number of community members signed the summary. 
-OOO- 
During the suspension meetings, I observed a general pattern emerging. Company personnel 
explained that resettlement plans were on hold until further notice. Those who had participated may 
or may not continue to be part of the process. Everyone should carry on with daily life, and while 
households began to grapple with this new significant change in plans, the NGO continued to 
deliver the Intervention. This sequence of events tended to overwhelm and infuriate the audience. 
The information provided within the session was difficult to process. By the time NGO personnel 
were relaying details of the Intervention methodology and results, local people had already 
disengaged. Some stared blankly, others fell asleep. In most cases, few questions were asked. In the 
case where news of the suspension aggravated the audience, the Intervention became the subject of 
intense criticism.  
Gabriel returned to the La Granja office and relayed his experience to the other NGO 
practitioners. They were furious and perceived the company had set them up for failure. One 
practitioner surmised that the NGO presentation was “caught in a crossfire” because local people 
were responding negatively to news of the suspension, while their session, aimed to provide 
meaningful feedback, had been completely blindsided. This reading aligns with my observations. 
While in interviews household members had expressed broad dissatisfaction with the Intervention, 
their comments in the meeting seemed disproportionately negative. The “failure” of the Intervention 
appeared to be a lever to pressure Rio Tinto to provide local jobs and greater certainty over land 
access plans. In an attempt to reclaim some power in their interaction, local people drew upon their 
available resources to hold the company to account for raising expectations only to cancel plans at 
its convenience. The Intervention was caught in the middle. CR personnel had used the Intervention 
in a similar way.  
Company personnel were interested in maintaining social consensus. News of the 
suspension had been challenging to deliver. I observed CR practitioners struggle to deliver the hard-
line business logic while giving an impression of responsible practice. The contradiction was that at 
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the same time as claiming the company was responsible, the impact of suspending their two-and-a-
half-year dialogue on land acquisition was overlooked. As highlighted in the previous chapter, 
households had made plans in anticipation of resettlement. The company had actively built 
expectations that people would leave the area; and they were now being instructed to “get on with 
daily life”. In the face of diminishing resources, local people drew upon the Intervention as one 
leverage point in the negotiation of a new company–community relationship, given the changing 
circumstances.  
 
Vignette Three: December 2014, the NGO–Company Training 
This section aims to highlight a dynamic that formed at the interface between the company 
and NGO as plans for land acquisition and resettlement were suspended. In the previous chapter I 
explained that, in the course of project activity, company priorities changed from a focus on 
acquiring local land to maintaining good company–community relations amidst planning 
uncertainty. As a result of this changed focus, NGO personnel found themselves in a position of 
defending the value of the Intervention to company personnel. They ultimately failed to do so. The 
Intervention was cancelled and the NGO database absorbed by the company, representing a breach 
of household confidentiality. In this vignette, I highlight how development practice can become 
distorted in the course of implementation activities. The events that unfolded highlight these 
organisations’ different value orientations, and raise questions about the ethics of corporate-
managed Resettlement with Development. 
Before addressing a breach of household information, the following vignette describes my 
observations of an NGO-run workshop with company personnel. The LA&R manager requested 
that workshops be held following the suspension meetings. They were aimed at providing company 
personnel with an opportunity to learn about the activities and methodology being applied by NGO 
staff. The workshops formed part of the LA&R manager’s evaluation of the Intervention. She was 
yet to decide whether to continue funding the work. The two workshops each lasted two days. This 
vignette describes the dynamic that unfolded during day one of the second workshop. This scene of 
action was chosen to highlight that with changing company priorities, the NGO was placed in a 
position of trying to defend the value of their work.  
-OOO- 
At 7 am Rodrigo, Alfredo, and I arrived at the La Granja project camp (see Figure 23). We 
were directed by security to the CR office block, where we began to set up in a meeting room. As 
the most senior and longest standing Intervention staff member, Rodrigo was calm and joked that he 
was looking forward to eating lunch at the mess. Alfredo, on the other hand, was visibly nervous; he 
confessed to feeling intimidated by the company staff. After a short period, Leon, a member of the 
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LA&R team, joined us in the room. He had played a central role in organising the workshop 
logistics and helped the NGO staff prepare the content. Leon was very familiar with the 
Intervention. He had worked as a practitioner in the NGO before taking a role in the CR team when 
the opportunity presented. I knew that Leon was anxious that the workshop went well. Having 
worked in the Intervention originally, Leon was convinced the work had helped families and would 
assist in restoring livelihoods restoration in an eventual resettlement scenario. Moreover, Leon was 
cognisant that the NGO was under evaluation. If Rodrigo and Alfredo could not defend the value of 
their work, they faced losing the NGO contract and, with it, the social capital built with households 
in the area.  
 
 
Figure 213. The La Granja project camp. 
By 9 am, seven personnel from the LA&R and CR teams arrived at the room. Rodrigo 
invited them to take a seat around the table and thanked them for coming. He initiated a summary of 
the workshop content (see Figure 24). The first day of the workshop was focused on providing an 
overview of the Intervention rationale, and its conceptual and methodological basis. “Why did Rio 
Tinto decide to support this Intervention?” Rodrigo asked. He answered, “A new model of 
development was needed.” He explained that traditional development programs offered by the state 
and mining companies in Peru had generated dependency relationships. He said that local people 
expect donors to provide for their needs, and that this is not sustainable development. The 
Intervention was based on a people-centred approach, aimed at empowering households to 
proactively use existing resources, including those provided by the company and state. In building 
household capability, participating families were more resilient and adaptable in changing 
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circumstances. Rodrigo stressed that in supporting this work, Rio Tinto had built social consensus 
for the Project development. Local people can use the Intervention as an opportunity to achieve 
improvements in their lives, including through resettlement.  
 
Figure 224. NGO workshop at the La Granja project camp.  
As the day progressed, Rodrigo and Alfredo spoke at length on how the NGO applied the 
people-centred methodological approach. Leon frequently interjected, elaborating on Rodrigo’s 
points and responding to questions from the floor. PowerPoint presentations, role-play and 
participatory methods were used to engage the staff. Rodrigo spoke to the challenges they had faced 
in overcoming high levels of distrust in the local community. Their success was a result of social 
development expertise and autonomy from the company. Rodrigo drew upon household case 
examples to illustrate progress achieved. Some participants commented they had not understood the 
NGO’s work and were pleased to learn about the people-centred development approach. 
By late afternoon one participant suggested that, from his viewpoint, there was an elephant 
in the room. He commented that the key question was whether this program had helped to improve 
the image of Rio Tinto, because as far as he was concerned, the families did not like it. Some CR 
staff agreed with his point, remarking that locals frequently complained. The NGO seemed always 
to draw upon a small handful of “success stories”. The results had not been clear enough to the 
community, raising questions about what benefit the Intervention had provided to them and the 
company. Leon stood to address his colleagues; he stressed that the empowerment process was 
difficult to quantify. Case examples were the best way to demonstrate the collective impact. 
Rodrigo added that sustainable change in behaviour could only occur at the pace of the household. 
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The NGO was only half-way through its activities when the suspension notice was given; most 
households were yet to mobilise actions in their family vision.  
Another CR practitioner sat back in his chair, catching the attention of the room. He 
commented that if the Intervention had already been going for two and a half years, the benefits 
should be clear to all. Further to this, he was not convinced the work should sit with an NGO. If Rio 
Tinto was paying for the work, then it should be widely publicised to support good relations with 
the families. The presence of an NGO had confused matters; the CR staff could do the work. A 
debate erupted within the group. On the one hand, the people-centred development process made 
sense in theory, but if households did not like it and success could not be demonstrated, then the 
work was not necessarily contributing to the company’s social licence.  
-OOO- 
This vignette highlights one of two findings on how company and NGO actors navigate their 
interests at the interface between them. The first is to illustrate that, in time, company priorities can 
change, with implications for development-oriented work. Before the change occurred, the focus 
was upon long-term, people-centred development. After the change, the focus moved to managing 
more immediate short-term priorities, including maintaining favour with households, and the 
company image. Initially, an NGO had been a suitable organisation to work with families and 
support them in building greater self-reliance. This was because in a post-resettlement scenario, the 
company sought to reduce dependency relations and assist households take ownership of rebuilding 
their lives and livelihoods elsewhere. This arrangement was, however, no longer favourable as 
company personnel sought to re-establish their legitimacy and positive contribution to the local area 
following the suspension announcement.  
While the Intervention activities were still in progress, it was problematic that households 
did not appear to like the work or accept it as valuable. From the company perspective, what was 
the benefit of sponsoring a development program if local people complained it hadn’t helped them 
and expressed confusion over where the assistance had come from? From the viewpoint of the 
NGO, however, their work was incomplete. Many households were yet to realise the potential of the 
empowerment work. During an informal conversation, one practitioner likened the evaluation to 
assessing a house that was half built. Despite the original intent, the Intervention was no longer 
being assessed for its contribution to long-term land access and resettlement plans. Instead, it was 
being assessed on whether it had made a positive contribution to the company–community 
relationship. 
The implication of this changing priority was that NGO personnel were placed in a position 
of defending their work on these new terms, (i.e., contributing to reputational value) while 
attempting to maintain the importance of their role as independent development providers. They 
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ultimately failed to convince company staff. The NGO director called a meeting in the final weeks 
of my fieldwork and informed the team that all data collected on the households would be 
transferred to the company LA&R team as requested by the manager. The remaining weeks of 
activity were dedicated to ensuring all household Life Plans were complete and digitalised ready for 
the transfer. Shortly after my departure from La Granja in mid-December 2014, a number of NGO 
practitioners confirmed that their contracts would not be renewed in the new year.  
During my last interview with the LA&R manager in early December, I confirmed my 
understanding of events and asked what would happen to the household information, and whether 
Intervention recipients would be made aware of the information transfer. The manager explained 
that information would be kept for the purpose of potentially continuing the work in future. It would 
also provide a resource for planning options for land acquisition and resettlement. The Life Plans 
were described as “useful in the design of livelihoods packages” because the team could “tailor 
[proposals] to their interests, their expectations and motivations” (C_F2). In this way, the Life Plans 
were a complement to the company’s pre-established social baseline data by providing additional 
insight into households’ self-identified aspirations for improvement. As confirmed by the livelihood 
manager, the NGO had “worked really well, [because] they left good information” (C_M9). In his 
assessment, households had sometimes gone “deeper with the practitioners because they are not 
wearing the Rio Tinto uniform” (C_M9).  
On any measure, the transfer of household information from the NGO administrator to 
members of the LA&R team was an ethical breach of household confidentiality. I had witnessed 
NGO practitioners consistently assure household members during their visitations that the 
Intervention was confidential, that household information would not be shared with the company, 
and that they were operating independently. I asked the LA&R manager about the fact that 
households were under the impression their information would only be used by the NGO, for the 
purposes of the Intervention. From the company standpoint, two justifications were provided. The 
first was an acknowledgement that the transfer of information had presented the team with a 
“dilemma” because they did not want rumours to circulate that they had used the Intervention 
unethically (C_F2). The LA&R manager explained that she wanted to seek household permission 
for the transfer, but the NGO management had refused, stating that there was “absolutely no way 
that families would agree” (C_F2). Despite the refusal, key personnel within the NGO were 
cognisant of this breach in household confidentiality, and were compliant in facilitating the process. 
This may be explained, in part, by the company’s second justification, which was that information 
recorded in the Life Plans was apparently “not confidential”, only “the household secrets” were 
confidential (C_F2). Household secrets were those personal and private stories and insights about 
the household and broader community dynamic. Practitioners were clear that these secrets were 
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never recorded within the Life Plans, but were instead known to the practitioner and household 
member as a form of bonding and trust.  
I found this explanation for the meaning of confidentiality within the Intervention context 
confusing, and returned to the NGO practitioners to clarify my understanding. They confirmed my 
perception that in practice “confidentially” had referred to all information collected by the NGO. 
One explained, “We told households it’s all confidential […] we said we keep it in a database for 
the Intervention. To help us in this work” (NGO_M15). At the same time, a few practitioners 
argued that they had not betrayed the household’s deepest trust as no one would ever know their 
secrets. One practitioner rationalised the information transfer by claiming that it could help 
households if company personnel knew more about their interests and preferences. My data 
suggests that practitioners were grappling with an ethically fraught position and reinterpreted the 
notion of confidentiality. Practitioners had recorded household information in good faith; the 
decision to protect that information was out of their hands. One practitioner expressed his 
discomfort with this ethically fraught position in our interview: 
There is conflict within the NGO, we feel that we are representing families [and their 
interests]. We have later found out that the information we are recording is going to the 
company. We feel that in some ways we have cheated the families. (NGO_M7) 
In the following chapter, I discuss the ethical implications of this breach in household 
confidentiality. In the course of fieldwork, I learnt that this was not the first time information 
exchange had occurred between actors. Indeed, the second finding to highlight – at the interface 
between the company and NGO – is that in the course of Intervention activity, practitioners were 
incidentally incentivised to use household data as a leverage point to obtain company jobs. The 
finding highlights that some NGO personnel were also capable of using and willing to use the 
Intervention to meet their own interests. Practitioners explained to me that in Peru, employment 
within the not-for-profit sector is poorly paid, underresourced, and generally lacks career 
development opportunities. In comparison, working for a multinational mining company is 
relatively secure, and the pay and conditions are substantially better and garner social status. It is 
against this backdrop that some practitioners perceived their work in the Intervention as a stepping 
stone to a more prestigious role with the CR team. The company had “poached” staff from the NGO 
in the past. During the course of the Intervention, two practitioners were offered positions, one 
within the LA&R team, the other with CR.  
During interviews, a few practitioners explained that once it became clear a transition to the 
company was possible, the internal culture of the NGO changed. Some practitioners felt animosity 
that, in their view, the work they undertook with households was essentially similar to that of CR, 
yet with comparatively poorer working conditions and pay. Moreover, speculation about why some 
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practitioners had been chosen to work in the company over others became a point of contention. 
According to interviews, some practitioners sought to demonstrate themselves as good workers and 
gain acknowledgement by company personnel in the hope of a promotion. The Intervention had few 
formal key performance indicators or incentives. There were no metrics around the application of 
the people-centred methodology or the quality of relationships with households. The practitioners 
were monitored on two key indicators. The first was their progress in completing Life Plan 
activities, which was recorded during NGO team meetings and sent to the company’s livelihood 
manager on a weekly basis. The second was the practitioner’s adherence to the Rio Tinto health and 
safety protocol.  
As part of the health and safety protocol, practitioners were required to record “perceptions” 
and “interactions” under a quota system allocated and supervised by the livelihoods manager. 
Perceptions are comments made by project-affected people about company activities and plans. The 
recording of perceptions formed part of the health and safety protocol by helping company 
personnel to address latent and emerging community conflict before it escalated. For example, if a 
household member raised a complaint about the company with a practitioner, the literal text of this 
complaint could be recorded, with or without the individual’s consent, and submitted to the 
livelihood manager as part of a monthly quota. Interactions, on the other hand, were aimed at 
ensuring the health and safety of workers by encouraging practitioners to intervene in a colleague’s 
actions should they partake in an “unsafe” or “high safety risk” activity.  
It is here that an incentive was incidentally created for practitioners with aspirations for 
employment in the Project. On a monthly basis, the LA&R manager ranked practitioners according 
to their health and safety performance. Practitioners explained to me that their names were 
compiled in a list and displayed on the NGO office wall each month. The individual with the 
greatest number of perceptions and interactions was commended by the LA&R manager. 
Inadvertently, the recording of perceptions and interactions became one of the few available 
mechanisms to gain recognition as a high-performing employee. The result was to incentivise the 
documentation of interaction and perceptions, which was said to have created tension in the 
workplace.  
Practitioners recalled that before the Intervention was reduced in size, practitioners would 
sometime turn on each other, reporting superficial interactions to exceed their monthly quota. One 
practitioner said:  
It got to point where people were just making up interactions to fill the quota, you would be 
nervous to turn your head too quickly because someone would say, well sorry friend but you 
could strain your neck, I’ll have to make a record. (NGO_M17)  
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The documenting of household perceptions reported by NGO management and practitioners 
also got out of hand. Practitioner relationships and the frequency of their visitations became a 
resource for uncovering unfolding dynamics in the direct area of influence. A small percentage of 
ambitious practitioners had formed relationships with personnel within the LA&R team, and would 
reportedly call them and report any information they deemed of interest. Practitioners recalled 
meetings with company staff where the NGO management would relay news of a suspected 
conflict, only to discover that the information had already been received. Practitioners with 
aspirations to work in the Project appeared to be responding to incentives deemed important to 
company personnel, sometimes at the expense of the Intervention’s intent and their colleagues.  
These findings demonstrate the challenges these actors faced in holding to the intent of the 
development practice over time. Changing company priorities meant that the Intervention was 
evaluated for its contribution to the company’s reputation, rather than for its original emphasis on 
household empowerment. While acknowledging the theoretical value of household empowerment, 
in practice, the NGO contract was not renewed. The Intervention household data was acknowledged 
as valuable and absorbed into the company database despite the “dilemma” that households were 
unaware and no plan was in place to externally communicate the information transfer. In fact, I 
observed practitioners lie to household members and claim that all information would be held at the 
NGO headquarters after the transfer had taken place. The NGO also used the Intervention in 
unofficial ways. In addition to enabling the data transfer, incidental incentives were created in the 
course of implementation work. Practitioners were also capable of deprioritising their mandate in 
favour of career promotion. The NGO could also be seen as servicing the client or individual’s 
needs over those of their intended beneficiaries.  
 
Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, I set out to examine how actors navigated their interests and expectations 
through the Resettlement with Development practice. The findings highlight that as the least 
powerful actors, households may not have had the ability to direct the content of development 
assistance, but nonetheless intentionally pursued some interests. I suggested that households had 
strategic and pragmatic reasons to stay enrolled in the Intervention, whether to counter company 
claims of respectful relations, or to clarify information about company plans or assistance for senior 
family members. The NGO personnel also demonstrated capacity and willingness to use the 
Intervention to realise their own interests. To this effect, I described the NGO as complicit in 
breaching household information in response to company directives. Some practitioners also used 
their engagement as a means for career progression. The company, however, was ultimately in the 
best position to reinterpret and use the Intervention to respond to their changing business priorities.  
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The events that unfolded raise ethical questions about the role and responsibility of 
multinational mining companies in their application of resettlement as a development process. The 
finding also highlights a consistent theme running through this thesis, which is that there is a lack of 
guidance and accountability for activities in the predisplacement phase. In the chapter that follows, I 
discuss the implications of empirical findings presented within the prior four chapters for theorising 
the relationship between Resettlement with Development as policy concept and practice. This 
requires returning to the DCDR and MCDR literature, to examine the linkages between established 
research and the findings of the La Granja case. 
147 
CHAPTER EIGHT: DISCUSSION 
 
Introduction 
The research question guiding this thesis is how Resettlement with Development practice is 
integrated, understood, and used by actors in the predisplacement phase of land acquisition and 
resettlement for mining. In this chapter, I draw together the research findings and develop the core 
argument of this thesis, which is that people engaged in preparations for a proposed resettlement are 
affected by these processes, with implications for the practice of Resettlement with Development. I 
develop this argument through a discussion of three main findings, each of which highlights how 
characteristics of the predisplacement phase can distort practice intent, even before displacement 
has occurred. My research raises questions as well as providing answers, which is to be is expected 
given that this research is exploratory. The findings of the La Granja case make significant 
contribution to consolidating, extending, and advancing future research opportunities for theory, 
policy, and practice in MCDR, and in DCDR more broadly.  
First, this thesis suggests that in this case, Resettlement with Development practice was 
unimplementable due to historical legacies and the political economy of corporate engagement at 
La Granja. Many householders were superficially engaged in the empowerment-style Intervention. 
They were highly distrusting of outsiders’ (practitioners’) motives, unconvinced of the value of 
long-term (post-resettlement) planning, and held expectations for a more paternalistic and 
transactional style of corporate benefit-sharing. These issues greatly undermine practitioners’ ability 
to communicate the intent and value of the Intervention, and meaningfully engage local people in a 
process of self-empowerment. The finding raises questions about the effectiveness of corporate 
attempts to operationalise Resettlement with Development in the La Granja case. It also highlights 
historical legacies and the political economy of company–community engagement as a 
complicating factor for practice in brownfield resettlement contexts. 
Second, the thesis establishes Resettlement with Development practice as vulnerable within 
its organisational setting due to planning uncertainty. During the early mine phase, land acquisition 
planning is prone to change. As a contingent social process, Resettlement with Development 
practice is vulnerable. In the La Granja case, the value of the Intervention was evaluated by the 
company on the basis of its contribution to positive company–community relations, and the 
Project’s external reputation. The value to positive relations was prioritised above household 
readiness for resettlement. Company personnel suspended and later abandoned the Intervention, 
largely because they suspended the mining project itself in response to volatility in global 
commodities prices. Practice vulnerability gives rise to social risks and impacts, both for potentially 
displaced people and the company–community relationship.  
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Third, this thesis draws attention to the potential for Resettlement with Development 
practice to be misused by corporate actors. During the predisplacement phase, the stakes are high 
for people targeted for displacement and for project developers. Project developers require land 
access. Local people may be reluctant to relinquish land-use rights without guaranteed benefit. This 
leads to a situation where the corporate promise of Resettlement with Development provides a 
convenient mechanism to incentivise land access. The problem, however, is a project developer’s 
ability to guarantee that resettlement will provide positive development outcomes. Both previous 
empirical studies and the findings of this thesis highlight this as a challenge. While Resettlement 
with Development is posited by academics and policymakers as the best method for improving 
resettlement outcomes, it is first and foremost a tool for offsetting loss and minimising harm to 
affected people. Thus, it was misleading for the company to position resettlement so positively. The 
findings of this research highlight the potential for such positivist practice to be used as a 
mechanism of soft coercion, by empowering people in their own land dispossession without 
guaranteeing development outcomes. 
 
Lost in Translation: The Implication of Prior Disruption to the Practice of Resettlement with 
Development 
The findings of this thesis suggest some household members were superficially engaged in 
the Resettlement with Development practice.58 Below, I elaborate on this finding by demonstrating 
that historical legacies, in addition to the unfolding political economy of corporate engagement at 
La Granja, manifest challenges to the practice, specifically to practitioners’ ability to effectively 
translate the intent of their work. Three prominent issues are identified to have greatly undermined 
practitioners’ capacity to implement the Intervention. The first is householders’ learnt distrust of 
outsiders. Second is local people’s disinterest in long-term planning, given their cumulative 
experience of project uncertainty and abandoned mine project plans. Third is the householders’ 
expectation that corporate benefit-sharing would take a more paternalistic and transactional style. I 
elaborate upon these issues and their implications for broadening knowledge on Resettlement with 
Development practice, below.  
Local people did not trust in the motivation of the Intervention because they perceived the 
practice was connected to mining company interests and plans. In the experience of local people, 
outsiders working for, or associated with, the La Granja project tended to prioritise corporate 
interest to develop the operation. NGO practitioners claimed the Intervention was aimed at 
household development. The data suggests that householders were nonetheless dubious of this 
                                                 
58 The finding is drawn from data responding to the first and second subquestions of this research, which 
considered the practice context and the everyday activities associated with the practice. 
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claim. Some questioned and speculated on the “real” motivation for the work, right up until the 
cancellation of the mine project and the Intervention itself. Highly sceptical household members 
reduced the practice to a covert mechanism for convincing people to resettle, and thereby 
undermining their power in a future land negotiation. Covert, because practitioners told local people 
the Intervention worked exclusively with household agendas, and aimed to facilitate their self-
empowerment. Interviews with householders suggest that they did not accept or understand how 
empowerment would improve their lives. Practitioners sensed they were sometimes being “played” 
with by local people. 
Practitioners sought to depoliticise the Resettlement with Development practice from the 
historical legacies and unfolding political economy of company engagement at La Granja to 
overcome household distrust. Practitioners attempted to dissociate themselves from corporate 
motives and from local people’s experiences and astute knowledge of mining companies, including 
Rio Tinto. Practitioners actively promoted the Intervention as independent of corporate interests; 
they emphasised the emancipatory intent of their practice and institutional connections with the 
Peruvian aid and development sector. Practitioners sought to manage an external perception of 
indifference to company interests and activities. That NGO personnel considered it necessary to 
construct this perception – albeit unsuccessfully – highlights the extent to which prior company–
community engagements undermine practice within this context.  
A second issue affecting practitioners’ capacity to translate the intent of the Intervention into 
practice concerns local people’s collective social memory of project uncertainty and abandoned 
mine development plans. Prior to Rio Tinto’s arrival in 2006, people living in the proposed mine 
footprint had witnessed Cambior and BHP Billiton initiate, and later cancel, plans to develop a 
mine. The Intervention focused on achieving long-term, sustainable development outcomes. It 
appears, however, that household members had important reasons to focus on securing short-term 
and tangible benefits from the company. In their experience, prior companies had repeatedly 
withdrawn from the region within a period of years, despite stating long-term plans. It is 
understandable that, to household members, long-term livelihood planning around a potential 
resettlement appeared to be in vain. They were ultimately right to be cautious and instead focus on 
short-term gains. Rio Tinto suspended the land acquisition and resettlement process. The 
Intervention was, as suspected by household members, dependent upon company land access 
interests and subsequently cancelled.  
A third issue identified to undermine the practice is household members’ experience of prior 
corporate-led benefit-sharing initiatives. This experience had shaped local expectations for the 
company to contribute a more paternalistic and transactional style of development. Chapters Six and 
Seven highlight households’ aspirations, which first and foremost centred on gaining direct 
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employment with the company, and therefore to remain in the area and close to the Project. The 
local economy had thrived with the arrival of Rio Tinto in 2006. Local businesses were created to 
service company staff and consultants working on the Project. Householders also indicated their 
expectation that the company should alleviate household poverty by providing material and 
immediate assets such as cash, medical supplies, farming equipment, products, and training. This 
expectation reflects the paternalistic and transactional style of development contribution made by 
mining companies in the past. 
Over two decades, local people had acquired significant manufactured, natural, and financial 
assets as a result of corporate investments in La Granja. In addition to employment and procurement 
opportunities, Rio Tinto provided some householders with significant compensation to lease their 
land. Direct social investments were also made through the CR team and the La Granja Social Fund. 
For example, families were provided with pit latrines and materials to initiate small businesses. 
Prior to Rio Tinto, Cambior had provided landowners with cash payments in exchange for land. 
BHP Billiton unwillingly provided this land back for free, and provided cash and materials to 
rebuilt community assets and household livelihoods. By comparison, the Intervention focused on 
building human (health, knowledge, skills) and social (networks and relationships of trust and 
reciprocity) capital. It is unsurprising that the empowerment approach did not resonate with 
households as a meaningful form of development, given their prior experiences of corporate 
benefit-sharing. As a requirement of the Intervention’s methodology and approach, practitioners 
asked householders to contribute their own resources for development. In the past, companies had 
generally provided these resources for free. 
Though the Intervention did not meet householders’ expectations, the majority maintained 
engagement with the practice and found ways to meet their interests. Some drew upon their 
relationship with practitioners to access information about company plans and activities; others 
sought to maintain their connection with the company’s broader benefit stream. A few young adults 
spoke of using the practice to relieve them of family obligations by checking on, and assisting, 
senior family members with their health concerns and general wellbeing. The finding highlights 
that, within limits, local people were found to take advantage of the company-sponsored practice. 
There is limited evidence to suggest, however, that householders’ engagement would ultimately 
assist them in achieving Resettlement with Development. In the context of La Granja, the practice 
appears to have been entirely disconnected from its policy intent. The finding has implications for 
broadening the theorisation of involuntary resettlement practice. 
As a policy concept, Resettlement with Development holds clear instrumental aims to 
conduct resettlement as a sustainable development intervention. This case study suggests challenges 
in the pre-displacement practice as a result of historical legacies and the unfolding political 
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economy of corporate engagement. In Chapter Two, I examined DCDR literature to explore why 
resettlement practice frequently fails to protect affected people. De Wet (2009) theorised two 
explanations for poor post-resettlement outcomes (see Table 8). The resource deficits approach 
centres on managerial explanations of resettlement practice failure and, specifically, that project 
proponents rarely commit sufficient upfront inputs to the process. A complementary explanation is 
the inherent complexity approach. The approach points to generic factors − which often lie outside 
managerial control − that introduce complexity to the process and are often unamenable to 
planning.  
 
Table 8. 
Theorising Problems in Involuntary Resettlement Practice 
Resource deficits approach  Inherent complexity approach 
Insufficient: 
• National legal frameworks and policies 
• Political will 
• Funding  
• Predisplacement studies 
• Planning 
• Consultation 
• Implementation 
• Monitoring and evaluation 
 
• Imposed spatial change 
• Changes in resource access 
• Integration into more heterogeneous 
settlements 
• Integration into wider structures 
• Accelerated socio-economic change 
• *Sociohistorical political economy of 
company–community engagement 
 
In the context of brownfield resettlement scenarios, this research suggests an additional 
complexity factor influencing resettlement practice: the historical legacies and the unfolding 
political economy of corporate engagement. For simplicity, I have coined this factor the 
sociohistorical political economy of company–community engagement (see Table 8). How 
experience accumulates, influences, and shapes local perceptions and expectations is challenging to 
predict but important to understand. I argue that this factor has two broad implications for the 
practice of Resettlement with Development. To exacerbate relations of distrust between the Project 
developer and households, and reduce the likely effectiveness of the practice. 
The NGO’s attempts to depoliticise the practice appears to have exacerbated local distrust. 
Practitioners’ active portrayal of the Intervention as independent of company interests was absurd, 
at best. The arrival of any mine, even in an early planning phase, fundamentally redefines the 
political economy of a place, given the level of global capital investment involved. This occurs in 
all parts of the world, but is exacerbated in areas with populations that are relatively disadvantaged. 
To suggest that livelihood plans should be developed independent of the effects of the mine was to 
ignore the political and economic context that the mine was creating. It did not matter that mine 
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development had not yet started, as participants were inescapably focused on what the mine was 
going to be.  
This misconception inevitably played out. During the land acquisition and resettlement 
meetings, two and a half years after the Intervention began, local people were formally informed by 
company personnel that the Intervention was indeed connected to the company, and influenced by 
company land access plans. At these meetings, the Intervention was presented as an initiative of the 
land acquisition and resettlement process and, as such, was also placed on hold until future land 
access plans were secured. Interview data suggests that most local people were not surprised, and 
some had their suspicions confirmed. Many had maintained a healthy scepticism of the Intervention 
throughout. In attempting to conceal the association with the company, practitioners were 
effectively lying to household members. The effect was to contribute to the legacy of their 
predecessors: to exacerbate and entrench local distrust of outsiders. This outcome confirmed to 
some that the practice had been a covert attempt to engage and manipulate household affairs in the 
interests of the mining company.  
From a policy perspective, the question of how a project developer should best engage 
historical legacies and the unfolding political economy of company–community engagement 
warrants greater attention. Research in MCDR has established the likelihood that company land 
access strategies occur in contexts with a legacy of prior social disruption (see Owen & Kemp, 
2015). In the La Granja case, the company attempted to apply international involuntary resettlement 
guidance by investing in preparation activity, which they deemed to assist households in 
transitioning their livelihoods. However, the practice failed to meaningfully engage with the 
historical and unfolding company–community dynamics; practitioners attempted to work within a 
vacuum. The challenge for policymakers, government, industry, civil society, and multilateral 
organisations is how to reconcile the historical legacies and the unfolding political economy with 
involuntary resettlement guidance. For example, in the Zimapán hydroelectric dam development in 
Mexico, local people were also distrusting of company resettlement processes (Guggenheim, 
1993a). While frontline practitioners advised households to accept the resettlement package, they 
nonetheless rejected this advice and chose to receive full cash compensation. The problem is that 
cash compensation can exacerbate the risk of impoverishment (Cernea, 2003; Jayewardene, 2008) 
and expose a project developer to reputational harm, ongoing dependency challenges, and even 
social conflict. 
A practice implication arising from this finding is that the Intervention appears unlikely to 
support sustainable development outcomes for households. Trust is a minimum predisposing 
condition of participatory and sustainable development practice (see for example Robert Chambers, 
1983, 1997) Without trust, the relationship between actors can deteriorate to a transactional-style 
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engagement, and the recipients become less willing to contribute their own resources and drive 
identified improvement activities. Aronsson (2009, p. 48) finds trust to be “a concept that is basic 
for all social interactions [but also] crucial for getting results” in the context of land acquisition and 
resettlement processes. Without trust, local people become less likely to meaningfully engage in 
company-facilitated resettlement processes, and instead focus on the more immediate outcome of 
cash compensation as highlighted above.  
The Social Impacts and Risks of “Practice Vulnerability”  
The second finding of this thesis is that Resettlement with Development practice is 
vulnerable within its broader organisational structure.59 I call this “practice vulnerability” and 
demonstrate that during the predisplacement phase, the uncertainty of corporate land access 
planning has significant implications for involuntary resettlement practice. As a contingent social 
process, the practice is susceptible to being interrupted or cancelled, with impacts for local people 
and the company–community relationship. Current guidance in involuntary resettlement 
recommends that project developers engage potentially displaced people as early as possible. This 
research highlights, however, that early engagement can have unintended impacts where practice 
vulnerability destabilises – rather than strengthens – relationships between actors, inflates local 
expectation, and undermines trust. This research highlights how practice vulnerability impacts 
potentially displaced people, a point that is overlooked by involuntary resettlement guidance.  
La Granja is an interesting site in which to study early phase project development in the 
mining sector. The case demonstrates that mining companies do not always proceed sequentially 
through the project cycle. Cambior undertook a series of technical and social studies, only to 
abandon development before entering the construction phase. BHP Billiton jumped from an early 
study phase to project closure within a year. Rio Tinto progressed to prefeasibility on two 
occasions, only to return the Project to early exploration due to volatility in the global commodity 
prices. The first instance was in 2008 with the Global Financial Crisis; the second was in 2014 as a 
result of technical challenges, ongoing social risk and, primarily, a downturn in international 
commodity prices. Owen and Kemp (2016) have established that mining companies are limited in 
their capacity to counterbalance planning uncertainty. An original contribution of this thesis is to 
draw implications for resettlement practice in a specific case context.  
The decision to progress the La Granja project ultimately sat with the Rio Tinto London 
Investment Committee. The committee’s decision to reject the La Granja development plan resulted 
in the suspension of mining development activity and changes to the organisational hierarchy. In 
2014, management gradually reduced the Project personnel by more than 50 per cent, and 
                                                 
59 The finding is drawn from data responding to subquestion three, which considered how embedded actors 
understood the meaning and value of the practice during the predisplacement phase. 
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remaining staff were redistributed to fill essential positions. The LA&R management evaluated the 
Intervention and reviewed whether to continue the NGO’s contract. The positions of the staff 
responsible for initiating the Intervention – the “internal champions” – were redundant. The initial 
justification provided by the internal champions of the Intervention was that the Project would 
reduce the risk of denied land access. The new team focused instead on its contribution to the 
company’s “social licence” and future options for planning land access. 
The new priority reflected the dilemma facing company personnel with the suspension of all 
LA&R activities. This dilemma was twofold. First, the majority of households had come to expect 
resettlement, and company personnel were now in “damage control” (C_M17). They were in a 
position of renegotiating community expectations with fewer resources. As an outcome of this new 
priority, the Intervention was deemed to be failing. Household members complained to company 
personnel that they did not like the Intervention: they were confused about its origin and purpose. 
Second, the LA&R team were under pressure from the social project management, and Rio Tinto’s 
London-based Investment Committee, to develop new land acquisition and resettlement options and 
reduce project development costs. While the new LA&R team concluded that the Intervention did 
not contribute towards the company’s social licence, information recorded in the Life Plan files was 
deemed useful for the design of livelihoods packages, should resettlement proceed. Within a period 
of weeks, the LA&R management withdrew their support of the Intervention from the La Granja 
project footprint and instructed the NGO to compile and transfer all household Life Plans to the 
company’s social database. Household members were not consulted or informed about this 
information transfer. This sequence of events highlights that the practice of Resettlement with 
Development is vulnerable within its organisational setting, because it is contingent on broader 
project development, staff changes, and internal comprehension of the value and intent of the work, 
and with that commitments made for confidentiality and safeguarding of private household 
information. I now consider the implication of practice vulnerability for the literature, policy, and 
practice on DCDR. 
The implication of practice vulnerability in relation to established DCDR literature is to 
support existing research, which highlights the social risks and impacts of predisplacement to 
people targeted for proposed resettlement. In Chapter Three, I cited Perera’s (2014) study of the 
proposed West Seti Hydropower Project in Nepal. Perera’s research confirmed that all of the 
impoverishment risks predicted to occur post-displacement in Cernea’s Impoverishment Risk and 
Reconstruction model manifest before displacement had occurred. Guggenheim (1993) similarly 
highlights that anticipation of land access negotiations spurred socioeconomic and political 
transformations in a population targeted for displacement. His research documented the 
predisplacement phase of the Zimapan dam in Mexico. With reference to the Mexico case, 
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Aronsson (2009, p. 55) concludes that “the internal change of the preresettled community, triggered 
by participation and negotiation, might be one of the elements that cause a society to disarticulate in 
the implementation phase”. These and other empirical cases (Hwang, Xi, Cao, Feng, & Qiao, 2007; 
Koirala et al., 2017) have drawn attention to the way that local people are affected by planning and 
preparations, even though they may not have experienced a displacement event. The La Granja case 
study constitutes another example of social impacts in the predisplacement phase.  
In the La Granja case, some household members expressed a sense of hopelessness, anger, 
anxiety, and indifference to the company’s planning uncertainty and its decision to suspend 
resettlement conversations until further notice. My analysis of the mixed range of emotions is that 
people were experiencing a lack of control or influence over plans, and that their lives remained 
suspended in limbo. Perera (2014, p. 92) documents a similar dynamic in his research, and 
described populations targeted for potential displacement as “suspended communities”. In his case, 
the uncertainty of suspended plans for land access ultimately eroded local entrepreneurship and 
people’s desire to improve their livelihoods or land at the site. Hwang et al. (2007) found 
anticipation of involuntary resettlement was a significant predictor of mental distress in potentially 
displaced communities at China’s Three Gorges Dam. Anticipation of forced migration was linked 
with rising depression levels in the population, who had limited available social and the 
psychological resources. The short- and long-term impacts of uncertainty on people targeted for 
displacement raises questions about how to address these impacts, including mental health 
concerns.  
A further dimension to practice vulnerability in the La Granja case is the investment that 
local people made in anticipation of and preparation for resettlement. Household members had 
invested considerable amounts of time participating in the Intervention, meetings, and company-
sponsored studies over a period of several years. They were encouraged by Intervention 
practitioners to compile Life Plans that, in the majority of cases, involved moving to the coastal or 
jungle regions. Some household members anticipated placing children in city schools the following 
year; others discontinued planting long-term crops; the company brochure suggested resettlement 
would go ahead by 2015. Local people had also made opportunistic investments, such as 
constructing additional housing to maximise compensation in a land acquisition agreement. Local 
people are both attuned to mining company behaviour and capable of making the best use of 
opportunities presented to them. This research must raise questions about the potential risks and 
impacts of predisplacement, and whether local people should be entitled to some form of 
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compensation when predisplacement activity is prolonged or cancelled through no fault of their 
own.60 
A clear policy implication arising from this research is the need for international involuntary 
resettlement guidance to explicitly recognise individuals targeted for future resettlement as affected 
at the onset of the engagement process. Broadening the definition of what constitutes an affected 
person in DCDR policy will draw attention to the risks and impacts of predisplacement on local 
people. It may also challenge a taken-for-granted wisdom in policy guidance: that the earliest 
possible engagement of people in resettlement planning is inherently beneficial. How these impacts 
are balanced with a community’s right to know and have access to information that may affect them 
warrants further research. The findings of this research suggest the need for policy to better engage 
legacy issues and context, and develop a process for determining how to engage people in the 
predisplacement phase, given planning uncertainty and practice vulnerability. 
A practice implication arising from this research is the need for better contingency planning. 
Further research should investigate practical configurations for how project developers and local 
people navigate changing plans and the roles and responsibilities of actors in this process. It may be 
appropriate to provide affected people with some form of compensation where resettlement 
processes are suspended or cancelled. For example, a contingency agreement at the onset of 
predisplacement activities might help stakeholders to articulate reasonable entitlements and 
obligations where project processes are interrupted, yet still cause disruption. In the La Granja case, 
local people’s expectations for resettlement were not unreasonable, given two and a half years of 
ongoing dialogue and engagement with company officials. At the same time, planning uncertainty 
in early phase mine development is common. How best to manage stakeholder engagement in the 
early predisplacement phase constitutes an important area for future policy and practice guidance in 
DCDR. 
 
Resettlement with Development, Intended Goal or Guaranteed Outcome? 
The third finding of this thesis is that private sector mining companies are capable of 
misusing Resettlement with Development practice during the predisplacement phase.61 Research at 
La Granja reveals that the Project developer conflated development as an intended goal and 
guaranteed outcome of the resettlement practice. In the literature, resettlement is a mechanism to 
mitigate risk and offset the inevitable loss that households experience from displacement. In the La 
                                                 
60 In addition to La Granja, the potential for a project developer to prolong or cancel land access plans was 
documented in the proposed Tampakan Copper-Gold Mine Project in Mindanao, Philippines (Wenk & Scherler, 2016) 
and the proposed West Seti Hydropower Project in Nepal (Koirala et al., 2017; Perera, 2014b). 
61 The analysis derives from data presented on subquestion four, which considered how embedded actors 
navigated interests and expectations in the predisplacement practice. 
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Granja case, the mining company widely advertised that “resettlement is an opportunity to improve 
the future of families in the area” (Rio Tinto, 2014, emphasis added by author). Resettlement with 
Development became an incentive for local people to consider selling their land to the mining 
company voluntarily. This conflation between goal and outcome exploits Resettlement with 
Development, and misconstrues the intent of academics and policymakers who advocate for its 
application. The risk is that local people will be encouraged to participate in their land 
dispossession, with no guarantee that resettlement will provide development outcomes.  
There is an urgent need for project developers to improve resettlement practice. As 
previously found, empirical evidence demonstrates that DCDR continues to fail affected people in 
most cases. Resettled families are likely to experience impoverishment for between seven and 10 
years as a result (Cernea & MacDowell, 2000; Cernea & Mathur, 2008). Impoverishment occurs 
even when there is an intent to see affected people empowered as project beneficiaries, rather than 
as victims of development-caused displacement. Advocates of Resettlement with Development 
posit it as a mechanism to mitigate and offset the loss and harms of displacement (Cernea, 2003). 
This does not, however, replace foundational knowledge in the field of DCDR: that avoiding and 
minimising displacement remains the best option for harm reduction. If displacement is 
unavoidable, then resettlement may assist in reducing harms, but it is unlikely to have an 
overwhelmingly positive impact. 
From the corporate perspective, a functional company–community relationship is vital for 
project development. The industry is under pressure to gain social approval for land access and 
operations (Demonte, 2012). This situation can become exacerbated where weak governance and 
“selective absence” of the state means corporate and local actors must navigate the impacts, 
interests, and expectations of project development directly (Szablowski, 2007). National legislation 
and international policy guidance also encourages developers to negotiate directly with landholders 
and users. This situation interlocks corporate and local actors in a high-stakes engagement, where 
asymmetries in access to information and resources can exacerbate tensions (Price, 2015b). 
Many companies require land access as a most basic requirement for developing an 
operation. DCDR scholars have argued that from an ethical viewpoint (Penz, Drydyk, & Bose, 
2011), involuntary displacement of populations for profit is unacceptable. This ethical hurdle to 
private sector displacement can be cleared – in the eyes of some – by providing resettlement as a 
voluntary sustainable development intervention. The implication is that local landholders and 
households are not merely sacrificing their tenure on land and sense of place for the good of the 
nation, region, or shareholders, but they are benefitting as well. That is, benefits realised by those 
who are displaced help to legitimise the private sector actions. 
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Resettlement with Development continues to be advocated as the best available mechanism 
for reducing the impact of resettlement (Vanclay, 2017). Participation and local-level empowerment 
in land acquisition and resettlement processes are central to improved practice (Jay Drydyk, 2015). 
This mode of engagement offers the best prospects for the materialisation of sustainable 
development principles through resettlement. In the context of the La Granja case study, the 
Intervention aimed to assist households in achieving greater self-reliance to meet their human 
development needs. Self-reliance does not necessarily imply self-sufficiency, but enhanced 
capability through economic, social, and political change. Empowered households are thus 
theoretically better equipped to cope with the shock of displacement, or even prolonged or 
cancelled resettlement plans. Empowerment is central to resettlement processes, both from an 
ethical viewpoint (the difference between “worthwhile” vs “maldevelopment” for affected 
households) and in terms of sustainability (self-reliance and independence). 
The problem is, however, that if local people (particularly subsistence farmers) give up their 
land rights, they also relinquish their existing livelihoods. They must instead rely on companies to 
fulfil commitments made to improve their livelihoods via some other means. The insecurity of this 
situation is particularly acute where companies fail to self-regulate their adherence to involuntary 
resettlement standards. Multinational mining companies are prone to change their plans on account 
of uncertainty (Owen & Kemp, 2015). As demonstrated by the La Granja case and others, local 
communities absorb the social impact of prolonged, suspended, or even cancelled land access plans 
(Koirala et al., 2017; Perera, 2014b). They also offer their time and other resources to participate in 
these processes (Aronsson, 2009). Furthermore, the company and NGO were complicit in the 
transferral of household information into the company’s social database, without gaining consent to 
do so. The implication of companies using Resettlement with Development to facilitate land 
dispossession has several implications for extending DCDR literature, policy, and practice.  
This thesis contributes to academic debates about the increasing role of the private sector in 
human displacement and resettlement. As outlined in Chapter Three, the topic is an emerging focus 
of DCDR literature (see for example Cernea, 2015; Fernandes, 2011; Mathur, 2016a; Price, 2010, 
2015b; T.  Scudder, 2009). Questions remain about how businesses are held to account for 
resettlement outcomes, and whether companies can deliver on international policy guidance, 
including Resettlement with Development. The research extends current debates in two ways: by 
highlighting weaknesses in corporate self-regulation of land acquisition and resettlement processes, 
and by raising questions about how Resettlement with Development practice may inadvertently 
undermine local-level volition in DCDR processes. 
The La Granja case study demonstrates a limitation of voluntary corporate adherence and 
failed regulation of Resettlement with Development practice. The practice is dependent on, and 
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shaped by, a business case argument. I have established that involuntary resettlement safeguards 
and standards do not provide project developers with explicit guidance on how to address the risks 
and impacts of predisplacement to potentially displaced people. In the context of La Granja, the 
Project Social team may have instead identified social risks and impacts via more general 
performance standards, such as the IFC Performance Standard One, on the Assessment and 
Management of Environmental and Social Risks and Impacts (see IFC, 2012a). Instead, the decision 
to accelerate or withdraw social investment in land access plans was shaped by Rio Tinto’s London-
based Investment Committee, which returned the Project to an earlier study phase. There does not 
appear to have been any contingency plan for the risks of impacts of this suspension on local 
people, who instead were advised by CR personnel to “continue with daily life” (C_M9). 
This research contributes an understanding of how the business case logic infiltrates and 
influences Resettlement with Development practice. Within the LA&R team, company personnel 
justified the breach of household confidentiality in response to changing business priorities. 
Company personnel ultimately evaluated the Intervention for its contribution to a social licence, 
rather than its sustainable development outcomes. In this light, household information was deemed 
potentially useful by the management in the LA&R team. The transfer of household information 
from the NGO to the company must raise questions about the ethics of corporate-led resettlement 
practice, and the role and motivation of NGOs participating in corporate development initiatives 
within a resettlement context. Future research could fruitfully examine linkages between literature 
about the role and limitations of the private sector in development interventions and DCDR. 
Academics examining corporate-led development in mining have already established the 
limitations of a “business case” argument for social investment (see Gilberthorpe & Banks, 2012; 
Idemudia, 2011), and for the private sector more broadly (see Blowfield, Jamali, & Karam, 2015; 
Frynas, 2008). A core critique is that the meanings, practices, and effects of corporate interventions 
tend to benefit companies over and above local communities in practice (Banks et al., 2016; Benson 
& Kirsch, 2010). As observed within this case study, mining companies tend to control the version 
of “Development” promoted through interventions, the criteria by which local people might be 
included or excluded, and how benefits work to reinforce marginalisation and unequal relations 
within localities. Critical research does not render Resettlement with Development irrelevant, but 
suggests a fruitful marriage between DCDR and business and development literatures, to provide a 
more nuanced understanding of the possibilities and limitations of the practice. Indeed, this 
discussion chapter is an initial attempt to highlight the relevance. 
Another contribution of this thesis is to raise ethical questions about how corporate 
investment in Resettlement with Development undermines local-level volition. By conflating 
development as an intended goal and guaranteed outcome of resettlement, private sector companies 
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can raise local expectations that appear unlikely to be fulfilled. “Successful” cases of Resettlement 
with Development are rare in the literature. My research contributes by providing deep insight into 
the nature of practical challenges associated with implementing Resettlement with Development in 
practice. It highlights that practitioners were unable to translate the goal into the outcome, largely 
on account of legacy experiences of project-affected people. Likewise, the practice was vulnerable; 
the intent became “repurposed” by company staff with changing priorities and was suspended and 
cancelled with no contingency plan in place.  
This research suggests that Resettlement with Development interventions are susceptible to 
misuse by private sector developers, as a mechanism to empower people in the dispossession of 
their land. In the academic literature, Resettlement with Development is a mitigation measure and 
aimed at offsetting the harms and losses associated with displacement (Tamondong, 2008). In the 
case, however, development was advertised by the company as a guaranteed outcome of company-
led resettlement. It was positioned as a win–win for corporate and local actors, addressing 
household ambition to alleviate poverty and “develop”, and enabling much-needed land access for 
development of the La Granja mine. While ostensibly Resettlement with Development is meant to 
mitigate risks for the households and communities who would be displaced, this thesis finds it is 
also, if not more so, a risk mitigation strategy for the company.  
The Intervention, the key component of La Granja’s Resettlement with Development 
predisplacement practice, worked to structure household expectations to leave the area. Household 
progress in the Intervention was both focused, and contingent, on members identifying and 
articulating aspirations for a better life. People without improvement aspirations – such as seniors or 
those people who claimed to be “developed” – could not progress in their Life Plan. Most 
household members understood the Intervention was directed at supporting company interest. This 
point is best demonstrated by the absence of any participants working with practitioners to plan for, 
and strengthen, their capacity to reject the land acquisition and resettlement proposal. In theory, this 
should have been possible. Some households informed practitioners they would not leave the area, 
and practitioners claimed to work exclusively with household agendas.  
The Intervention also worked to structure household interest to leave the area by prescribing 
the means through which they could achieve household development aspirations. To achieve 
people-centred development, household members were encouraged to draw on their existing 
resources and seek “external opportunities”. While household needs and aspirations are abundant, 
opportunities in La Granja are limited. Local people widely recognised the public services as 
insufficient and in disrepair, as I also observed. Livelihood opportunities are also limited, economic 
activity primarily revolves around agriculture, livestock, and opportunities with the mine project 
(e.g., direct jobs or procurement). Practitioners routinely referred household members to the 
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improved education, health care, infrastructure, and livelihood opportunities in the urban and 
semiurban context. From a local standpoint, it could appear that resettlement is an avenue through 
which to gain access to opportunities elsewhere. Most local people I spoke with expressed their 
desire to sell their lands to Rio Tinto in a belief that resettlement would lead to monetary 
compensation, and potentially, development.  
The risk here is that local people are ultimately encouraged to participate in their own 
impoverishment by relinquishing their source of livelihood for an uncertain future. In Peru, mining 
companies routinely make promises of local-level benefit-sharing that later go unfulfilled at the 
later stages of project development (Himley, 2016). This situation leaves mining companies 
susceptible to accusations of influencing and undermining the volition of households in land 
acquisition and resettlement processes. This argument has relevance for extending knowledge in 
DCDR studies about the important topic of local-level volition, because it suggests that 
Resettlement with Development practice can be used as a mechanism of soft coercion.  
The binary established in international norms between “voluntary” and “involuntary” 
resettlement is critiqued in DCDR literature as being better understood as a continuum, rather than a 
dichotomy (Penz et al., 2011; Wilmsen & Wang, 2015; Xue et al., 2013). Many scholars argue that 
if affected people are given meaningful opportunities to participate, and influence the decision-
making processes that affect their lives, the term “involuntary” depicts a spectrum of willingness 
rather than of forced displacement (Price, 2015b). The core assumption of this claim is that 
negotiated agreements reduce power asymmetries between actors. Recognising that negotiated 
settlements continue to be a preferred mode of engagement to forced displacement, this research 
highlights the potential for Resettlement with Development practice to play a coercive role, and 
potentially undermine local-level volition. A similar dynamic was observed in research conducted 
by Habich (2015) in China. Drawing on fieldwork conducted in resettlement communities along the 
Lancang River in Yunnan province, Habich (2015) documents how the local government 
implemented a socially oriented resettlement policy with a variety of strategies including soft 
coercion, negotiation, and propaganda work to implement resettlement policies, thereby providing 
evidence of a softer type of authoritarianism at the grassroots level. 
A policy implication arising from this thesis is the ongoing need for improved safeguards, 
standards, and laws to regulate practice and ensure that vulnerable people are protected in DCDR 
processes. At present, preparation activity between corporate and local actors is governed by the 
principle of good faith. The IFC advises private sector developers to facilitate good-faith 
negotiations, which they describe as occurring free of coercion or intimidation, where all actors 
have equal and timely access to the best available information and to grievance redress mechanisms 
(see International Finance Corporation, 2007, pp. 64-65). As a mechanism of soft regulation, the 
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principle of good faith appears unlikely to govern corporate behaviour, which is premised on 
business case logic, as this would represent one party’s interests. As demonstrated in the La Granja 
case, a tension arises in the predisplacement phase where companies attempt to incentivise land 
sale, and at the same time educate local people about the potential risks and impacts of 
displacement. The latter does not appear to have been a strong focus of company engagement, 
leaving potentially displaced households at a disadvantage in a negotiation. The asymmetrical 
power between these actors undermines the likely fairness of negotiated outcomes.  
Future research into DCDR must consider how to strengthen both the incentives and 
assurances for local people who accept company-managed resettlement, and for companies who 
claim to provide development in the post-resettlement phase. Measures that aim to address 
asymmetries in power must furthermore address underlying social and political dimensions. A 
starting point is to explicitly recognise actor motivations, and the limitations of corporate-led and 
self-regulated DCDR processes.  
 
A Reflection on Adopting an Actor-Oriented Lens 
In this section, I consider contributions made by examining the research problem via an 
actor-oriented lens. I first confirm the benefit of focusing analysis on the assemblage of practice. I 
argue that the approach provided novel and valuable insights into why Resettlement with 
Development practice can fail during the predisplacement phase. The second contribution is an 
emphasis on actor agency. The actor-oriented lens directs researchers to consider that even the most 
powerless actor will find ways to achieve their means. This emphasis helped to uncover the 
willingness and capacity of all actors to derive benefit from the practice. The asymmetry of power 
relations between actors, however, meant that the company was ultimately able to shape and 
constrain the agency of others.  
The actor-oriented lens provides a nuanced insight into the mundane and practice-based 
challenges of the preparations phase of resettlement, which must raise questions about the practice’s 
effectiveness. By focusing in on the work of translation, the actor-oriented lens directs the 
researcher to examine areas of practice rendered invisible by policy and guidance materials. 
“Translation” describes the work that brokers undertake to enrol the support of various social actors 
towards a particular intervention outcome (Latour, 1996, pp. 85-86). Brokers are individuals (e.g., 
company managers, frontline practitioners, or household members) working along the fault lines of 
an intervention. They must navigate the coexistence of different rationalities, interests, and 
expectations (Lewis & Mosse, 2006, p. 15). 
In the La Granja case, practitioners revealed several tensions arising in their daily work, 
including household ambivalence, disinterest, and even resistance to the practitioners’ work 
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mandate. In applying an actor-oriented lens, it is possible to understand how practitioners were 
capable of progressing their work (i.e., the Life Plan activities) by employing persistence, 
prompting, metaphors, and other techniques. The insight gained by examining actor perceptions and 
actions at the interface of the Intervention provides an understanding of how well-meaning policy 
guidance can be rendered hollow and meaningless in the context of DCDR practice. The viewpoint 
offered here helps expand knowledge about the nature of practice challenges in the field of DCDR, 
where much of the theory is derived from an assessment of post-resettlement impacts. 
The actor-oriented lens also helps to demonstrate that while we may assume people engage 
in corporate-led development processes because they value them, this is not necessarily the case. 
The majority of households maintained enrolment in the Intervention despite a widespread 
conviction that the Intervention had not given them anything. Practitioners were motivated to 
progress the practice, and they intentionally concealed the organisational relationship between the 
NGO and the company to Intervention recipients. LA&R team management did not know that some 
local people were unaware of who had funded the work, until they evaluated the practice following 
the suspension. What is perhaps concerning about this revelation is that mining companies invest in 
such initiatives in the belief that these processes contribute to company–community relations, 
without understanding tensions in the practice. They may report to their global shareholders on 
socially responsible business investment that is perceived as unhelpful by local stakeholders. The 
actor-oriented lens helps to demonstrate that this situation can occur, not as some malevolent plan, 
but as a result of practical tensions and misunderstanding at various junctures within the practice 
interface. 
A second contribution of the actor-oriented lens to this research is the focus on agency, and 
how different forms of power are used by actors, including when they intersect at the practice 
interface. This research has highlighted a myriad of ways that each actor group was capable of 
defining and deriving value from the practice. For example, household members created 
opportunities in the Intervention to achieve their desired goals. The data suggests some households 
maintained engagement in order to stay connected to the company benefit stream, to obtain 
information, and/or use the Intervention as a resource to leverage their cause against the company 
(i.e., a sense of injustice that the company suspended resettlement plans). NGO personnel were also 
capable of exercising their agency in the process. Some practitioners drew on their relationship with 
or intimate knowledge and understanding of household members to progress their own interests, for 
example, career progression into the mining company. The finding suggests that there are elements 
of practice which sit outside of managerial and planning control. It also highlights that people are 
capable of deriving some benefit regardless of how poorly implemented an initiative may be. 
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That said, applying this lens also sheds light on the limitations of actor agency within the 
case context. What is clear from this analysis is the extent to which corporate actors can direct and 
reconfigure community engagement in their interests. The most concerning evidence, in this case, 
was that the company was in a position to initiate an intervention aimed at empowering local 
people, and then to later undermine this power by absorbing their personal information and plans 
into company systems without their consent.  
 
Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, I have developed the core argument of this thesis, which is that Resettlement 
with Development practice is influenced by the predisplacement characteristics, with implications 
for people targeted for future resettlement. I supported this argument with three lines of evidence, 
each exploring a characteristic of the predisplacement phase and the influence on practice and 
people engaged at the Intervention interface. The first line of evidence is that practice became 
unimplementable due, in large part, to historical legacies and the unfolding political economy in La 
Granja. The second line of evidence is that the practice was vulnerable within its organisational 
setting due to uncertainty about corporate planning. Third, the practice is susceptible to misuse by 
corporate actors because of the asymmetrical power relations between them. In this case, enabling 
the company to direct activities in response to business priorities.  
These findings have made an original contribution to established DCDR and MCDR 
literature. Initially, the thesis provides a nuanced insight into the nature of resettlement practice 
challenges at the coalface between practitioners and intended beneficiaries. The La Granja case 
suggests that household members were superficially engaged with the Intervention on account of 
their distrust of outsiders, their disinterest in long-term resettlement planning, and their expectation 
for a more paternalistic and transactional-style development contribution. The finding raises 
questions about the likelihood that Resettlement with Development practice can effectively support 
sustainable development outcomes for affected people in this case. Future research must consider 
how companies and communities can better engage the sociohistorical political economy, so that 
past grievances and local expectations are explicitly acknowledged and engaged as part of the 
practice.  
I argued that disruption to company project plans has specific implications for land 
acquisition and resettlement. Along with legacy issues, the impact of prolonged, suspended, or 
cancelled land access planning is not currently acknowledged by companies or policymakers in 
DCDR. Despite the likelihood that mine company project plans can – and do – change, global 
guidance in involuntary resettlement does not recognise the impacts of predisplacement on so-called 
“potentially” affected people. While Resettlement with Development policy guidance aims to 
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enhance relations and benefit-sharing arrangements between actors, this case suggests that practice 
vulnerability may exacerbate tension and distrust of mining company activity. An immediate action 
required as a result of this finding is that involuntary standards and safeguards recognise people 
targeted for resettlement as affected at the onset of planning and engagement, not after 
displacement. Future research could consider contingency options to assist project developers and 
affected people in navigating change during the predisplacement phase.  
Finally, this chapter highlights the potential for private sector project developers to misuse 
Resettlement with Development to incentivise land sale. The finding is concerning given that, as 
currently practised, there is no guarantee that resettlement will provide development opportunity. I 
have argued that Resettlement with Development must be clearly understood, first and foremost as 
a mechanism to mitigate and offset the harm of displacement. It is not, as was widely advertised in 
the La Granja case, a guaranteed outcome. In the following chapter, I outline the core argument of 
this thesis, identify the contributions made by the investigation, and consider opportunities for 
future research.  
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CHAPTER NINE: CONCLUSIONS, CONTRIBUTIONS, AND FUTURE RESEARCH  
 
Introduction 
Academics, policymakers, activists, and civil society leaders recognise the urgent need to 
address the negative impacts of displacement on households and communities forced to make way 
for large-scale infrastructure development. This urgency is palpable. Conservative estimates suggest 
that 15 million people are already affected by DCDR each year (Cernea, 2008a, p. 20); however, the 
largest investment boom in human history is yet to occur. Major multilateral banks are currently 
mobilising unprecedented funds to support a new era of infrastructural megaprojects (Alexander, 
2015). DCDR academics warn that bigger infrastructure projects will lead to increased human 
displacement, and expose project-affected people to widespread risks and severe social impacts 
(Mathur, 2016). The pressing need for “stronger social policies, measures and tools to anticipate 
and counteract such risks” is apparent, not only because increasing numbers of people are affected, 
but also because resettlement practice has a dismal track record (Cernea, 2016, p. xxi).  
Resettlement with Development is a leading and pervasive academic and policy discourse 
underpinning international involuntary resettlement safeguards, standards, and good practice 
guidance. For over a decade, the World Bank (2004) has advocated that project developers should 
conceive of resettlement as a sustainable development intervention which improves the lives and 
livelihoods of displaced populations. DCDR researchers also posit theoretical arguments that 
Resettlement with Development has inherent benefits (Cernea, 2008a-b, 2009; Gamaathige, 2014a; 
Mathur, 2006, p. 66; Tamondong, 2008). Nonetheless, Resettlement with Development remains an 
ambitious and ambiguous policy ideal. Whereas DCDR literature extensively documents cases of 
post-resettlement impacts and outcomes, researchers have tended to conceive of resettlement 
implementation far too simplistically (as argued by Cernea, 2006; de Wet, 2006; Mathur, 2013a; 
Oliver-Smith, 2009). Furthermore, how project developers practically engage with and prepare local 
people for Resettlement with Development is a “blind spot” in the established literature (Koirala et 
al., 2017; Perera, 2014b). Normative involuntary resettlement guidance assumes that people are 
affected by displacement after they have been physically moved or their livelihood has been 
disrupted by the project development. 
In contributing to these ongoing debates in DCDR, this thesis provides an in-depth case 
study of Resettlement with Development practice in the mining sector. The study set out to better 
understand the practices, interactive dynamics, practical considerations, and dilemmas that arise 
from Resettlement with Development practice during the predisplacement phase. The research 
centres on the question: “How is Resettlement with Development practice integrated, understood, 
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and used by actors in the predisplacement phase of land acquisition and resettlement for mining?”. 
Four subquestions were posed to explore this primary research question. The subquestions are: 
1. What are the key sociohistorical, -political, and -economic contexts in which the practice 
is situated? 
2. What are the everyday practices that aim to achieve “development” within this context? 
3. How is the meaning and value of the practice understood by actors engaged in 
predisplacement activity? 
4. How do these same actors navigate heterogeneous interests and expectations of the 
practice? 
The findings of each subquestion were presented over four chapters. Chapter Four 
considered the key sociohistorical, -political, and -economic contexts in which the La Granja 
project’s Resettlement with Development practice was situated. The chapter locates the practice 
within a complex web of prior mining company–community engagements, including the unfolding 
political economy surrounding Rio Tinto’s local activities since arriving in the area in 2006. Mining 
companies had already fundamentally altered the configuration of households and communities in 
La Granja prior to Rio Tinto announcing their land acquisition and resettlement proposal in 2012. 
Local people had already experienced multiple counts of economic and physical displacement. 
Segments of the population were intimidated, forcibly displaced, returned to the Project area, and, 
in a minority of cases, temporarily resettled once more. Local people had experienced fluctuations 
in economic activity, as Cambior, BHP Billiton, and Rio Tinto each invested in and abandoned 
mine development plans in response to technical, social, and financial reasons.   
These experiences afforded local people considerable knowledge of multinational mining 
companies. A distinguishing feature of this experience was that the costs and benefits of corporate 
engagement had not been evenly distributed among local people, leading to breakdowns in the 
communities’ social fabric, distrust of local leadership, and inflated expectations that Rio Tinto 
should provide poverty alleviation, economic opportunities, and lucrative land-leasing 
arrangements. These factors, in addition to local leadership’s political linkages with the anti-mining 
ronda campesinas in Cajamarca, were cited by Project personnel as key motivations for the 
company’s stated intent to provide householders with Resettlement with Development. Against this 
backdrop, business risk was found to be a primary driver for Rio Tinto’s voluntary and self-
promoted commitment to conceive of resettlement as a development opportunity. The Project’s land 
acquisition and resettlement process aspired to improve the lives and livelihoods of affected people 
through ongoing consultation and capacity building as per good practice guidance.  
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In Chapter Five, the thesis zoomed in on the everyday practices of NGO practitioners and 
highlighted the nature of practice as involving three distinct domains, each presenting the 
practitioners with unique challenges. One domain of practice was focused on “winning families”. 
Given the high levels of distrust of outsiders, locally, practitioners sought to build rapport and gain 
legitimacy as household confidants and expert development facilitators. The work involved 
persistence, adaptive techniques, and creativity. NGO personnel ultimately deemed it necessary to 
depoliticise their presence by externally disassociating the practice from company interests. This 
technique appears to have exacerbated household distrust of practitioners and the practice intent.  
Another domain of practice centred on consolidating a household improvement agenda. The 
findings highlight that the logic of self-empowerment did not always resonate for household 
members. Practitioners struggled to connect their expert development knowledge about sustainable 
development and livelihoods transition with the lived experience of household members. Some 
household members were disengaged from, and confused by, practitioners’ planning activities. 
They struggled to understand the meaning of key concepts or development jargon such as “quality 
of life”. Practitioners sought to gently prompt, and sometimes force, elements of the Life Plan 
activities. Practitioners attempted to progress the work in the face of time pressures and local 
people’s apparent ambivalence; where possible, they sought to encourage household members’ buy-
in of the process. Although these methods enabled practice, the findings cast doubt over the 
likelihood that such methods would ultimately facilitate household ownership over the process.  
The final domain of practice identified in the study involved managing failures and 
containing household critique. The research demonstrates that household members were not merely 
benign recipients, but actively resisted the implementation process and practitioner bids to 
encourage initial and ongoing participation. The data suggests that some household members were 
tentatively engaged, their participation fragile, if not tokenistic. Practitioners nonetheless attempted 
to maintain their legitimacy and foothold in family life. They attributed completion of collecting 
activities to household members’ progress. They found creative ways to externalise responsibility 
for failures, invoking metaphors to render practice problems as superficial and rectifiable. As a last 
resort, practitioners shut down household critique by reminding recipients that the Intervention was 
voluntary, and they were free to discontinue their participation at any time. Combined, the insights 
provided in Chapter Five suggest that in the La Granja case, the nature of Resettlement with 
Development practice was fraught with tension and ambiguity.  
Taking a step away from the microinteractions between practitioners and householders, 
Chapter Six examined the meaning and value of the Resettlement with Development practice from 
the viewpoint of key actors: company and NGO personnel and household members. The findings 
highlight that contradictory messages had formed in the dynamics and relationships between 
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household members, the NGO, and company personnel over time. While household members 
demonstrated a willingness to contest the practice value, NGO and company personnel relayed their 
own interpretations, which were prone to change according to the company’s business priorities. 
The findings illustrate fluidity in how actors ascribe value and meaning to the work in response to 
changing circumstances. While the NGO practitioners were relatively consistent in their views of 
the Intervention’s intent and value, local people and company personnel connected the practice with 
broader interests and contestations over resources and company–community relations.   
In Chapter Seven, the thesis examined actor agency and how actor groups sought to navigate 
their heterogeneous interests and expectations of the Resettlement with Development practice. The 
findings indicate that all actors were capable of engaging the practice to assert their own needs, 
irrespective of whether these coincided with the Intervention’s intent. Although household members 
could not direct the content of development assistance, they had strategic and pragmatic motivations 
to stay engaged. The findings demonstrate that the Intervention could be used to leverage 
community interests with company staff. In one instance, local leaders claimed the Intervention had 
failed local people. This failure was framed as evidence that Rio Tinto did not respect or understand 
the needs of local people, despite the rhetoric of CR personnel. In addition, the data highlights that 
practitioners were constantly pushed by recipients to provide information on company activities and 
opportunities. Community members were struggling with the uncertainty and the lack of 
information surrounding Rio Tinto’s plans for land acquisition and resettlement. Practitioners made 
regular visitations and were capable of clarifying community rumours and responding to 
householders’ information needs, sometimes unconsciously. Household members also recognised 
practitioners as playing a role in alleviating familial responsibilities. As younger people had moved 
to the coastal areas in search of work, the Intervention activity became an important resource for 
determining the wellbeing of senior members, who rarely had cellular phones.  
While NGO personnel were adamant about the emancipatory aim of the Intervention, they 
were also capable of exercising particular interests through the practice. The data highlights that 
NGO management provided all household Life Plans for the LA&R social database. In doing so, 
the NGO management responded to company directives and changing land acquisition and 
resettlement plans; they were also compliant in breaching household confidentiality, given that 
practitioners had told household members that all information was confidential. This act suggests 
that the NGO managers were ultimately inclined to privilege company interests over those of local 
people, with a view to continuing the NGO work contract in future. At the practitioner level, the 
data also suggests that some individuals used their relational capital with families for career 
advancement. Practitioners recorded perceptions data on community issues of interest to staff, and 
made themselves available to transmit information to CR personnel. 
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Company personnel ultimately reinterpreted the Intervention according to shifting business 
priorities. Whereas the Intervention was initially intended as a tool for poverty alleviation, and to 
capacitate local people in preparation for resettlement, it was later assessed for its contribution to 
the company’s social licence. The findings suggest significant limitations in the practice of 
corporate-sponsored Resettlement with Development. The following section considers the 
implications of the research.  
 
Research Implications 
Households living within the La Granja project footprint have experienced more than 
20 years of prospective mining activity, yet a mine has never been developed. By international 
policy safeguards and standards, local people living in the La Granja project’s direct area of 
influence are potentially affected by a future displacement event. In this thesis, I problematised this 
assumption and argue that people targeted for future resettlement may already be affected by these 
processes, with implications for the practice of Resettlement with Development. The La Granja case 
study highlights that historical legacies and the unfolding political economy, planning uncertainty, 
and asymmetrical power relations ultimately rendered the practice unimplementable and susceptible 
to interruption and misuse. Local people were ultimately exposed to a range of risks and impacts 
even though they were not ultimately resettled by Rio Tinto as intended. The practice entrenched 
local distrust of outside actors, introduced new uncertainties into householders’ lives, and raised 
expectations that their resettlement might lead to their development. This proposition is unlikely to 
be fulfilled, even if mine development eventually proceeds. This research has implications for 
extending and contributing to DCDR academic literature, policy, and practice as elaborated below. 
 
Academic literature 
The La Granja case study has three clear implications for the DCDR academic literature. 
First, this research extends theoretical understanding of involuntary resettlement practice by 
drawing attention to the ways in which the legacy of social disruption can influence Resettlement 
with Development practice during the predisplacement phase. Prior research has attempted to 
identify factors that explain the persistence of poor resettlement outcomes. De Wet (2009) groups 
these factors under two broad categories: those that relate to “resource deficits”, and those that 
relate to “inherent complexity”. The former reflects a managerial emphasis, which identifies poor 
resettlement outcomes as the result of insufficient inputs (e.g. in policy, political will, planning, and 
implementation). The latter highlights factors that introduce complexity to the implementation 
process, which rational planning may be unable to predict or control for (e.g. accelerated 
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socioeconomic change and the integration of resettled people into more diverse and wider social 
structures). 
The “legacy of prior social disruption” is another factor that introduces complexity to the 
implementation process. Legacy was a major factor undermining the corporate-sponsored 
Resettlement with Development practice within the case. Despite Rio Tinto’s aspirational intent, 
local people’s pre-existing experience with and knowledge of mining companies had already shaped 
a mode of engagement that interfered with the NGO practitioners’ capacity to facilitated people-
centred development. Householders were highly distrustful of outsiders. Beyond the La Granja 
case, DCDR projects always occur within sociohistorical contexts that shape how resettlement 
practice will be perceived by local actors. Given that DCDR processes occur in settings where 
affected people are likely to be poor and marginalised (Bennett & McDowell, 2012), prior 
encounters with authorities and project developers are likely to influence how Resettlement with 
Development is received. I argue that academics should consider legacy to be an essential factor in 
analysing resettlement practice.  
A second academic contribution of this thesis is to support existing research about the risks 
and impacts of predisplacement for people targeted for future resettlement. The La Granja case 
demonstrates that while physical displacement had not occurred, the practices aimed at assisting 
preparation activity caused social impacts that must be recognised in DCDR practice-focused 
literature. On the one hand, the practice appears to have inflated householders’ expectations for an 
improved life in some cases. On the other hand, the NGO practitioners attempted (unsuccessfully) 
to depoliticise their practice by disassociating from the mining company land acquisition plans. 
Local people perceived the institutional relationship, further eroding their distrust of outsiders. Prior 
research highlights that people targeted for displacement are just as likely to experience the post-
resettlement impoverishment impacts during predisplacement, particularly given that plans for 
large-scale infrastructure projects are routinely suspended and prolonged (Guggenheim, 1993b; 
Hwang et al., 2007; Koirala et al., 2017; Perera, 2014b). This research suggests that academics must 
better engage with the predisplacement impacts of Resettlement with Development. In the context 
of La Granja, the practice was cancelled mid-process, with little regard for the relational capital 
formed between practitioners and local households, or the householders’ investment of time and 
resources. 
There is significant scope for further research about predisplacement in DCDR (Koirala et 
al., 2017). It is clear that the psycho-social-cultural impacts of uncertainty require attention in 
DCDR literature; academics must better grasp how prolonged or suspended processes affect people 
targeted by these processes, and establish ways to address household and community wellbeing and 
resistance. A clear barrier to academic engagement in the predisplacement phase is that the DCDR 
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models, specifically the IRR and the four-stage models, do not adequately account for the nature 
and activities of the predisplacement phase (see Perera, 2014b). Academic writing about the 
management and implementation of resettlement tends to treat the phase as a planning phase, and 
overlooks that predisplacement is an intervention in its own right.  
A third academic implication of this thesis relates to emerging debates about the increasing 
role of the private sector in DCDR. The La Granja case highlights the potential for corporate actors 
to misuse the sentiment of Resettlement with Development in practice. In Chapter Eight, I argued 
that the practice played a coercive role in Rio Tinto’s land acquisition and resettlement process. 
Company personnel promoted the anticipated benefits of resettlement, advertising that the process 
would improve families’ lives. This claim represents a distortion of involuntary resettlement 
guidance materials, which indicate resettlement is a mitigation tool for addressing loss. The claim 
also runs counter to the established evidence in DCDR literature, which indicates that resettlement 
is more likely to impoverish affected people and is by no means guaranteed to deliver development. 
Emerging research notes similar observations. Wilmsen and Webber (2016) have critiqued the 
Chinese Government’s adoption of Resettlement with Development, which is promoted as a 
poverty alleviation mechanism.  
The La Granja case highlights an inherent tension present in corporate DCDR processes 
during the predisplacement phase: companies must find ways to incentivise land sale, and at the 
same time educate local people about the potential risks and impacts of displacement. The 
asymmetries in power between corporate and local actors may undermine the fairness of negotiated 
outcomes, even in contexts where local people willingly decide to leave. Scholars argue the 
importance of providing local people with meaningful opportunities to participate in decision-
making processes (Penz et al., 2011; Wilmsen & Wang, 2015; Xue et al., 2013); however, these 
processes are unlikely to protect affected people when premised on business-case logic. The La 
Granja case raises the question of whether it is possible to balance and protect community interests 
where they do not coincide with those of business. 
 
Policy and practice 
This research has three key implications for the policy and practice of DCDR. First, the La 
Granja case demonstrates that DCDR policymakers, planners, and practitioners must conceive of 
resettlement processes in a more integrated way, which acknowledges the sociohistorical contexts 
in which involuntary resettlements occur. Current global policy standards and safeguards read as 
though DCDR processes occur within a vacuum. People targeted by displacement may not 
differentiate the activity of one previous project developer from that of another, nor the activities of 
the LA&R team from those of CR. Legacy issues shape company–community modes of 
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engagement, yet they are not always sufficiently understood or addressed in planning or practice. In 
the context of La Granja, NGO practitioners were confronted with the legacy of distrust in their 
daily practice, and attempted to ignore the unfolding political economy. The practical need is 
apparent for shared learnings and approaches to more explicitly engage legacy in resettlement 
implementation.  
A second policy and practice implication arising from this thesis is the need for explicit 
acknowledgement that people targeted by displacement are already “affected”. Existing guidance 
does not account for the likelihood that land acquisition and resettlement plans change and expose 
people to risks and impacts. Broadening the definition of what constitutes an “affected person” in 
DCDR policy will draw attention to the experiences and perspectives of people targeted for 
displacement. It may also challenge the taken-for-granted wisdom that engaging people in 
resettlement planning as early as possible is inherently beneficial. Managers and practitioners need 
better contingency plans. Policymakers and planners should consider whether people targeted by 
these processes are eligible for compensation when land acquisition and resettlement processes are 
prolonged or cancelled, and how to govern compliance in this area. I have recommended that 
introducing a contingency agreement into DCDR processes at the onset of predisplacement could 
help stakeholders to articulate reasonable entitlements and obligations. This would contribute to 
clarifying expectations between actors, and potentially reiterate the point to local people that land 
access plans do change.   
A third policy and practice implication of this research concerns the ongoing need to 
improve and strengthen involuntary resettlement standards and safeguards, and national regulatory 
frameworks to govern corporate-led practice. During the writing of this dissertation, the World 
Bank undertook a “systemic downgrading and dilution” of their social and environmental safeguard 
requirements (Cernea, 2016, p. xxi). In 2018, the World Bank will introduce a new Environmental 
and Social Framework, which will result in all social safeguard policies being downgraded to 
standards. While borrowers are required to implement policies as a matter of procedural and 
substantive compliance, standards are only recommended practice. This development will weaken 
protections for affected people, by reducing the accountability of borrowers and introducing greater 
flexibility in a developer’s approach to involuntary resettlement. The La Granja case provides one 
example where a private sector developer attempted to incorporate involuntary resettlement 
standards in practice on a voluntary basis. When the conditions for project development were no 
longer favourable, the practice was cancelled. The interests and expectations of local people were 
not addressed by the company or the government. The example highlights weaknesses in the 
voluntary application of international guidance and the need for improved governance mechanisms 
to ensure vulnerable people are protected at all phases of the DCDR process. 
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During the predisplacement phase, local people may be particularly vulnerable given their 
status as potentially affected under current normative policy on involuntary resettlement (e.g. by the 
World Bank, IFC, and other multilateral banks). The absence of active government officials, 
independent NGOs, activists, and lawyers in the La Granja case is not atypical of a project in early 
phase development. The remote setting and the dominance of Rio Tinto in the area meant that local 
people tended to depend on the company and contracted staff for information and cues about what 
might be considered a reasonable expectation. The policy assumption that predisplacement is 
merely a planning and preparation phase means that the range of potential risks and impacts are not 
necessarily acknowledged, and are therefore likely to be externalised by the company. The La 
Granja case indicates that there were no independently financed checks or balances on how the 
company ultimately misrepresented the intent of Resettlement with Development.  
Weaknesses in corporate self-governance of DCDR processes warrant further attention from 
a policy and practice viewpoint. Involuntary resettlement guidance encourages private sector 
developers to take primary responsibility for DCDR planning and implementation (on this guidance 
see IFC, 2002, 2012). In Peru, this situation is exacerbated by a government that has historically 
been selectively absent, and failed to protect the interests of campesino peasants (Szablowski, 
2006). The Peruvian example reflects a broader trend in many resource-rich developing countries, 
where governments encourage direct company–community land access negotiations and continue to 
provide legal mechanisms for landowners and users to be forcibly expropriated for large-scale 
infrastructure development (Demonte, 2012). This research suggests there is a need for policy and 
practice to better engage legacy issues and the unfolding political economy, and processes and 
mechanisms for engaging people in the predisplacement phase given planning uncertainty and 
practice vulnerability. 
 
Research Limitations 
All research has limitations by virtue of the scope, methodological restrictions, and practical 
realities that constrain data collection, and the broader relevance of findings to a field of study. Here 
I address how representative the research findings are, and consider limitations of my positionality 
in fieldwork. 
A prominent critique of the single case study concerns the issue of external validity or 
generalisability. King, Keohane, and Verba (1994, p. 212) suggest that “in all social science 
research and all prediction, it is important that we be as explicit as possible about the degree of 
uncertainty that accompanies our prediction”. A weakness of the single case study is that findings 
cannot produce statistical generalisations, and for this reason they are less useful for theory-testing. 
The approach is, however, beneficial in the context of exploratory research, which aims to 
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contribute analytical generalisations and build theory (Eisenhardt, 1989). In the context of this 
thesis, attention has been paid to the idiosyncrasies of the case and identifying more generic factors 
(behaviour and context) that help specify the conditions under which behaviour can be expected to 
occur. I have argued that mining companies are likely to apply business-case logic to their decision-
making processes on DCDR. As a point of difference, I do not claim that all businesses will, 
therefore, intentionally conduct unethical social practice, for example, by breaching household 
confidentiality. The particularities of this event remain grounded in the context of the La Granja 
case. In this way, generalisations made within this research are limited to analytical contributions, 
rather than claims to populations.  
In terms of my positionality in fieldwork, the situated approach taken within the research 
has benefits and constraints. As discussed within the opening of the thesis, researchers within the 
resource sector often make explicit decisions about whether to position themselves between or 
within actor groups. Kirsch (2014) raises an ethical and epistemological concern over extended case 
study research that engages mining corporations. He argues that “conducting research within 
corporations poses a risk of co-optation, because the tendency of ethnographers to empathise with 
the subjects of their research [and] may influence their findings or temper their critical 
perspectives” (2014, p. 12). I accept that engaging industry actors – and their contracted parties – 
can introduce ethical challenges. During research, ethical issues did surface in the data collection 
and analysis process as described in Chapter Four. I do not agree, however, that engagement 
automatically leads to co-optation. I sought to protect against the risk of co-optation by remaining 
critical of all actor perspectives. I have sought transparency in the presentation of my analysis, 
which will also highlight introduced bias.  
On this point, a further limitation of my positionality is that the approach introduces 
particular bias considering prolonged exposure to the NGO viewpoint. I sought to counter the 
dominance of NGO practitioners’ views by balancing my time with other actors during data 
collection and analysis. Days were spent at the La Granja project camp, where I frequently shared 
meals with project personnel at their camp cafeteria. On several occasions, I socialised with the 
staff through volleyball and soccer games. Considerable effort was also expended on spending time 
in the La Granja village and surrounding communities. In this respect, I attended the women’s 
volleyball training session in the centre of the village on most afternoons. I also attended mass on 
Sundays and frequently accepted invitations to visit community members in their homes. Despite 
my due diligence, I recognise that some bias may have occurred nonetheless. I believe this is 
justifiable: as a result of my positionality, I was able to gain access to key relationships and 
additional entry points for validating data and analysis that would otherwise not be obtainable.  
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A final limitation of my positionality relates to how I approached gatekeeper access. Kemp 
and Owen (2013) suggest that while access to the internal domain of multinational mining 
companies is improving, gaining access remains a significant challenge to researchers (Kemp & 
Owen, 2013). As explained in Chapter Four, the process involved obtaining access to the 
organisation via the hierarchy from senior to more junior staff, and later, to the NGO. I gained 
access to families primarily through practitioner introduction. The ethical issue potentially created 
in this process relates to the imbalance in power relations between actors. Junior staff may have felt 
obliged to contribute to my research; householders may have felt that practitioners required them to 
participate in interviews. Going into fieldwork, I focused on ensuring that all potential research 
participants understood the voluntary and confidential nature of interviews and my role as an 
independent researcher who did not receive company funding. In fieldwork, however, I learnt that 
the more prominent challenge was managing the perceptions of actors who believed that I could 
provide them with access to resources, including company plans. 
As a foreign researcher embedded within the political economy of La Granja, my presence 
attracted suspicion and interest from many actor groups, particularly in the communities of La 
Granja. I became aware that some local people suspected I was a secret company spy. Local leaders 
were reluctant to provide permission to record interviews. In one case, a local leader recorded the 
interview on his personal phone, which was interpreted as a means of safeguarding himself and the 
community. Like NGO practitioners, I also encountered challenges as a result of local distrust of 
outsiders. I was aware that some local people perceived the research to be an evaluation of the 
NGO. As a result, I believe some household members were inclined to exaggerate their discontent 
with the Intervention activity, as they thought that my analysis would lead to the company investing 
in something more useful (such as jobs). Corporate and NGO personnel also made bids for 
assistance. More junior staff inquired about business plans. Those whose employment was tied to 
the Intervention were keen to see my research demonstrate the value of the work to corporate 
management. I sought to counter misperceptions associated with my presence and the impact of my 
research throughout the data collection process. In recognising the various interests at play, I sought 
to maintain the integrity of the findings. 
 
Future Research 
Reflecting on this thesis, several themes are identified for future research. First, there 
remains a need for ongoing examination of the processes and practices that can most successfully 
incorporate the values, knowledge, and lived experience of local people in involuntary resettlement 
practice. Future research should explore the potential for including multiple actor voices in land 
acquisition and resettlement processes. There is significant scope for greater theoretical 
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consideration of how historical legacies and company–community engagement are treated within 
the DCDR literature. In particular, while local people’s concerns for poverty alleviation were 
reflected in the company’s approach to land acquisition and resettlement, their interests and 
expectations around accessing employment with the Project, services, and goods were not 
addressed. 
The discrepancy between householders’ interests and expectations of company engagement, 
and Rio Tinto’s approach to sustainable resettlement practice, highlights a dynamic that is likely to 
be present in other contexts of DCDR practice. Research is needed on how project developers, 
governments, and/or civil society groups might prepare local people for the prospect of resettlement 
and the decision to leave or resist land access. Questions remain about the timing of company–
community engagement and information sharing. Mining company plans are often uncertain; the 
question is how to address local people’s right to information, given the impact that information 
sharing will have on a local population. Who decides what is best, and under what circumstances, 
needs greater consideration. These questions constitute critical areas for future policy and practice 
development. They also draw attention to the need for an improved theoretical characterisation of 
the predisplacement phase, and practice implications.  
This thesis has provided a valuable insight into the nature of practice and the kinds of 
tensions and dynamics present during early phase development at La Granja. A key area for 
practical gains through future research include comparative studies with cases of similar attributes 
that draw attention to the social risks and impacts of predisplacement. There is also a pressing need 
for DCDR scholars to address the absence of clear obligations, particularly around compensation, 
where project developers and local counterparts are engaged in extended DCDR preparations that 
cause negative social impacts.  
On a related note, future research should consider how to strengthen both the incentives and 
assurances for local people who accept company-managed resettlement, and for companies that 
claim to provide development in the post-resettlement phase. Measures that aim to address 
asymmetries in power must address underlying social and political dimensions, and ensure that 
practice is both ethical and accountable to its intended “beneficiaries”. A question with continued 
importance and relevance in resettlement is how to explicitly recognise actor motivations and the 
limitations of corporate-led and self-regulated DCDR processes. This research has contributed to 
this debate; however, the DCDR literature could benefit from greater linkages with literature on 
corporate self-regulation, business, and society (for example Jamali, Karam, & Blowfield, 2015), 
which provides critique and practical pathways forward on corporate-led development.  
Finally, there is an opportunity to take an explicit action research approach, in contrast to the 
actor-oriented approach taken in this thesis, to further a participatory design of this (and other) 
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studies. This would include completing the action research cycle of implementing and evaluating 
change strategies, potentially improving the configuration of Resettlement with Development 
practice for affected households. The benefit of this approach would be to facilitate a rapid, real-
time uptake of findings. 
 
Prologue 
Fieldwork for this thesis was completed in February 2015. Shortly afterwards, the Rio Tinto 
La Granja project team presented new mine development options to the Rio Tinto London 
Investment Committee. The proposal was once more rejected. The La Granja management returned 
the Project from an advanced (order of magnitude) stage to an early (target generation and testing) 
stage of the exploration phase. By January 2016, Rio Tinto Exploration (RTX) assumed all 
administrative and operational activities. Since that time, RTX has been working to explore the 
known deposit and its surroundings, with the aim of finding high-grade resources, which would 
strengthen the business case for the future mine development. Since 2014, management has reduced 
the La Granja workforce: of approximately 450 staff, only 35 remain. 
As of April 2017, senior staff in RTX have confirmed that all household information 
captured for the Intervention remains secured in the company’s social database. According to a key 
informant, no plans have been made to use household data, nor was the transfer of information into 
the database communicated to households in La Granja. Management’s decision to use the 
information will depend on whether future land access involves the same households or not. The 
company’s land acquisition and resettlement process remains suspended, with the long-term future 
of the La Granja project uncertain.  
Rio Tinto has not re-engaged the NGO following the cancellation of the Intervention. All 
remaining practitioners lost their jobs in early 2015, following completion of the company contract. 
Soon afterwards, practitioners were invited by the NGO management to provide feedback about 
their experience with the Intervention. The learnings captured in these workshops were used to 
refine and improve the Intervention methodology and tools. The NGO management has since 
sought to engage other mining companies in a similar contract. As of July 2017, they have been 
unsuccessful in securing any contracts. The majority of NGO practitioners involved in this study 
work in the field of community development as teachers and practitioners with multilateral aid 
organisations.  
People living in the direct area of influence have been affected by the reduction in project 
activity. As Rio Tinto is the largest economic driver in La Granja, many people have left the area in 
search of jobs. Remaining residents focus their attention on livestock and agricultural production. 
The primary school and health clinic continue to service the reduced population. In the experience 
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of local people, mining companies come and go. Families continue to adjust, learn, and build 
resilience to change. A key informant confided in me that younger people maintain hope the mine 
operation will go ahead in coming months and years. More senior members have been put at ease 
for now, with no signs that land acquisition and resettlement will occur in the immediate future.  
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APPENDIX B: SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
 [a] Company [b] NGO [c] Local Informant 
NAME/S  
AGE 15-19      20-29      
30-39      40-49      
50-59      60-69      
70+ 
SEX F         M 
Background  
 
[a & b] Formal position and department – role and responsibilities  
[c] Family description – who and how many household members living here 
[a & b] Professional background  
[a & b] Length of time with current company 
[c] Length of time participating in the INDES program 
Areas of Inquiry Broad Questions 
Background  
 
[ab] Can you tell me a little about yourself? What is your educational background?  
[ab] Can you tell me about your current role and how long have you been with the company/INDES?  
[ab] Have you worked in land access and resettlement in the past?  
[c] Can you tell me a little about yourself and who lives here? How long have you been living in La 
Granja?  
Historical context 
 
Before talking about the current situation, it would be great to hear a little bit about the past. 
[abc] Can you tell me about the history of La Granja? 
[abc] What do you know about previous mining company activity in the area? 
[ab] Do you think the legacy of previous mining activity in the area affects the way that Rio Tinto works 
here with the communities? How? 
[c] How is the current company working here similar or different to the previous ones?  
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Change, uncertainty,  
 
My next question is about what has been going on here recently. [In particular I am interested in changes 
to the land access and resettlement planning] 
[abc] Can you tell me a bit about what has been going over the last few months?  
[abc] Can you tell me a bit about why this has happened? What were you told?  
[ab] How have recent changes impacted your team/what you do here? How? 
[b] how have the changes impacted you personally? 
Experience and knowledge 
of the Acompañamiento 
Program 
I would like to ask you about the Acompañamiento program.  
[abc] What is the aim of the Acompañamiento program?  
[abc] What is your personal opinion about what the program does here? 
[abc] Can you tell me a bit about your experience of the program and how it works? 
[c] Why did you decide to do the program?  
[b] what would you say is the most rewarding aspect about this work? 
[b] what would you say is the most challenging aspect in working with families here? 
Prompts Can you tell me more about this based upon your personal experience here? 
What is your personal perspective, given your experience? 
You mentioned --- can you tell me more about that? 
I am really interested in hearing more about that 
 
 
 
